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The Kansas Industrial Court Act has the distinction of being 
the only one of its kirrl ever passed. The things it attempted to do 
had never been done before in just the same way, nor have they ever 
since been imitated. But, to many people, there had been previous 
experiments closely resembling the Kansas act of 1920. They pointed 
to various acts passed in the latter part of the 19th. century, and 
the early part of the 20:Ji}.,in such places as New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, and even in parts of the United States as being forerunners 
of the Kansas Industrial Court Law. These laws were passed to pro-
vide for the compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes. The Kan-
sas Court of Industrial Relations, also, has many times been referred 
to as an attempt at the compulso y arbitration of industrial disputes. 
The men who drew up the Kansas act of 1920, however, always claimed 
that compulsory arbitration was not the underlying principle of the 
experiment. Instead, they called their plan compulsory adjudication 
of disputes occurring between labor and capital. 
It is not a court of arbitration or conciliation; it is 
a court of justice, arrl in the personnel of that court 
there is no man who represents labor from a professional 
standpoint, or employing capital from a professional stand-
point -- they all three represent government, with its 
pledge of impartial justice.l 
1. Henry J. Allen, "Increased Production as a Remedy for Inflation: 
The Kansas Industrial Relations Court Plan," Proceedings of the Academy of 
Political Science, IX (June, 1920), p. 71. 
2 
As far as this study is concerned it makes no difference which of the 
tenns is applied to the Kansas act. Both it and the other acts men-
tioned above had one thing in conunon, they were at tempts to prevent 
industrial warfare by governmental interference. So, before going into 
the history of the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, we shall 
briefly describe how these other governments attempted to solve the 
problem of preventing industrial disturbances. A comprehensive history 
of the acts will not be given, merely the main characteristics of each 
act. Keeping in mind, the~,the main points of these laws the reader 
will be able later on to see how the problem was approached differently 
by the Kansas act, yet will see that there were many points of similarity. 
Previous Attempts at Compulsory Arbitration 
A look at these early attempts at compulsory arbitration will 
show that Kansas was not the fir st governmental unit to step in and use 
its power to prevent labor and capital from carrying on industrial war-
fare. All of these laws are similar in principle and aim, that of find-
ing some way to do awa:y with industrial warfare. Their main differences 
are in scope and method. One thing will be noticed throughout, and that 
is that every one of these attempts at compelling both labor and 
capital to come together in an attempt to iron out their difficulties 
grew out of a serious strike, one that threatened the nation with wide-
spread suffering and possible economic ruin. These crises seemed to 
point out to these peoples that unless government stepped in and re-
quired at least an attempt at peaceful settlement of these disputes 
the country ~uld totter on the. brink of eventual civil war. Then, we 
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find that during times of relatively peaceful industrial relations, 
there is little or no agitation from the erection of such a system 
which in some ways compels the industrial antagonists to peacefully 
settle their controv~rsies. 
One of the early outstanding examples of compulsory arbitration 
was the Industrial Conciliati·on and Arbitration Act of New Zealand 
passed in 1894. In 1890 New Zealand had had a terrible maritime strike 
which devastated the whole of Australasia. It soon spread from the 
shipping world, where it began, into a great circle of related indus-
tries. "Merchants and their clerks drove drays and loaded and unload-
ed merchandise; shipowners and their sons and friends took the place 
of sailors and stokers; the country want to the edge of civil war. 112 
The maritime strike was eventually over, but other labor disputes were 
looming over the horizon. It was at this time that Mr. w. P. Reeves, 
the Minister of Labor for the Colony, set himself ·to find a remedy to 
prevent the recurrence of such terrible struggles as the maritime 
strike had bem. Eventually Mr. Reeves hit upon the idea of compulsory 
arbitration. He was treading on new ground here as there had been no 
previous attempt at this in New Zealand. However, he had come upon 
this solution and decided to try it, because in looking over the 
experiences of the other countries of the world whose experience 
had been confined to voluntary arbitration and conciliation, he saw 
2. Henry D. Lloyd, A Country Without Strikes (New York, Double-
day, Page, and Company, 1900), P• 5. 
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only a record of failure. Success had been achieved mostly when ther~ 
was very little at stake, never when a great strike had either been 
threatened or called. 
The following are the main points of the Industrial Conciliation 
ani Arbitration Act as finally amended in 1898. 3 
(1) It was recognized that it ~uld be difficult to apply 
the principle of compulsory arbitration to individual 
and irresponsible workingmen, so the law first of all 
provided f or the organization of industrial workers into 
associations or unions, and then provided that the 
principle of compulsory arbitration could be invoked by 
such organization. Workingmen who f¥led to organize 
themselves in such unions could in no way invoke the 
benefits of the law. It also made it easy for employees 
to organize into recognized unions, any five persons or 
more, by confonning to a few provisions could organize 
and be recognized as a union. 
(2) In the second place, the New Zealand law did not prevent 
private conciliation or arbitration. Industrial agreements 
could be made between industrial unions and employers. 
and they would be enforced the same wa:y as if they were awards 
of the court of arbitration. 
(3) Now as regards the conciliation and arbitration f eatures 
of the law. The law provides for two bodies, conciliation 
boards arrl a court of arbitration. The arbitration court 
was to be used only as a last resort, every facility 
being offered the disputants to settle their controversy 
peacefully before arbitration was compelled. 
(a) New Zealand was divided up into as many "industrial 
districts" as the Governor thought proper, and for 
each of these districts there was to be established 
a board of conciliation. It was to have jurisdiction 
to settle industrial disputes in that district. 
Members of these boards (either 4 or 6) were elected 
by the employees and the employers, each electing 
an equal number. 
(b) Industrial disputes could be brought to this board 
either by toe workers (unions) or the employers. 
3. w. F. Willoughby, "Foreign Labor Laws," Bulletin of the 
Department of Labor, No. 33 (March, 1901), Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1901, pp. 207-234• 
However, ·after the board once had jurisdiction, 
the employers could not use the lockout, and the 
workers couldn't strike. Things were to go on as 
usual until the board had made its decision. If 
the decision wasn't satisfactory to either of the 
parties, it had to be taken to the court of 
arbitration. 
(c) The court of arbitration consisted of a single body 
for the whole C~olony. The three-man court was app-
ointed by the Governor; one member on recommendation 
of the unions, one of employer's associations, and 
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the third member, who acted as president of the court, 
had to be a judge of the Supreme Court. The court act-
ed in most respected as an ordinary court of law, ex-
cept that the ppocedure was simplified, and the de-
cision was not ta be written up in technical language. 
(41) The awar<Eof the court of arbitration were to be enforced 
through the regular law courts, but could not be enforced 
for longer than a two-year period. 
(5) There was no provision for imprisonment for violating the 
All penalties were money payments. 
This was the essence of the law then. Strikes were outlawed, in 
fact were crimes against society. Workers who didn't organize into unions 
did not come within jurisdiction of the act, however, and employers who 
prevented their workers from organizing could disobey the act. Mr. 
Reeves had it in mind that these boards ~uld do most of the work in 
handling disputes, and that the arbitration court was to be used only 
as a last resort. However, out of 109 cases dealt with by the boards 
up to June 30, 1900, 73 went on to the arbitration courts. 4 This 
would seem to show that the conciliation boards merely prolonged the 
settlement of disputes and served no useful purpose in the compulsory 
system. 
4. Bulletin o..!_ the Department of Labor, No. 40 (May, 1902), Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1902, PP• 552-553° 
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Mr. Henry Lloyd very succinctly stated the underlying philosophy 
of this act when he made the following statement. 
We cannot understand • • • why compulsion cannot be used 
to prevent economic crime, as well as any other crime, or to 
repel economic invasion of one class by another, which is 
just the same thing, for all intents and purposes, as the 
invasion of one country by another.5 
If any one part of any society, then, takes it upon itself to invade 
the rights of the others, the State can step in to protect itself, be-
cause the State is composed of all the component parts of society. 
This should be kept in mind because it will be seen later that those 
who created the Kansas Industrial Court used exactly the same argument 
as part of their supporting statements for the act. 
At about the same time that New Zealand was starting her ex-
periment in compulsory arbitration, beginnings were being made in 
Australia too. In 1894 the Colony of South Australia passed an act 
entitled., 11 An Act to Facilitate t e Settlement of Industrial Disputes, 11 
and it followed in many respects the system as created in New Zealand. 
However, it was more of a conciliation plan than it was compulsory 
arbitration. Neither party could_ compel the other to take the dispute 
to a conciliation board, there was no general system of compulsion, 
and six years after the law was enacted not a single case had been 
tried under it. 6 
Most of the other colonies in Australia passed, in the late 19th. 
and early 20th. century, acts intended to suppress strikes and to cause 
5. Lloyd, 2.E• cit., p. 125. 
6. Bulletin of the Department of Labor, No . 33 (March, 1901), 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901, PP• 252-253• 
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labor disputes to be adjusted, if possible, by agreement under public 
sanction, and in the last resort by the awards of special legal tri-
bunals. The fundamental provision of most of these statutes was that 
a strike or lock-out was illegal v.hen other means were provided for 
settling disputes. 
The Commonwealth itself enacted an act in 1904 entitled, "Comm-
onwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act. 11 It made provision for a 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court. One of the most important provisions 
of the act was that which forbade strikes or lockouts umer penalty 
of 1000 pounds. Thus, the right to strike was denied the Australian 
worker, but he was encouraged, as in New Zealand, to organize into 
unions so that he could bring his disputes as a unit of workers and 
try am get them settled peacefully. 7 
Next should be mentioned the attempt made in Canada at some 
sort of compulsory arbitration stem. An act was passed in 1907 
called, "The Industrial Disputes Investigation A.ct." It, as will be 
clearly seen, was not pure compulsory arbitration as the system set 
up in New Zealand was. The act applied to coal mines and metal mines, 
public utilities, including municipal service corporations, transpor-
tation of all kinds, including occupations subsidiary thereto, and to 
all agencies of communication. Whenever a dispute arose between an 
employer and any of his employees, and the parties thereto were unable 
to adjust it, either of the parties to the dispute could make appli-
7. Mary Chamberlain, "Settling Labor Disputes in Australia, " The 
Survey, XXXII (August 1, 1914), P• 455. 
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cation to the Minister of Labor for the appointment of a Board of 
Conciliation and Investigation, to which Board the dispute was to be 
referred. ·Like the Arbitration court in New ZE;Sland, every board was 
to consist of three members, one appointed on recommendation of the 
employees, one on recommendation of the employer, and the third chosen 
by the above two •. 8 The main purpose of this act was to prevent and' not 
prohibit strikes apparently, and did not aim directly at compulsory 
arbitration like the New Zealand act. 
The act made it unlawful for employers in these industries and 
occupations to lock out their -workmen or for employees to strike until 
this board had investigated the dispute and had made a report of its 
findings. After the report of the board had been issued the parties 
could refuse to accept its findings and start a strike or a lockout, 
whichever the case might be. 9 Therefore, if this attempt at conciliation 
was a failure, either side could then resort to industrial warf are. The 
law merely forbade strikes and lockouts while the dispute was being 
investigated by this board appointed by the Minister of Labor. It can 
be seen that the actual compulsion didn't extend as far as it did in 
the New Zealand act. 
The last example to be mentioned before getting into the actual 
history of the Kansas law will be the experiment made in the state 
of Colorado in 1915. It was patterned somewhat after the Canadian Trades 
Disputes Act. 
8. Charles W. Eliot, "The Canadian Act," McClure's Magazine, XXX 
(November, 1907), p. 149. 
9. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Review, III, 
No •. 4, (October, 1916), Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916, 
PP• 16-19. 
9 
The Colorado law created an industrial commission, and confer-
red upon it· certain powers as to the adjustment of industrial disputes. 
The act made it unlawful for employers to declare or cause a lockout, 
or for employees to go on a strike prior to or during an investigation 
or arbitration of a dispute by this industrial commission. The law re-
quired 30 days' notice before a strike or lockout was actually engaged 
in. Conciliation efforts were to be carried on during this period to 
try and reach a peaceful solution. If this failed, informal conferences 
could be held to afford a means at arriving at an understanding. If all 
this failed, then a strike or lockout could be called.lo 
These, then, were some of the previous attempts at some form of 
compulsory arbitration of labor disputes. To what extent was the Kansas 
law copied from these? Did they serve as a model for the industrial 
court established in Kansas in 1920? Governor Henry J. Allen, who was 
largely responsible for the t..nactment of the Kansas law, very definite-
ly stated that they did not serve as models for his court. In the first 
place he criticized these laws because of the makeup of the boards of 
conciliation and arbitration. He didn't believe at all in having either 
a representative of labor or a representative of capital of them. 
When you, representing employing capital, select your 
member of the board of arbitration, and I, representing 
labor, select my representative and the two choose the 
umpire, that umpire may do one of three things. He may join 
your side an:i secure a partisan decision; he may join my 
side and secure a partisan decision; or he may dicker back 
and forth and secure a compromise. But into the consideration 
10. United States Department of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor 
Review, X (March, 1920), Washington: Government Printing Office, PP• 216-
217. 
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of that board of arbitration, there never comes an,y con-
cern for the other party in the triangle, the party which 
in eve1I essential industry is chiefly concerned, the 
public. 1 
Thus Governor Allen developed his theory that the greatest sufferer 
in industrial warfare was the public, and that the only way that the 
public could do something about it was to form a court whereby in-
dustrial disputes were tried and settled in a court like an,y ordinary 
civil suit or crime. But, it was not to be an arbitration board made 
up of representatives of labor and capital, as the result was too often 
compromise, not justice for all. 
Here, then, is where the proponents of the Kansas law made a 
differentiation between compulsory arbitration and adjudication. Gover-
nor Allen had no faith in arbitration boards at all. Only with impartial 
judges adjudicating industrial disputes could any form of justice be had 
at all. 
The chief fault of industrial arbitration, fundamentally, 
is not that of commission, but of omission. It is only a 
rudimentary and defective form of adjudication not suited 
to the handling of sweeping industrial issues. It omits what 
is most necessary in adjudication -- namely, inherent and 
fairly constructed authority, and the application of police-
power principles.12 
Governor Allen admitted that arbitration had worked well in boundary dis-
putes and other similar private cases. But he said that in these cases 
the paramount interest of the public scarcely ever entered as a factor. 
11. Allen, .2.E• cit., P• 74. 
12. Henry J. Allen, The Party of the Third Part, (New York: Harper 
arrl Brothers, 1921), P• 234. 
11 
Neither was there any class interest involved. In those cases the arbiters 
were fairly open-minded because there was no historic or deep-seated pre-
judice to be overcome. Then there was another and more important factor 
which most champions of arbitration overlooked. That was that if civil 
arbitration failed, the contending parties knew they must resort to a 
court of law; hence they were constrained always to accept what their 
·, 
consciences told them to be reasonably fair by the knowledge that there 
always lurked in the background the resort to the process of law, which 
might not be overridden.13 In other words, it was the law standing in 
the background that made civil arbitration successful. But if industrial 
arbitration failed there was no resort to law but to strikes, lockouts, 
and boycotts in the majority of cases. 
In his book Governor Allen also noticed that throughout the 
history of industrial arbitration there had occurred the phenomenon 
of swinging from compulso to voluntary and back again. Neither had 
proven satisfactory •. He felt that the ideal spirit of arbitration was 
inherently that of voluntary agreement, and that it could not be bent 
to the fonn of compulsion. To him an arbitration board did not present 
an atmosphere of calm, detached impartiality, but one of prejudiced 
and clashill?; viewpoints, of pulling and hauling and jockeying for 
position.14 
Out of these ideas am theories of Governor Allen, am of 
13. Ibid., P• 223. 
14. Ibid., P• 227. 
12 
others who played an important part in drawing up the Kansas law of 
1920, a statute was enacted with the idea in mind of correcting these 
failings and evils inherent in conciliation ani arbitration •. fhe re-
sult, as was mentioned in the beginning, was a law distinctly diff-
erent from any passed before or since its time. The things it was 
aiming for were largely the same, industrial warfare must be done 
away with, ani the people as a \'bole must be protected by outlawing 
this warfare. But the Kansas law went one step farther. It took into 
account that if the laborer was to be denied the right to strike to 
get redress of his grievances, and the employer the lockout, some-
thing else had to be provided to give both an equal chance to secure 
their rights and insure justice. This was the Kansas Court of Industrial 
Relations. 
As the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations was also conceived 
out of an emergency period, a bri ef review will be given of this 




CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COURT 
The General Coal Strike of 1919 
It was mentioned earlier that all of these attempts· at com-
pulsory arbitration of labor disputes arose out of great national 
emergencies. Mainly, these emergencies were in the form of serious 
strikes affe?ting the country as a whole. The Kansas Court of Indus-
trial Relations grew out of the same sort of circwnstances. In this 
instance it was the nation-wide strike of the bituminous coal miners 
which precipitcmtd the experiment in Kansas. In order to give the prop-
er background for tre formation of the Court, a brief picture will be 
given of the national strike and its spread to the coal fields in 
Kansas. 
The coal strike of 1919 was merely another manifestation of the 
industrial unrest prev~lent in the United States during the years fol-
lowing the end of World War I. During tre war years the workers in 
many industries had refrained from striking, and in some cases had 
accepted wage scales proposed by governmental agencies, in order to 
further the war effort. With the end of the war, workers in many in-
dustries began to demand a change, demanded higher wages and new 
contracts with their enployers. 
The orders to strike in 1919 were issued directly as the result 
of the adoption of the recommendations of trn scale committee by the 
miners' delegates at the Twenty-seventh Consecutive and Fourth Annual 
14 
Convention of the United Mine Workers of America, held in Cleveland in 
1 
September, 1919. The Central Competitive Field, made up of Illinois, 
Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, had entered into a contract with the 
operators at the beginning of the war, and which was to last for the 
duration of the war. It was not, however, to extend later than March 
31, 1920. The convention took the position that the war in effect was 
over, even though the United States had not signed a peace treaty offi-
cially ending it, and that it was only fair for a new contract to be 
negotiated. Because they hadn't had a wage increase .for more than two 
years, and in view of the fact t hat the cost of living had gone up great-
ly during that period, they thought it only right that a rise in the wage 
scale be granted immediately. 
The order calling all union (U. M.W.) bituminous coal miners of 
the country to "close production of coal at midnight on Friday, October 
31, 1919 11 was issued from the international headquarters of the union 
on October 15, 1919. The order was signed by John ,L. Lewis, acting 
President , and William Green, secretary-treasurer of t he miners. 2 Lewis 
blamed the operators, saying that the union had made a sincere effort 
to negotiate a new wage agreement, but t hat the operators had persisted 
in an arbitrary attitude which resulted in a final adjournment of the 
joint wage conference held in Philadelphia, October 11, 1919., As the 
strike order was to include all bi. tuminous coal miners in the United 
1. C. E. Stoddard, "Bituminous Coal Strike11 , u. s. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, IX (December, 1919), P• 61. 
2. Topeka Daily Capital, October 16, 1919. 
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States, it was thought to affect around 500,000 miners. 
The miners were making a very drastic demand as far ~s a wage 
increase was concerned. They wanted a 60% increase immediately.3 In 
addition to this they wanted a six-hour day, a five-day week, and a 
few other minor demands. The demand for a five-day week was misunder-
stood by many at the start of the strike. They wondered why the miners 
should only have to work 30 hours per week .. The fact of the matter was 
that the miners were asld.ng for more work rather than for less. Accord-
ing to Mr. George o. Smith, director of the United States Geological 
Survey, "in the twelve weeks of February, March, and April the average 
working time of bituminous coal miners were only a fraction over 24 
hours, 114 or six hours less than the miners wanted to work. Because of 
the seasonal character of coal-mining the mines closed for many days 
during the year. The miners, therefore, were askirg for a guaranteed 
time of work. It was almost impossible for them to seek employment dur-
ing slack periods because they couldn't know when t he mines would re-
open. There were even charges that operators kept mines closed for long 
periods in order to keep coal prices up. 
After the strike call had been issued the government at Washing-
ton stepped in and took measures to prevent it from taking place. Pres-
ident Wilson called on the miners and operators to continue negotiations, 
3. "The Coal Miners' Strike, 11 Current History, XI (December, 1919), 
P• 420. 
4. "Down to Facts in the Coal Fight," Literary Digest, LXIII 
(December 13, 1919), P• 16. 
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and if they failed to agree, to submit the controversy to a board of -
arbitration. The operators accepted the proposal but the miners turned 
it down. President Wilson then branded the strike as unjustifiable and 
unlawful and said that the laws v.0uld be enforced. He called attention 
to the probable effects on the country of a nation-wide coal strike, but 
the miners went ahead with their plans. 
Attorney-General Palmer then intervened and said tbat the strike 
was a distinct challenge to the , law, that the mines would be protected 
by the government, and that the Justice Department was preparing to 
take vigorous steps against all who conspired to restrict the supply 
or distribution of the nation's fuel supply. "All the resources of the 
Government 'WO uld be used, 11 said Attorney-General Palmer, 11 to prevent 
the national. disaster involved in the threatened strike." 5 
The Senate and House voted to assure President Wilson the support 
of Congress in maintaining o der during the threatened industrial emer-
gency. The t\\U houses resolved: 
That we hereby give the national administration and all 
others in authority the assurance of our constant, continuous, 
and unqualified support in tre use of such constitutional and 
lawful means as may be necessary to meet the present industrial 
emergency, and in vindicating the majesty and power of the 
Government in enforcing obedience to and respect for t he Con-
stitution and the laws, and in fully protecting every citizen 
in the maintenance and exercise of hii lawful rights and the 
observance of his lawful obligations. 
On October 31, Judge Albert Anderson of the Federal District Court at 
5. "The Coal Miners' Striken, 2£• cit., P• 422. 
6. Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 1 sess., P• 7761. 
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Indianapolis showed what he understood by such "constitutional and l;aw-
ful" means. 7 He issued a temporary injunction restraining John 1. Lewis 
and other officials of the U. M.w. from taking any further steps in dir-
ecting the coal strike called for the following day. Naturally t he issuance 
of this injunction was bitterly resented by the miners. 
At midnight on the last day of October a large proportion of the 
bituminous coal miners quit work, despite the fact that their leaders had 
been silenced and prohibited from further activity in promoting the strike. 
Meanwhile, the government took steps to insure the workers• protection, 
and troops began to move into the various coal fields. 
Measures were immediately taken by the government to prevent 
profiteering in coal and the Railway Administration took steps and per-
fected plans for the transportation of the coal supplies already on hand. 
In the meantime, the miners had decided to fight the temporary 
injunction order. They said he government had no right to interfere in 
the dispute. 8 On Novanber 8, however, Judge Anderson ruled that t he bi-
tuminous coal strike was a defiance of the Fuel Control Act (the Lever 
Act), was almost equivalent to rebellion, and refused to listen to the 
miners I representatives who sought to demonstrate the miners I right to 
strike. He then issued an order to the United Mine Workers union to 
recall the strike order before November 11, 1919. 9 Judge Anderson, in 
handing down this order, said, "I consider this rebellion. That is what 
7. Topeka Daily Capital, November 1, 1919. 
8. 11 The Coal Miners' Strike," 2.£· ill·, P• 425. 
9. Kansas City Star, November 8, 1919. 
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it is• 11 He went on to s ay that, "The government is supreme even to -the 
labor unions. 1110 He was m~rely echoing the prevailing opinion among 
many people in all walks of life during t his trying period of our 
history that there was a real danger from radical labor unionism, and 
that they should be curbed by all th e powers at the control of the 
Government • 
After Judge Anderson's order to call the strike off by November 
11 was received, a meeting of the district presidents and other offi-
cials of t h e U. M. w. was called for Indianapolis. They met there, and 
after an all-night session and much debate for arrl against compliance 
wi. th the order, the union issued an order calling off the strike. "Gentle-
men, we will comply with the mandate. We do it under protest. We are 
Americans. We cannot fight our Government. That is all. 1111 This terse 
statement signified the capitulation of the union to the "majesty and 
power of the Government. 11 
The way was open now for negotiation between the miners and the 
operators to look for some way of settling the dispute. Another question 
' that arose at this time was _ whether or not the miners would obey the 
order rescinding the strike and go back to work. In many areas, es-
pecially in the Kansas coal fields, very few, if any, miners reported 
for work when the whistles blew at the mines the next day . In some 
fields the miners said the order they received abrogating the strike 
1.0. Loe. cit. 
U, Kansas City Star, November 11, 1919. 
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was sign~d by typewritten signatures and they wouldn't obey such an 
order. They thought it might be a ruse of Lewis' to get around the in-
junction order issued by Judge Anderson. 
On November 14, 1919, the joint conference of the miners and the 
operators began in Washington to try and find some basis for permanent 
settlement. For several days th.ere was little or no progress made and 
Dr. Garfield, Fuel Adninistrator, appeared before the meeting and told 
both the miners and the operators that coal would have to be mined on a 
large scale, and produced at a reasonable price. This seemed to be threat 
of added government al intervention and spurred the two parties to buckle 
down and really try to reach an agreement. Neither side wanted the govern-
ment to intervene more than it already had. The operators feared govern-
ment operation of the mines and the miners were fearing added coercion 
in the form of injunctions. 
Secretary of Labor Wilson interceded at this stage and proposed 
a straight 31% increase in wages. The miners said they would accept this 
12 on the basis of a 7-hour da.y-.. The operators refused to accept this how-
e~r and Dr. Garfield tried another proposal. He proposed a wage increase 
of 14% with the understanding that the price of coal to the public would 
not be increased ani that the Government ~uld continue provisionally in 
control of prices. He also urged the formation of an advisory body, to 
be permanent, with equal representation of miners and operators to get 
information regarding the industry which ~uld govern future disputes. 13 
12. "Settlement of the Coal Strike," Current History, Il (January, 
1920), P• 25. 
13. Ibid., P• 26. 
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The operators accepted this proposal, but Lewis turned it down. He 
announced ths. t he was standing squarely behind Secretary Wilson I s 
offer of a 31% wage increase. He took the stand that the Government 
was pledged to this increase on the basis of SecretaryWilson 1 s position, 
saying t hat if they didn't stick with it they 'WOuld be breaking their 
word. With this the negotiations reached an impasse. 
It was at this juncture that President Wilson intervened in a 
personal attempt to settle the controversy. He suhnitted a proposal of 
his mm to both parties and it was immediately rumored that it would be 
acceptable by them both. 14 The actual proposal, however, was kept secret 
from the public for seYeral days. 
Then, on December 10, 1919, the strike of nearly 500,000 hard 
coal miners came to an end when the general committee of the United 
Mine Workers of America agreed to accept the plan offered by President 
Wilson. The plan, as agreed to , provided for immediate return to work 
at a 14% increase in wages over the wartime scale. Operations in the 
mines were to be resumed, except as to wages, on the same basis which 
obtained prior to the strike. Immediately following the return of t he 
miners to work the President was to appoint a commission of three men, 
including one practical miner and one ope1:ator or mine owner i n active 
business. This commission was to consider further questions of wages 
and working conditions. It was also to consider profits of operators and 
the proper coal prices. The duties of the commission were to include the 
14. Kansas City Star, December 8, 1919. 
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readjustment of both wages an::l. coal prices. Its report was to be made 
within 60 days and would be accepted as the basis of a new wage agree-
ment .15 
At last the coal strike was brought to an end, and one of the 
greatest industrial battles in the history of union labor in the United 
States up to that time reached its climax in a Presidential intervention. 
This strike, as do all general strikes in an important industry, had 
reached far beyond the confines of the coal mining industry. It had 
paralyzed business, manufacturing, and transportation, and caused acute 
suffering in many localities. Here, then, lies the beginning of the 
Kansas Court of Industrial Relations. To get closer to the actual incep-
tion, however, it will be necessary briefly to review the strike as it 
occurred in Kansas. 
The Coal Strike in Kansas 
When the strike of bituminous coal miners was cal.led by John L. 
Lewis in October, 1919, it affected the southeastern corner of Kansas 
also. Here were found the Kansas coal mines and District 14 of the Unit-
ed Mine Workers of America. They went out on strike with the rest of the 
miners thoughout the United States. The state was brought face to face 
'With a difficult situation and had to almost strike out blindly in an 
attempt to find some way out of the dilemma. Here was born the Kansas 
Industrial Court. Governor Henry J. Allen, who was largely responsible 
for the legislation resulting in the formation of the court, has stated 
15. Kansas City Star, December 10., 1919. 
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graphically the situation faced by Kansas in that winter of 1919, at 
least as seen by the chief executive of that state. 
Whether government is supreme; whether the nation and 
the state were sovereign in their powers and superior to 
an organized minority of capital or of labor or both; 
whether a helpless people were to be protected against 
industrial strife, in the making of which they had no part; 
whether the forces that regard neither the name nor the 
fundamental principle of democratic government, using its 
freedom as an opportunity to destroy the spirit of demo-
cratic institutions, should overawe and set at naught the 
welfare of the majority; these are the questions that 
were at stake when Kansas and the nation faced a fuel 
famine, the result of a c~gntry-wide coal strike at the 
beginning of last winter. 
This statement of Governor Allen will show the manner in which he was 
judging the crisis, its cause, and its ramifications. He was to be of 
the group fearing radical unionism with the resultant decay of our 
democratic institutions, and he was to vigorously assert the power of 
government as being supreme in~ matter affecting the welfare of the 
people at large. The coal trike and the suffering it brought to many 
people proved to him that something, drastic perhaps, had to be done 
and done right away. He attacked the situation in Kansas in a vigorous 
manner, created a vigorous instrument to prevent future occurrences, 
and was this instrument's most vigorous defender throughout its short 
life. 
What struck Governor Allen with the most force was the wide-
spread inconvenience and suffering which were brought home to many 
people in the state, and the seemir:g inability of anyone to do any-
16. Henry J. Allen, 11 Let the People Freeze, 11 Independent, CI 
(March 13, 1920), P• 385. 
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thing about. it. To him the ma.in question was not that of continuing-
industrial production, but of the more basic one of keeping wann and 
preparing food. The situation was serious in Kansas because t here was 
hardly a reserve supply of coal at all, the winter weather was very se-
vere, and people were going around actually begging for a small supply 
of coal. Schools and churches had to be closed and all industry shut 
down. 
After two weeks of this situation had brought no relief, and in 
fact had merely intensified the suffering, Governor Allen took precip-
itate action to do something about it. An application wa s filed with 
the supreme court of the state f or a receivership for the mining 
corporations on the grounds that these corporations were derelict in 
their corporate duties. On November 18, 1919, every coal mine in the 
Crawford-Cherokee Kansas fields was put in the hands of the receivers. 17 
The Court order provided that the receivers 
Are instructed to take immediate possession of all of 
said property ani to operate said mines and produce an::i 
distribute, and sell within the State of Kansas, all coal 
possible at once. And for said purpose said receivers are 
empowered and directed to employ all labor or necessary 
agents and make all construction necessary. Said receivers 
shall execute their bonds in the sum of $25,000 before 
entering upon their duties.18 
It was one thing to put the mines in the hands of receivers, but it was 
another thing to get three men to accept the recreivership. Two of t he 
first two appointed flatly refused to serve. Both the miners and t he -
17. Topeka Daily Capital, November 18, 1919. 
18,. Ibid. 
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operators refused to suggest men to represent them on the board of -
receivers. Finally, three men were fourrl who accepted the responsi-
bility. 
The next problem, of course, was to get the coal then in pos-
session of the state out of the ground and into empty bins. Governor 
Allen, himself, went direct to the coal camps, called meetings, arguing 
and pleading with the miners to return to their jobs and work for the 
state, Realizir:g that the miners \ooOuld not and could not return to 
work for the operators, Governor Allen appealed to their sense of duty, 
to their fealty of citizenship, to the fact that now the State was run-
ning the mines and needed their help to relieve the suffering. He 
promised them that they would be paid at the old wage scale until a 
new scale was fixed, and then that that scale would be retroactive to 
the date they returned to work. It was further proposed that if no 
national agreement should b reached by Janua:ry 1, 1920, the State 
would enter into a separate agreement with the Kansas miners. However, 
all this came to naught and he was not able to persuade the miners to 
return to the mines. The union officials would not permit the miners to 
work for the state. The typical attitude was expressed by August Dorchy, 
vice-president of District 14, United Mine Workers, when he said 11 The 
public is sympathetic with itself because of a temporary inconvenience, 
but indifferent to the fact that hundreds of thousands of miners are 
forced to work hard at a hazardous occupation and earn t'b little that 
they an:i their families live in • • • squalor. 1119 He went on to say 
19. Topeka~ Capital, November 22, 1919. 
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that Governor Allen I s proposal for the miners to return to work under 
state receivership offered the miners nothing that the operators did 
not concede before the strike began, that is, that if they went to 
work any wage increase granted would be retroactive. Nothing the gov-
ernor could say would get the miners back on the job. He was received, 
in the main, courteously, and was listened to respectfully wherever he 
went, but that was all. 
As the Governor then saw the situation, there was only one thing 
left to do, and that was to call for volunteers to mine the coal. This 
aspect of the strike in Kansas received much publicity and fanfare, and 
was typical of the actions taken by Governor Allen all throughout the 
trying period. At least it can't be said of him that he sat back waiting 
for something to happen to relieve the situation. He grasped the bull 
by the horns and waded right into the wallow. 
On November 27 Governor Allen issued a fonnal call f or volunteer 
workers to dig coal in the Kansas mines. His attempt to get the miners 
to work for the State had failed utterly and this was his answer to 
their negative decision. He inserted the f ollowing notice in the paper: 
WANTED -- 1,000 MEN 
Wanted - one thousand able-bodied young 
men to dig coal to 11 keep the home fires 
burning" in Kansas. Experience unnece-
ssary. Hardy young men able to take 
care of themselves and to wield a pick 
arrl shovel preferred. Travel expenses 
and at least $5 a day guaranteed by the 
State of Kansas. Also forty-five engi-
neers to run steam shovels in the Kansas 
strip mines, with an equal number of 
firemen. Can use also a limited number 
of men accustomed to use of dynamite. 
pply in person, by telegraph, telephone 
or by mail, to Governor Henr~ J. Allen, 
State House, Topeka, Kansas. 0 
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What, just exactly, was the position taken by the state in this matter, 
and what were the explicit reasons for taking it? Governor Allen ex-
plained the State I s attitude in this manner: 
It is the duty of government, and it has the inherent 
power, to protect the people whose welfare is dependent 
upon it. Facing a desperate situation, through a stoppage 
of coal production at the beginning of winter, government 
in Kansas is brought to the pass of using all its powers 
to protect the people whose suffering will be unspeakable 
unless relief is afforded. If government is to mean any-
thing, then its obligation is to prevent innocent people 
from becoming the victims of a fuel famine which, in the 
course of events, is both unnatural and unnecessary.21 
In other words, the police power of the state can and must be used to 
protect the health, the peace, and the welfare of all t he people. This 
is important because it is one of the main principles upon which was 
built the Kansas Industrial Court. 
Governor Allen went on to say that the situation in Kansas, and 
in the nation as a whole for that matter, was distinctly a challenge t o 
government. President Wilson and Attorney-General Palmer had t aken 
exactly the same attitude towards the situation. According to GQvernor 
Allen, the government of Kansas was going to accept t he challenge, arrl 
for that reason had called for volunteer workers for the coal mines. He 
20. Topeka Daily Capital, November 27, 1919. 
21. Topeka Daily Capital, November 28, 1919. 
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wanted it understood, however, that it wasn 't a strike-breaking enter-
prise at all, and that it was not intended to affect t he adjustment 
of the issues between the miners and the operators. "But once and for 
all it must be understood that the powers of the state now surmnoned 
into action for the protection of its people are above and beyond 
those of any association or organization, whether of capital or of 
individuals. 
The response to the call for volunteer workers exceeded the 
fondest expectations of the governor. There are no reliable figures, 
apparently, on just how man.y men volunteered, but the estimate is 
generally put at around 10,000. They came from all walks of life, from 
the colleges, from the stores, from the banks, from the fi elds and 
farms. Many were returned soldiers and sailors. The 1000 who had been 
selected were escorted to the coal fields by the National Guard, but 
there was little or no violence on the part of miners attempting to 
prevent them from mining the coal. Their attitude was only of dis-
belief that anything of real benefit could be accomplished by these 
volunteer workers. Their attitude was not belligerent, it was 
skeptical. 
Governor Allen started the volunteers out at $5 per day, but 
later raised the pay by 14%- The men had to work under incredible hard-
ships. They only took coal out of the strip mines, the law prohibiting 
them from going underground. The strip mines had to be pumped out, as 
they were full of snow and icy water. The machinery was in need of 
22. Loe. cit. 
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repair. Added to this was the bitter weather w'nich existed all through 
the time the volunteers were digging the coal. But they all seemed to 
be willing to put up with the inconvenience to get the coal dug. Friend-
ly rivalry developed between delegations from rival colleges to see who 
could get the most coal out. A great quantity of coal was not mined, but 
enough was produced by the novice miners to aid localities in which the 
need was particularly acute. 
While the volunteer -workers were still in the pits word came out 
that Governor Allen was proposing the calling of a special session of 
the state legislature to appropriate money to pay the expense of the 
receivership and maintaining order, and also to discuss statutes which 
would eliminate strikes altogether. 
On December 12, after the national coal strike had been settled 
on the basis of President Wilson's proposals, Alexander Howat , president 
of District 14, United Mine vorkers of America, ordered the miners back 
to work. The job of the volunteer miners was done. 
On December 17 the coal mines of southeastern Kansas were returned 
to the owners. At the same time Governor Allen announced that the legis-
lators at the special session of the state legislature which was to meet 
in January, 1920, w:>uld have a pleasant surprise waiting for them. He 
said they would not be asked to pay the expenses incurred during the 
state's operation of the coal mines. He announced that every item of 
expense incurred by the state in effecting the receivership, in hiring 
and transporting the volunteer workers to the mines, and in paying their 
expenses and wages could be met out of the proceeds of the receiver-
h . 23 S ip . 
29 
Just what had these volunteer miners accomplished during their 
brief stay in the Kansas mines? It was reported that 600 Federal 
troops and 1,200 Kansas National Guardsmen were in the Kansas fields 
at one time or another . Also approximately 1200 volunteer workers 
engaged in operatiI¥s the strip pits . There were approximately 145 
cars of coal mined in the Pittsburg district alone, which was enough 
to furnish temporary relief to 23,200 families, 500 lbs. of coal 
being available to each family. 24 
Thus came to an end the national bituminous coal strike during 
the winter of 1919 . In its wake it brought the creation of the first, 
and only, truly industrial court, one that vigorously took hold of 
the problem and held out a solution it sincerely believed w:>uld be 
the death of industrial warfare. The story of that court's creation, 
its successes and failures, and its demise will be the theme of the 
remainder of this paper. 
23. Topeka Daily Capital, December 18, 1919. 
24. Topeka Daily Capital, December 14, 1919. 
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CHAPTER III 
CREATION OF THE COURT 
It has already been seen that Governor Allen felt very strongly 
about the coal strike in Kansas, the refusal of the miners to even 
work for the state, and the suffering brought to many homes because of 
the cessation of work. During the weeks of the crisis he was beginning 
to formulate his plan which he felt would put an end to such warfare 
between the forces of labor and those of capital. We find in him a 
preoccupation with the whole industrial situation over the nation. He 
was beginning to feel that the labor leaders were largely responsible 
for the wave of unrest sweeping the country . This was during the 
fundamentalist revival following the World War and it wasn't hard to 
associate labor leadership and strikes with radicals, Reds, and un-
Americans . However, the result which arose out of the Kansas creation 
was not merely a repressive measure directed against thes~ men. While 
Governor Allen believed that the only way to do away with industrial 
warfare was to outlaw it, he still realized that something in its 
place had to be provided so that both labor and capital could some-
how find redress for their grievances. 
As early as December 8, 1919, word was announced that "new laws 
looking toward the establishment of industrial courts" might result 
from the proposed special session of the legislature which was to meet 
in January, 1920. 1 It was aloo announced that arbitration might be 
1 . Topeka Daily Capital, December 8, 1919 . 
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compulsory if the kind of legislation expected was put through. Then 
on December 9, 1919, it was announced by Governor Allen that "the 
first industrial court the world has ever known will be established 
in Kansas, 112 that is, if the legislature called into extraordinary 
session for January 5, would take action in accordance with suggestions 
upon which he would urge immediate action. 
Before going into the recommendations made to the legislature 
by the governor, something should first be said as to the origin of these 
recommendations. Where did Governor Allen find his industrial court? It 
was not completely original with him at all. Mr. William L. Huggins of 
Topeka was mostly responsible for the original idea, and for the actual 
drawing up of the bill as presented to the legislature. Mr. Huggins, a 
Topeka lawyer, happened to be thinking along the same lines as Governor 
Allen about the industrial situation, and when Allen became familiar 
with Huggin I s beliefs he prevailed upon him to translate them into 
definite form. On October 30, 1919, Mr. Huggins had delivered an address 
before the Topeka Rotary Club, at which time he developed his thinking 
along the lines later made part of the industrial court. It wijs after 
reading this speech that Governor Allen got together with Mr. Huggins, 
out of which meeting the legislation was born. 
Vfuat were these ideas held by Mr. Huggins which so impressed the 
governor and others attempting to find a solution of industrial warfare? 
In the first place he saw the industrial strife then raging over many 
2. Topeka Daily Capital, December 9, 1919. 
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parts of the United States as a distinct threat t o our democracy. It 
was a momentous problem which had to be solved by peaceful means. Hav-
ing in mind the threatened coal strike of November, Mr. Huggins said: 
When the responsible head of an almost all-powerful indus-
trial trust peremptorily and contimptuously refuses to meet 
and confer ~dth representatives of anployees on matters re-
lating to wages and working conditions or other matters of 
interest to such enployees, when he refuses to arbitrate 
matters in dispute, when he denies the right of the i,,orking-
man to bar gain dollectively, he commits acts of tyranny which 
should not be, cannot be, and will not be tolerated any long-
er by a free people.3 
Then Mr. Huggins had something to say about the other side of the pro-
blem too. 
On the other hand, when the duly elected representatives 
of a great labor trust presents to employers demands, justifi-
able or injustifiable, and couples these demands with a threat 
that if his requirements are not promptly complied with he will 
call out on strike a hall' million workingmen and thereby 
paralyze industry and cause incomparable nation wide suffer-
ing among his fellow citizens, he also commits an act of 
tyranny which is without parallel in the history of free 
governments, and one which, in the new industrial code which 
we must havek should be denominated 11 treason" and penalized 
accordingly. 
This was strong language indeed, but to many far-thinking indivd.duals, 
that was just the kind of language, coupled with action, that was need-
ed to find some way out of the maze. It can be seen, theri., that this new 
industrial code that Mr. Huggins mentioned would have as a vital part of 
in the outlawing of the strike., the boycott., and the lockout. However., 
and we have mentioned this previously, the solution had to go far deeper 
3. William L. Huggins., Labor ani Democracy,_ (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1922), P• 130. 
4. Ibid. , P• 131. 
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than that. 
In his Rotary speech Mr. Huggins went on to point out that in 
justice and fairness the right of the worker to strike could not be 
taken away from him unless he was given something better as a means 
of defense. He realized that then the worker had no other means of 
defense and that he had to be provided with something. That something 
turned out to be an impartial industrial court meant t o give just 
adjudication to labor disputes, the same way that orS,inary courts 
did to civil arrl criminal suits• 
Mr. Huggins also mentioned something else in his speech which 
later became one of the main foundations of the Kansas Court of Indus-
trial Relations. That was the principle of "public int erest". This 
principle had long been applied to public utilities and the railroads, 
and the essence of this principle is that the public has interest@ ::.. 
which transcend the private interests of those engaged in providing the 
necessities and comforts of life to the public. The statute enacted by 
the Kansas legislature extended this principle to include many more 
industries than the two mentioned as generally having been consi dered 
as being affected with a public interest. Along this line Mr. Huggins 
said that the new·in:iustrial code which should be devel~ped should 
provide that all lines of industry whose business affected the pro-
duction or distribution or cost of the necessaries of life be impress-
ed with a public interest, because they affected the entire public, and 
that in case of any dispute which might affect t he operation of such 
industry, the matter should be taken into court, investigated and ad-
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judicated. 5 This was later incorpor ated into the Kansas statute. 
After having mentioned the taking of industrial disputes into 
court, Mr. Huggins brought up the question as to what kind of court 
was needed, and whether or not the present court system might not 
suffice for this purpose. I£ it would not he was in favor of creating 
one that IDuld. It seemed to him that there should be lawful means to 
adjudicate industrial conflicts the s ame way in which civil and criminal 
disputes were taken care of. He made it clear that he was advocating a 
court, not a commission or a committee, and he wanted adjudication, not 
arbitration. 
The last thing mentioned by ¥1r. Huggins in his Rotary speech 
which was eventually made part of the new "industrial code" in Kansas, 
was the theory that the businesses affected with a public int er est 
should be required to operate continuously unless a court of competent 
jurisdiction should find justif i able causes for disoontinuanee.He had 
in mind the rumored practice of many industrialists who curtailed 
production in certain seasons in order to raise the price or keep it 
at a high lev:el. 
These, then, were to be the main underlying and guiding principles 
to be included in the legislation asked of the special session by Gover-
nor Allen in January, 1920. On January 5, 1920, Governor Allen was in-
vited before the joint session of the legislature to deliver his message 
5. Ibid., P• 137. 
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in person. Before explaining the proposed legislation he delivered a 
brief preliminary statement concerning past labor troubles in Kansas, 
and also warned the legislators against the efforts of the organized 
lobby to defeat the purposes of the special session. 6 He produced 
statistics to show that from April, 1916, to December, 1918, there had 
been 364 separate strikes at the individual mines in the State of Kansas. 
He pointed out how small had been the victory of the miners in these 
strikes by saying that the record of the operators proved that the 
amount of dollars and cents gained to the strikers was $784.84. The 
total loss to miners in wages, as figured at the scale rate per day per 
man, on account of these strikes was $1,006,454.41. According to the 
governor there had been on the average 11 strikes per month in the coal 
fields of Kansas, and that most of them had been called on trivial 
grounds. 
He mentioned that most of the mire rs would favor the new legis-
lation if they were left to their own initiative, because it would pro-
tect them in their desire to work and would prevent the needless closing 
of the mines, either on account of strikes called by their officials or 
for any unjust shutdowns by the operators. Then he accused the labor 
leaders of urging the miners to fight the legislation, labor leaders 
who made their living off labor controversies. He specifically accused 
the Fourt Railway Brotherhoods of leading the fight against the proposed 
legislation. 
6. Preliminary statement appears in pamphlet, The Court of Indus-
trial Relations, Topeka, 1920, PP• 3-4. 
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After delivering the preliminary statement Governor Allen went 
right into his regular message outlining the proposed legislation. In 
the beginning he reviewed the coal strike in Kansas, how the people had 
suffered from lack of coal, the heartlessness of both operators and miners 
union officials in not even providing coal for hospitals, and how the 
state was finally forced to take over receivership of the mines and oper-
ate them to alleviate widespread suffering and possible death. 
After reviewing the growing quarrel between capital and labor, 
Governor Allen said he had come to the conclusion that no progress had 
been made toward t he provision of a just and orderly basis of solution. 
Then too, the largest party at interest, the public, scarcely ever re-
ceived a hearing. 
I believe the time has come, in the increasing industrial 
life of the country, when a tribunal should be established 
which shall have the power to take under its jurisdiction 
the offenses committed against society in the name of indus-
trial warfare, a tribunal which shall have the authority to 
meet industrial discontent, before it crystallizes, by a 
careful oversight an:i regulati. on of the conditions of labor 
before any injustices are allowed to fester and breed class 
hatred and bitter antagonisms.? 
According to Governor Allen there was no reasons why government should 
not have the same power to protect society against the ruthless offenses 
of industrial strife as it had always had to protect it against recognized 
crime. The industrial court, -which he hoped to create, was to provide a 
substitute for strikes and lockouts and protection for the public from 
abuses arising out of industrial controversies. 
7. House Journal, State of Kansas , Special Session, 1920., P• 8. 
37 
Governor Allen also touched upon the growing r adical labor 
movement, saying t hat it was attempting t o set up a system of intimi-
dation which set government at naught . He went on to say that he knew 
labor had bettered itself by organization and threats of strikes against 
capital for advantages they should have been given willi~ly. But, he 
said, the trend now was toward a situation which made it clear that t he 
final app eal in labor controversies should not rest on the issue of 
industrial warfare. 
In my judgment the legislation enacted should not deny 
to labor the right to collective bargaining, but it should 
establish somethiQ?: saner and juster, when an effort at 
collective bargaining has failed, than recourse to strike. 
Arbitration has never provided a guarantee of justice 
because at best it leads only to a compromise , an:i into 
the deliberations of a board of arbitration there seldom 
comes a representative of the public, wni ch, in the con-
troversies8affecting essential industri es, is chiefly 
concerned , 
It is seen that the governor was very much impressed by the fact t hat 
the public, through th e state, should have an effective voice in the 
settlement of labor controversies. The suffering of various commur:atie§ 
duriQ?: the coal strike had touched him deeply, and made him antag-
onistic to those agencies he held responsible. This doctri°' t hat 
these so- called "essential" industries were so important that they 
were subject to state regulat ion was not a new one. The United States, 
and many of the individual states, had had laws providing for the 
regulation of railroads and public utilities for several years . 
Saying that legislation was i mperatively needed, Governor Allen 
8. Ibid., P• 9. 
wanted a law: 
1. Declaring the operation of the great industries affect-
ing focxi, clothing, fuel and transportation to be im-
pressed with a public interest and subject to a reason-
able regulation by the state. 
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2. Creating a strong, dignified tribunal, vested with power, 
authority and jurisdiction to hear and detellll.ine all 
controversies -which ma,y arise and which threaten to hinder, 
delay or suspend the operation of such irrlustries. 
3. Declaring it to be the duty of all persons, firms, corpor-
ations and associations of persons engaged in such industries 
to operate the same with reasonable continuity, in order 
that the people of this state may be supplied at all times 
with the necessaries of life. 
4. Providing t hat in case of controversy arising between em-
ployers and employees or between different groups or 
crafts of workers which may threaten the continuity or 
efficiency of such industries and thus the production or 
transportation of the necessaries of life, or which may 
produce an industrial strife or endanger he peaceful op-
eration of such industries, it shall be the duty of said 
tribunal; on its own initiative or on the complaint of 
either party, or on the complaint of the attorney-general, 
or on complaint of citizens, to investigate and determine 
the controversy and to make an order prescribing rules and 
regulations, hours of labor, working conditions, and a 
reasonable minimum wage, which shall thereafter be observed 
in the conduct of said i ndustry until such time as the 
parties may agree. 
5. Providing for the incorporation of unions or associat ions 
of workers, recognizir:g the right of collective bargainir:g 
and giving full faith and credit to any and all contracts 
made in pursuance of said right •. 
6. Providing for a speedy determination of the validity of any 
such order made by said tribunal in the supreme court of 
this state without the delay which so often hampers the 
administration of justice in ordinary cases. 
7. Declaring it unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or 
association of persons to delay or suspend the production or 
transportation of the necessaries of life, except upon 
application to and order of said tribunal. 
8. Declarir:g it unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation 
to discharge or discriminate against any employee because of 
participation of such employee in any proceedings before said 
tribunal. 
9. Making it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation engaged 
in said lines of industry to cease operations for the purpose 
of limiting production, to affect prices or to avoid any of 
the provisions of this act, but also providing a means by 
which proper rules and re gulations ma,y be formulated by said 
tribunal providing for the operation of such indus-
tries as may be affected by changes in season, market 
conditions, or other reasons or causes inherent in 
the nature of the business. 
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10. Declaring it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, 
or for any association of persons, to violate any of 
the provisions of this act; or to conspire or confederate 
wi. th others to violate any provisions of this act, or to 
intimidate any person, firm or corporation engaged in such 
industries with the intent to hinder, delay or suspend the 
operation of such industries and thus to hinder, delay or 
suspend the production or transportation of the necessaries 
of life. 
11. Providing penalties by fine or imprisonment, or both, for 
persons, firms, or corporations or associations of persons 
wilfully violating the provisions of this act. 
12. Making provisions whereby any increase of wages granted to 
labor by said tribunal shall take e~fect as of the date of 
the beginning of the investigation. 
This was a large order and was a far-reaching program, which, if passed, 
would project the state ri ght into the middle of the industrial life of 
Kansas. It was taking the state into radically new fields. Strikes, boy-
cotts, and lockouts were absolutely pro hibit ed. The operator of one of 
the essential industries couldn ' t suspend his operations whenever he 
wanted to, the court had the last word an that. Minimum wages, hours of 
labor, and working conditions were all to come under the purview of the 
industrial court. It can readily be seen that many issues would inevit-
ably arise out of the application of this act, there were many points 
at which the act could be attacked as violating freedom of contract, 
due process of law, and other rights coming under the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Naturally, a statute as all-
embracing as this one was, and one that had no precedents, was bound 
9. Ibid., PP• 10-11. 
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to be challenged by those directly affected by its operation. The story 
of those challenges and their results is reserved for a later section 
of this paper. 
These things which Governor Allen desired to incorporate into the 
legislation he was a sking for is a brief outline of the final provisions 
of the Industrial Court Law. Just what did the state think it could accom-
plish by passing such a law? For one thing they felt that strikes, lock-
outs, 1:x:>ycotts and blacklists unnecessary and impossible by giving labor 
as well as capital an able and just tribunal in which to litigate all 
controversies. ·They thought they could insure the people a steady and 
continuous supply of the so- called "necessaries of life". This was to 
prevent a recurrence of the situation during the coal strike. It was 
held that by stabilizing production of these goods, the price to the 
producer and consumer would be stabilized as well. They were going to 
insure labor steadier employment by keeping the industries running con-
tinuously, arrl insure a better wage by setting a minimwn wage scale. The 
result of all this being, of course, the prevention of the colossal 
economic waste which is always a part of industrial warfar e. 
So this was to be Kansas' answer to the growing industrial struggle 
penneating every part of the United States. Radical labor and selfish 
capital were to be constrained and held to the level of the public in-
terest in their relations with one another. There was no doubt but what 
something was needed. Even the International Executive Board of the 
United Mine Workers of America, pointing to the situation in Kansas, nad 
agreed that the situation had become intolerable. They issued a special 
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report in which they recognized that District 14 (comprising the Kansas 
fields) had been in one continuous turmoil. The report stated that it had 
been the practice to allow all the outlying disVicts of the union to 
enter into "district agreements", which provided for tribunals to which 
grievances were submitted for adjustment when disputes arose between 
employers and employees. It went on to say that for some time past the 
procedure adopted by the Kansas mine workers by which their grievances 
were adjusted had become such a howling farce that the people of Kansas 
went to the other extreme and enacted the industrial court, believing 
that the Mine Workers had become an organization of contract-breakers 
and composed of an irresponsible membership. This very concisely stated 
the prevailing belief of many persons in Kansas, including Governor 
Allen. 
At any rate, the gauntlet was down and the struggle was on. The 
struggle was to come after the enactment of the law, however . Apparently 
the same feeling toward the situation had pretty well affected the 
people of Kansas as was held by the architects of the industrial law. 
There was to be little difficulty in pushing the bill through the 
special session of the legislature. Labor, capital, and representatives 
of the public were all given a hearing at the session, but it was fairly 
well understood by most that it was nothing more than display. The temper 
of the times insured a quick and easy passage. 
10. Official Statement~ the International Executive Board, 
United Mine Workers of America, in regard t~the Kansas Controversy, 
International Headquarters, Indianapolis, Indiana, P• 4. 
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Even though their arguments had no affect on the ultimate pass-
age of the act, we should look briefly at what these various factions 
thought of the proposed industrial court. Speaking for labor, and pre-
senting their attitude, was Mr. Frank P. Walsh, a lawyer representing 
the Four Railway Brotherhoods. He had represented labor in the courts 
for years. 
Government has neither the oonstitutional nor moral right 
to take away t h e right to strike. Labor is not a commodity, 
to be bought arrl sold, nor can the workingman be constitution-
ally held, nor can he be morally expected, to observe a con-
tract for his labor if under new conditions that contract does 
not seem to him reasonable. 11 
His main attack against the bill was based on what he called the funda-
mental and inherent right of labor to work for whom it chooses, when it 
chooses, and on what terms it was able to wrest. He called the statute 
state socialism in that it gave to a bureau the right to regulate, con-
trol, and in emergency, to operate, industries, includi~ transportation. 
Later on in his same speech he expressed the hope that the Federal 
Government w::>uld continue to operate the railroads, and transport all 
12 products at cost. 
Mr. Walsh spent much time, he spoke most of one whole day, in 
attacking capital, corporate interests, profiteers, and big business 
generally. He mentioned their huge profits during the World War. After 
his tirade against business, Mr. Walsh got right down to the Court itself. 
11 As for us (labor), we oppose every line and ev.ery clause of this bill --
11. Topeka Daily Capital, January 9, 1920. 
12. Loe . cit. 
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except the object sought . 1113 He thought it would completely strike -
down the labor movement in Kansas. He took the line that there could 
be no final settlement of the labor struggle, that it was bound to 
continue as long as mankind advanced. He thrust aside the fears of 
many- that it all would lead to Bolshevism or Communism by saying that 
he had every confidence in his country, that such ideelogies just 
couldn't possibly find a place in our scheme of things. 
Walsh attacked the bill as infringing the 13th. Amendment to the 
Constitution, which forbids slavery or involuntary servitude except as 
a punishment for crime. In closing, Mr. Walsh said that the law gave to 
a board created by human minds, "powers that were an attribute of the 
Almighty. 11 
Mr. J. I. Sheppard, representing the State Federation of Labor, 
also made a speech before the legislature on behalf of labor. 14 He made 
more of a hit with the legislators than did Walsh •. He first declared 
himself in thorough accord with Governor Allen's handling of the coal 
strike in Kansas. He said that Alexander Howat, president of Di strict 
14, had been wrong in his action during t he strike. He defended Howat, 
who was to prove a mighty thorn in the side of t he industrial court through-
out its entire existence, however, at the same time making a plea for labor 
and its troubles. He pictured Howat as a gig-hearted and patriotic man 
who did wrong because his viewpoint was wrong . He pointed out that Howat 
13. Loe. cit. 
14. Topeka Daily Capital, January 10, 1920. 
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had been fighting for the miners for ye ars and all he had ever gotten 
for them had been by tooth and claw. "It is the only way labor has 
obtained what rights it has now, arrl while I deplore his stand, I do 
not condemn his motives." 
Mr. Sheppard approved of the industrial court measure, except for 
the penalty clause. 
I know the old tooth and claw business has got to stop ••• 
But your jail and penitentiary law puts the claws deeper into 
the matter. The strike penalty is a bad thing. You are depriv-
ing us of the right to use force, but you use force against us. 
Don't write the law of force into this statute. Write the Golden 
Rule into it. Provide for your court, make its findings publig, 
but don't make labor a criminal for fighting for its rights. 
In other v.0rds, take all the teeth out of the law, and create a mere ar-
bitration court with no power whatever to enforce its decisions. Mr. 
Sheppard apparently overlooked the fact that when it came to fighting 
for bread and shelter, money and profits, the Golden Rule was most often 
lost in the shuffle someplace. heppard suggested that the law be written 
so that in case the employer and employee finally couldn't agree, the 
state would step in, as it did in the coal strike, and take charge of 
the property. The paper reported that no member of the legislature was 
unkind enough to remind Sheppard, when the time for questions came, that 
that was just what happened in the coal strike, and the miners refused to 
work when the state did take charge, with the result that the governor 
had to call for volunteers to dig coal, and for the National Guard to 
insure protection for them. 
15. Loe. Cit . 
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Mr. John S . Dean, of Topeka, and r epr es enting the empl oyers , 
also made a sp eech opposing; passage of the bill. 16 Mr. Dean, apparent-
ly, presented the most log ical lega l a r gument s a ainst the measure that 
had been heard du.ring the three days of discussion. Dean took the vi ew, 
and stuck closely t o it without any excursions i nto other fields, that 
the measure was unconstitutional, a s it undertook t o c onfiscate property 
and provided for involuntary s ervit ude. There was one s t r iking difference 
between the argument s of Dean and t hos e pr e sented by Sheppard the day be-
fore, but their attitudes toward t he bill were much ali ke in one r espect . 
They wanted the p enalty clause changed . Sheppard had wanted the penalty 
again st t h e workingman stricken out, but t he provisi ons bringing indus-
tries under re gulation by the proposed court he thought were all right . 
Dean, on the other hand, wanted the i ndust ries left more or less alone , 
but wanted the penalty clause a gai nst stri ke s i n s erted in the measure, 
but purely under the police p wers of the s t at e . 
This, after all, wa s natural on both t heir parts . Labor had always , 
and does today, vigorously oppose any r est ricti on on their right to 
strike. Capital, on t he other hand, shies away from s tate regulation of 
any kind. Dean went on to urge that the measur e should be amended to 
eliminate the sections gi vi ng t he court the "confiscatory" powers re-
ferred to, and the right to r egulat e pr i va t e industries . He s aid that if 
these provisions were left i n the bill, t he c ourts -would declare it un-
constitutional. How right he was l ater proved t o be J 
16. Ibid., January 11, 1920. 
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Next, it was the turn of Mr. William L. Huggins, the man who did 
most of the drafting of the measure, to answer these opponents of the 
bill. Mr • . Huggins was representing the public in his ~peech before the 
legislature. 17 In the beginning Mr. Huggins took issue with Mr. Wal sh 
coreerning the definition of the word "democracy", a very elusive t erm 
at best. As he remembered the speech made by Mr. Walsh before t he legis-
lature, he recalled that that gentleman had said he approved of the 
methods used by the Four Railway Brotherhoods at the t ime of t he passage 
of the Adamson Act, that is, pass the law or suffer a nation-wide tieup 
of the railroads. Then he recalled Mr. Walsh's statement favoring democ-
racy. To Mr. Huggins that wasn't government by the people, of all the 
people, nor was it for all the people. That was coercion to favor one 
group, merely one unit of that "all the people. 11 
Mr. Huggins als:> scored Mr. Walsh's statement saying he approved 
of the methods used by the Kansas miners during the coal strike. He was 
referring to such things as their refusing coal to hospitals, schools, 
and other needy institutions. Mr. Huggins also thought that Mr. Alexander 
Howat was a very able man, but that he was misguided from having viewed 
the abuses perpetrated on the miners for so many years. 
One of the fairest portions of the bill as far as labor was concer n-
ed, said the drafter of the original bill, was the fact t hat the poorest 
working man could come into the court with his case, without posting bond, 
the court would collect his evidence, and handle his case f or him wi"thout 
17. Speech Delivered Before the Kansas Legislature !?z W. 1· Huggins, 
January~, 1920, State Printing Plant, Topeka, Kansas, 1920, PP• 1-18. 
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one cent of cost to himself. If the worker didn't think he had received 
justice from the industrial court, he could have his case taken for him 
to the state supreme court. Mr. Huggins couldn't see how anybody could 
be a gainst this section of the bill, having in mind the statment of Mr. 
Walsh that labor was against every line of the proposed law. 
He scoffed at the argument that the bill was anti-union, saying 
that surely ta.kills away the right to strike was not a death-blow to 
labor unionism. Wasn't there something more in unionization that just 
the right to strike down their opponents by force? Besides , the worker . 
had a right to quit his job any time he wished, but couldn't conspire 
with others to do the same. The worker would do so, however, with the 
understanding that after he quit his job someone else was perfectly right 
in getting his job. 
The spectre of Bolshevism also entered into Mr. Huggins• s arguments 
supporting his bill •. To him, any laboring man who put his union first, 
above the welfare of his state or country, was a bolshevist. In other 
words, this could easily lead into the so-called "dictatorship of the 
proletariat. 11 To him, the only thing wrong with the American labor move-
ment was just that. Th~ radical leaders, and the ideas they had imported 
from Russia, had gotten into the movement and got a voice in it. The 
loyal element, meanwhile, remained inarticulate. 11 That is what is the 
matter with it nothing else. 1118 
18. Ibid., p. 13° 
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To me, this seems to be one of the basic fears lying behind the 
Kansas experiment of 1920. Too many times this fear of radicalism is 
mentioned by the men responsible for the drawing up of the measure to 
think that only a si nc ere feeling that something should be done to com-
pose the struggle between capital and labor was the guilding motive of 
those creating the law. Certainly this was pa.rt of it, but it stemmed 
from the belief, and fear, that if this composing wasn't done soon there 
would develop a dangerous threat to our government and way of life. I 
would like to quote part of the conclusion of Mr. Huggin' s speech be-
fore the legislature, because I feel it summarizes this basic drive of 
those bringing up the measure. 
I think this is the most serious time in the history of this 
republic outside of the first three years of the civil war. I 
bar no other period. The statement by Mr . Walsh that there is 
no danger from bolshevism goes contrary to the known f acts. 
The government of the United States is hunting down, arresting, 
putting in jail, and deporting thousands of these agitators, 
arrl I don't believe they ever will get near all of them, because 
some of them are too smart to get caught. We are challenged by a 
soviet government, we are confronted by a condition where a 
considerable portion of the people in this country say that 
their first duty is not to the government of the United States, 
but some other government, a goverrunent within a government; a 
government that is more powerful than the government of the 
United States, a government that demands their fir st loyalty. 
There are too many who believe that. They never deport enough 
of them. Any man who says: 11:My first duty is to my union, or to 
my church, even, or to my lodge - - I owe no allegiance to t he 
government of the United States nor to the State of Kansas that 
I will not freely set aside if my union • • • tells me to 11 - -
no man who believes in that is a good citizen. No man who acts 
in this manner should be granted the protection of the law which 
he despises, and no penalty that yau can i npose upon that kind 
of a man is too severe. 19 
19. Ibid., P• 18. 
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This also served as a final reply to those who said they favored the 
law, l::ut were opposed to the penalty provisions of it. 
These, then, were the main arguments f or and against the indus-
trial court bill as presented bef ore the special session of the Kansas 
legislature in January, 1920. Mr. William Allen White was also invited 
to speak on behalf of the public before t he legislature and did so on 
January 12, 1920. 20 His arguments supporting the measure were largely 
taken up with the belief that eventually both capital and labor would 
look upon t he Kansas act as that mich finally emanci pated them from 
their own strangle hold on each other, arrl that which established an 
equitable and living relation between them. 
Passage of the Law 
Immediately after the introduction of the industrial court measure , 
labor leaped into the fray with all its f ury to try arrl defeat it. Mr. 
Alexander Howat., president of District 14., United Mine Workers of America 
led the struggle against the law. He foresaw absolute slavery for the coal 
miners, and all other classes of labor in Kansas, if the bill was passed. 
He called it the most drastic and vicious bill against labor that was 
ever heard of; it would put the workers at the absolute mercy of the 
employers; they would be brutalized and oppressed more than ever before; 
and it would completely destroy the usefulness and effectiveness of the 
20. Kansas City Star, January 12, 1920. 
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labor movernent. 21 He urged every member of the union to use his utmost 
effort in defeating the proposed legislation. 
It wasn't long, however, before labor realized that the cards 
were stacked against them and that they would be unable to defeat t he 
law. The labor lobby in Topeka then turned its fight to strike out the 
penalty clause of the bill . This was the clause that provided for the 
enforcement of the measure, and to remove it, would have been to simply 
create a court of investigation without the power to have a court of 
competent jurisdiction enforce its orders. This was just what labor 
wanted as it would have still left the strike as the f i nal s elution of 
all labor controversies with capital. 
Those favoring the bill, however, said there would be absolutely 
no compromise with the penalty clause. 22 They said that if the people of 
Kamas wanted the law they should prevail upon their representatives to 
keep the penalty clause. To t hem a law without the penalty clause would 
be nothing . They saw that exactly the same sort of situation which brought 
on demand for the bill, meaning the 1919 coal strike, could take place in 
Kansas again the next winter and the people would be powerless to prevent 
it. No, if there was going to be an iniustrial court law, one worthy of 
the name, it would have the power to enforce its orders and decisions. 
The Kansas Industrial Court Act was not a partisan measure, support-
ed by one party and opposed by another. It was created by the Republicans, 
but was just as vigorously supported by the Democrats of the state. On 
21. Ibid., January 10, 1920. 
22. Loe. cit. 
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January 13 the Democratic members of the legislature held a caucus and 
voted to support the industrial court bill. They announced, however, 
that they would attempt to anend the bill so as to make the members of 
the court elective after the first tenn.g3 The law made provision for 
their appointment by the governor. Whether this amendment passed or not, 
they announced they would support the bill. 
The Kansas Industrial Court Act had been introduced into both 
houses of the legislat ure as companion bills on January 5, 1920. In the 
senate the bill went to the judiciary committee. This committee in the 
senate wrote an important amendment into the act. This amendment prohibited 
the "check-off" system at the Kansas coal mines. 24 Under the check-off 
system, the coal operators were compelled to collect union dues and fines 
from their union employees and turn the money over to t he union officials. 
The money was held out of the miners' pay envelope and the result of the 
system was that the mine oper ators were made the r eal support of the union. 
No miner could work without p83'ing his due s arxl he had no way of r esisting 
the imposition of any fine the union might impose . The system left the 
mine laborer at the absolute mercy of the union, the amendment was f inally 
dropped. 
The bill passed the senate by a vote of 33 to 5. The senate , upon 
convening, voted as a committee of the whole to recommend the measure. 
Little oratory or tirne was wasted in the quick passage of the act. 'rhe 
bill was voted on section by section, and the senate voted down the 
23. Ibid., January 13, 1920. 
24. Ibid., January 14, 1920. 
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Democratic amendment to make the judges elective. It was passed as it 
had come from the judiciary committee. 25 
As mentioned above, the original bill was introduced into both 
houses as companion measures. Both houses proceeded to pass their own 
measure. The result wa s that there were a few differences outstanding 
between them. The two bills differed only in three essential points, all 
three being amendments adopted by the house. They broadened the powers 
outlined in the original draft . They (1) allowed the industrial court to 
regulate profits, price.s and wages of all industries engaged in the sale 
or barter of food or food products, (2) required labor contracts with 
unions to be approved by the industrial court before they became binding, 
and (3) prohibited any "closed shop" contract with labor organization. 26 
The senate voted not to accept the house amendments, so a confer-
ence was needed between representatives of both hous es to iron out the 
differences. Two conferees were appointed from each house to accomplish 
this. Points 2 and 3 seemed to be those most outstanding between the two 
houses. The senate was apparently disposed to grant the house contention 
that there should be some tribunal in which retail prices might be con-
sidered and regulated, but that it should be ,worked out in a separate 
bill and not tied in with a measure intended to deal only with industrial 
controversies arrl thus endanger the constitionality of the entire 
measure. The result was an agreement which didn't materially affect the 
25 . Ibid. , January 16, 1920. 
26 . Ibid. , January 17, 1920. 
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original senate measure. 27 The amendment in regard to retail price-
fixing was written into a separate bill, and the open shop amendment 
and the one requiring labor contracts to be approved by the new court 
28 were dropped entirely. Both houses approved of the conference report. 
As was mentioned the measure passed both houses on January 16, 
1920, subject to the later agreement on the conference report . It might 
be well to glance just a moment at the vote as it occurred in both houses 
on the bill. It has been seen that the vote in the senate was: Yeas 33, 
. 29 Nays 5, absent or not voting, 1. Three Republicans an:i two Democrats 
voted against the bill. A Republican abstained. These men who voted 
against the measure were from Leona, Fort Scott, Girard, Wichita, and 
Galena . Most of these towns were in the coal-mining district. The 
abstainer was from Kansas City. James Malone, who voted aye on the 
measure explained his vote in the following manner, which showed that 
he was apparently thinking more level-headed than were some of his 
colleagues. 
In my judgment we a:re acting with too much haste in en-
acting this legislation at this time . At this moment of .un-
rest and discontentment, immediately following t he great 
World War, an:i also following the great industrial disorder, 
when men 's passions are aroused and the accumulated vengeance 
of the public is directed upon labor and labor unions, there 
27. Ibid., January 22, 1920. 
28. State of Kansas, Senate Journal, Special Session, 1920, P• 98. 
29. Ibid., P• 44. 
is serious danger of doing a grave injustice to the labor-
ing class . JO 
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He thought the legislation should have been held over until the next 
regular session, an1 that the court should have been made elective . 
However, since the prople were asking for legislation of this kind, he 
voted aye, believing that in the future the act would be amended to 
make it elective. 
In the house the Industrial Court Act passed with the following 
vote: Yeas 104, Nays 7, absent or not voting, 13. 31 Of the seven voting 
no, four were Republicans and three were Democrats. They were fairly 
widely spaced which showed that apparently their independent judgment, 
not pressure from coal-mining communities, influenced their vote. They 
were from Topeka, Augusta, Parsons, Ashland, Weir, Hays, ani Galena. 
Some of these can be seen to have come from the coal fields however. Of 
those not voting, 12 were Republicans ani one a Democrat. They were 
from widely spaced parts of the state. Representative Mulroy of Hays 
explained his no vote in this fashion: 
Believing a law placing in the hands of the governor 
the authority to appoint three men whose duty it will be 
to regulate everything and everybody to be fundamentally, 
if not cons titutionally, wrong, and as a protest against 
the ~team- roller tactics anployed in the last hour, I vote 
no. 3 · 
Anothe r representative explained his vote in much the same way, saying 
JO. Ibid. , P• 45. 
31. State of Kansas, House Journal, Special Session, 1920, P• 77. 
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he didn't approve of having measures like this shoved down his thro_at. 
The Kansas Industrial Court Act had successfully cleared the 
legislative hurdle, an:i the great experiment was ready to get under way. 
It will be necessary now to see just what the new law provided for, as a 
means of doing away with industrial controversy an:i warfare . 
The Kansas Industrial Court Law33 
The Court of Industrial Relations was to be composed of three 
judges, to be appointed by tbe governor, by and with the advice and 
consent of the senate. The three judges originally appointed were 
appointed for one, two, and three year terms to begin simultaneously. 
Each succeeding judge was to be appointed for a three-year term. The 
salary of the judges was $5,000 per year. 
The act conferred upon the industrial court the jurisdiction 
formerly held by the Publ·c Utilities Commission, but these powers 
were to be taken away after a mort while. 
In order to preserve the public peace, promot e the public welfare, 
protect the public health, prevent industrial strife, a.rrl to secure the 
regular and orderly conduct of the businesses directly affecting the 
living conditions of the people, the following businesses were declared 
to be affected with a public interest and subject to state supervision: 
(1) the manufacture of food products, (2) the manufacture of clothing 
and wearing apparel, (3) the mining or production of fuel, (4) the 
33. Laws of Kansas, Special See~ion, 1920, Chapter 29, PP• 35-48. ------
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transportation of food products, and (5) public utilities an d common 
carriers. 
Because it was recognized that the continuous operation of these 
industries was necessary to the peace and security of the people, and so 
that they could be supplied with the necessaries of life, the law provid-
ed that no person, firm, corporation, or association of persons should 
in any manner wilfully hinder or suspend the continuous operation of an 
industry for the purpose of evading the purpose and intent of the act, 
nor could they refuse to perform any duty for'oidden by the act with the 
intent to hinder or suspend the continuous operation of any of these 
industries. 
Cases could be brought before the court by either party to a con-
troversy, or the court could initiate a case on its own if they thought 
the situation warranted it . Then, too, any ten citizens in an area 
threatened by an in:iustrial dispute could bring suit before the court to 
prohibit a strike from resulting, arrl the Attorney-General was given the 
right to institute cases before the court. 
The industrial court was given the power to make chang es in t he 
industries affected with a public interest in regards to working and 
living conditions, hours of labor, and could set a minimum scale of 
wages to be paid by the employer. Such changes were to continue for 
such reasonable time as fixed by the court, or until changed by agree-
ment of the two parties with the approval of the court . 
If either party refused to obey an order of the industrial court, 
that court had the authority to bring proceedings in the supreme court 
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of Kansas to compel obedience to such orders . Also, eit h er part 
could bring suit in the state supreme court if they wer en 't satisf ied 
with the ruling of the industrial court. Such cases were to be given 
preference over other civil ca ses before t he supreme court. Such suit 
had to be brought within 30 days of t he service of t he order made by 
the industrial court • 
The act also recognized t he right of collective ba r gaining, a n:::l. 
any agreements made collectively by labor and capit al were to remain in 
force as long as both parties were s a tisfied wi. th t hem. Then, if they 
couldn't agree on another contra ct, the i nd ustrial court a ssumed j uris-
diction in order to prevent the disagreement from ending i n a strike, 
boycott, or lockout. 
It was made unlawful by the act f or any corporation engaged i n 
the industries covered by the act to fire an employee because h e 
testified before the i ndu~trial court, or because he wa s in any way 
responsible for the bringing of a suit bef ore s ai d cour t . It was un-
lawful for any of t h e industries affected with a public i nter est t o 
cease or limit operations with the idea in mind of raising prices, or 
for avoidir.g a ny provision of the act. These i ndustries oo ul d apply t o 
the in:::l.ustrial court for permission to cease or l imit operations, how-
ever, and if the application was f ound to have been ma de in good faith 
authority to take the action would be given. 
The Kansas Industrial Court was given the power to make rules, 
regulations and practices to govern the operations of industries whose 
operation might ordinarily be affected by changes in season, market 
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conditions, or other causes inherent in their line of bu sire ss, so _ that 
the best service i,,ould be rendered to the public at all times. 
The law outlawed the right to strike. Individual workers were 
free to quit their employment at any time they pleased, but they could 
not conspire with others to quit their employment for the purpose of 
hindering or interfering with the operation of any of the industries 
mentioned in the law. Picketing was declared to be unlawful also. 
Section 18 was the penalty clause of the act and made it a 
misdemeanor to wilfully violate any pro vision of the act, or any valid 
order of the industrial court. Upon being found guilty of such viola-
tion by any state court of competent jurisdiction, punishment was by a 
fine not to exceed $1,000, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a 
period not to exceed one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
Section 19 provided that any officer of the industries mentioned, 
or any officer of a labor · on, who -wilfully used his power or authority 
coincident to his official position to intentionally influence or compel 
any other person to violate any provisions of this act, or any valid 
order of the court, was to be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon con-
viction, should be punished by a fine of not to exceed $5,000, or by 
imprisonment in the state penitentiary at hard labor for a term not 
to exceed two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
The court was given authority by the act to take over and operate 
any industry mentioned in the act, in case the operation of that industry 
was being suspended or limited contrary to the prlbvisions of the act, if 
it appeared to the court that such suspension or limitation of operations 
might injure the public welfare, public peace, or public health. During 
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the period of state operation a fair return was to be paid the owne_rs 
of such industry, and a fair wage to the v.orkers. 
The court could institute investigations into various subjects, 
and could hire competent help to carry them on. Any order made by the 
court as to a minimum wage was to be deemed prima facie reasonable and 
just, and if this wage scale was higher than the wages currently being 
paid by the industry, the new scale was to be paid from the date of the 
service of summons or publication of notice institution said investiga-
tion into that industry. 
The last section of the act, Section 28, made the following pro-
vision: 
If any section or provision of this act shall be found in-
valid by any court, it sh all be conclusively presumed that this 
act would have been passed by the legislature without such 
invalid section or provision, and the act as a whole shall not 
be declared invalid by reason of the fact that one or more 
sections or provisions may be found to be invalid by any court. 
This section is very important because it was later used as a basis for 
saving parts of the act not declared unconst itutional by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
We have said that the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations was a 
new creation entirely, that it had no precedent, nor has it had any 
successor. But an act that goes into such f ar fields as does this measure 
certainly is created on the basis of somethil'\g that has gone before. In 
other words, the men who drafted the Kansas act of 1920 first found some 
basis of authority upon which to found their new court. There wouldn't be 
much use in writing the law if it was so new and different that it could 
not be sustained by something more definite than urgent need. In the case 
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of the Kansas statute, citations of authority were gathered by Mr. 
Huggins and others mainly responsible, which seemed to show them that 
what they were doing would be held constitutional by any court in the 
land. Not only did they believe in the main principles of their act, 
they believed also in its legality. Where, then, did they find justifi-
cation and a legal basis for the Kansas act? 
In the main they turned to the Supreme Court of the United States 
and studied c ases which see.med to them similar in point of law. In several 
of these cases they found support for their doctrines of "public interest", 
and the right of a state to use its police power to protect the public 
welfare , health and comfor t of its citizens . One case in particular which 
was studied was Munn y. I l linois, 34 which, to them, was sufficient 
authority for their declaration that certain industries were affected 
with a public interest and were therefore subject to regulation by the 
state. The United States Supreme Court said that: 
Property does become clothed with a public interest when 
used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect 
the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his 
property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in 
effect , grants to the public an interest in that use, and must 
submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to 
the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw 
his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he main-
tains the use , he must submit to the contro1.35 
There is a very important sentence in this excerpt, that which says 
that he has to submit to public control to the extent of the interest 
34. 94 U. S. 113, 1877; 24 Law. Ed. 77. 
35 . Ibi d., P• 84. 
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he has thus created. Well, then, is the business of the food producer, 
and the clothing producer affected with a public interest to an extent 
subjecting it to public regulation? It isn't a question of principle, 
but of extent, and that was to be one of the pitfalls of the Kansas act. 
Another case studied by the creators of the Kansas industrial 
court was German Alliance Insurance Company!• Lewis.36 This case con-
cerned a Kansas law of 1909 which gave t~ state superintendent of in-
surance ultimate control over the rates that could be charged by in-
surance companies in the state. The company claimed, that since they 
were a private business, there was no constitutional power to allow a 
state to fix the rates and charges for services rendered b~ it. Here 
again the Supreme Court brought out the principle of public interest 
when it said, "The underlying principle is that tu sine ss of certain 
kinds hold such a peculiar relation to the public int ere st that there 
is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. 1137 The Supreme 
Court then declared that the insurance business fell within this 
category. 
The case, Buddy. State of New York, 38 was another citation 
apparently confirming the stand taken by the Kansas industrial court 
law. This concerned a New York statute which regulated the fees and 
charges "for elevating, trimming , receiving, weighing, arrl discharging 
grain by means of floating and stationary elevators and warehouses in 
36. 233 U.S . ~a); 58 Law Ed. 1011. 
37. Ibid., p. 411. 
38. 143 U. S . 518, 1892; 36 Law. Ed. 247 . 
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the state. 11 The claim was made that floating elevators i n the port of 
New York were private, were not affected with any public interest, and, 
therefore, were not subject to regulation of rates. In upholding t he l aw 
the Supreme Court relied heavily upon its decision in the Munn case. 11We 
must regard the principle maintained in Munn y_. Illinois as firmly 
established. • • • 1139 This main principle, which was seemingly used in 
these cases in arriving at when a state could use its police power in 
regulating businesses affected with a public interest, was stated by 
Mr. Justice Bra,dley in speaking of the Munn case. 
The inquiry there was as to t he extent of t he police power 
in cases where tre public interest is affected; and we held 
that when an employment or business becomes a matter of such 
public interest and importance as to create a common charge 
or burden upon the citizen; in other words, when it becomes a 
practical monopoly, to which the citizen is compelled to re-
sort, and by means of which a tribute can be exacted from 
the community, -- it is subject to regulation by the legis-
lative power . 40 
Now, here is t he critical point in the whole l::usiness. When a busi ness 
is such trat it creates a virtual monol)Oly, then it is subject, under 
the police power of the state, to legislative regulation. Well, is 
the manufacture of food and clothing a monopoly? It is interesting to 
note that in all these cases being mentioned, that which is declared 
t o be affected with a true public interest is fenerally a virtual 
public utility or means of transportation, some sort of enterprise 
that is generally recognized as being monopolistic . Nothing yet has 
been mentioned of the ordinary pursuits of manufacturing food products 
39. Ibi d., P• 255 . 
40. Ibid., P• 253 . 
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and clothing f or general consumption . Again, it seems that on prin~ 
ciple the Kans a s court was on s:>lid ground, but on the extent to 
which the pri JXiple was extended, on dubious ground. 
The case,~ y. Walker41 was used to justify the exercise of 
the police power in Kansas to enforce the industrial court act, that 
is, in the state's claim that in enforcing the act it was in reality 
protecting the public welfare. This case involved an Idaho statute 
putting certain restrictions on t he grazing of sheep on the public 
domain. The Supreme Court upheld the statute as a valid exercise of 
the police power. They claimed that indiscriminate grazi ng of sheep 
was harmful to the public domain, and therefore, in restricting it 
the state was merely protecting public property. The police power, 
said the Supreme Court, "embraces regulations designed to promote the 
public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations 
designed to promote the public health, the public· morals, or t he public 
safety. 1142 The State of Kansas, t hen, was doing the same by prohibiting 
industrial warfare and re quiring labor and capital to compose their dif-
ferences according to public regulation. 
It also seemed to the supporters of the Kansas law that Mul ler y. 
0regon43 gave supporting sanction to the fixing of working condi t ions by 
the industrial court, as a valid exercise of t he police power . In t ~is 
41. 204 u.s. 311, 1911. 
42. Ibid., P• 317. 
43. 208 u. s. 412, 1908. 
case the Supreme Court upheld the validity of an Oregon statute w~ich 
made it unlawful to employ women more than 10 hours in any one day. 
The law was challenged as being an abridgment of freedom of contract. 
The Court held that there were limits on the freedom of contract. Be-
cause of the possible effect on the race of overworking women in indus-
try, laws limiting the number of hours they could be anployed a day were 
valid. Women were in a different position than men. 11 ••• her physical 
structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions - - having 
in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the race - -
justify le gislation to protect her from the greed • of man. 1144 
Another case, Holden~· Har~y45 added more justification to the 
state's regulation of working conditions and terms of employment, with-
out being in violation of the freedom of contract. This case arose out 
of a Utah statute regulating the hours of labor for un:lerground miners, 
a limit of 8 hours per day having been set. The question was whether or 
not this was a violation of freedom of contract, or was it a valid 
exercise of the police power of the state? The Supreme Court thought 
the latter. 
We think it a settled principle, growing out of the nature 
of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property, 
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, hold it 
under the implied liability that his use of it may be so 
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoy-
ment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of 
their property , nor injurious to the rights of the community. 
All property in this commonwealth, as well that in the in-
terior as that borderir:g on tide waters, is derived directly 
44. Ibid., p . 422. 
45 . 169 u.s. 366, 1898. 
or indirectly from the government, and held subject to 
those general regulations which are necessary to the 
common good and general welfare. Rights of property, 
like all other social and conventional rights, are sub-
ject to such reasonable limit ations in their enjoyment 
as will prevent t hem from being injurious, and to such 
reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, 
a s the legislature, under the governing and controlling 
power vested in them by tge Constitution, mc33" think 
necessary and expedient •. 4 
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Because of co nditions in underground mines, therefore, the state was 
empowered to regulate the time of working in them, as unlimited ex-
ploitation of underground miners muld have a detrimental ef fect on 
the public . This seemed, to the creators of the Kansas act, as complete 
justification for the court of industrial relations to fix wages, hours 
of labor, and working con:iitions in state industries to promote public 
welfare an:l. protect public health and morals . 
Another very important case studied by those responsible for 
the industrial court in Kansas was Re Debs. 47 Mr. w. L. Huggins had 
this to say about the case: 
In Re Debs • Justice Brewer delivered the opinion and 
with his usual clarity of thought and felicity of expression, 
stated the principles of law which very largely influenced 
and guided in the framing of the Kansas Industrial Act.48 
Eugene Debs had violated an injunction forbidd.ing _him to obstruct inter-
state commerce on the railroads during the Pullman Strike of 1894• The 
Supreme Court held t hat the United States Government could, through its 
46 . I bid., P• 392. 
47 . 1 58 u. s. 564, 1895-
48 . w. L. Huggins, Labor and Democracy, (New York: Macmillan _ 
Company, 1922) , P• 75 . 
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official agents, use physic al force to carry out the powers and func-
tions that belonged to it. This included the power to command obedience 
to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent. 
Supporters of the Kansas statute made an analogy between the right of 
the Federal Government to use police power to prevent hindrances to 
interstate comrnerce and the right of the state to use its police 
power in cases which might arise urn.er the Kansas Industrial Act. Then, 
to support the power of the industrial court to apply to courts of com-
petent jurisdiction for orders to enforce its decisions, the founders 
relied upon this statement of Justice Brewer: 
Ev.ery government, entrusted by the very terms of its be-
ing with powers an:i duties to be exercised and discharged for 
the general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts 
for any proper assistance in the exercise of the one and the 
dis charge of the other. • • • 49 
The Court went on to · say that, while it was not the province of the govern-
ment to interfere in the mere matter of private controversy between in-
dividuals, or to use its great powers to enforce the rights of one 
against another, yet, whenever the wrongs complained of were such as 
affected the public at large, then the mere fact tha t the government 
has no pecuniary inter est in the cont roverey was not sufficient to 
exclude it from the courts. 
The last principal case used as a citation of authority for tbe 
act was Wilson y. New. 50 
49 . 158 U.S . 564, P• 578-9. 
50. 243 u.s . 332, 1917. 
It is claimed that in everthing, except possibly its 
penal sections, the Kansas Industrial Act is strictly· 
within the principles of law laid down by Chief Justice 
White in the prevailing opinion in Wilson y_. New. 51 
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This case upheld the constitutionality of the Adamson Act, which 
established wages and hours on railroads in interstate commerce. It was 
to avert a threatened nation-wide strike on the railroads th at the law 
was passed. In this case the following was relied upon by Mr. Huggins, 
apparently, as encompassing the main principles contained in the Kansas 
law and justifying them • 
• what benefits would flow to society by recognizing 
the right, because of the public interest, to regulate the 
relation of employer and employee and of the employees 
among themselves, arrl to give to the latter peculiar and 
special rights safeguarding their persons , protecting them 
in case of accident, and giving efficient remedies for that 
purpose, if th ere was no power to r emedy a situation created 
by a dispute between employers and employees as to rate of 
wages, which , if not remedied, would leave the public help-
less, the whole people ruined, arxi all the homes o.f the land 
submitted to a danger of the most serious character?~ •• 
We are of opinion that the r easons stated conclusively estab-
lish that ••• the act before us was clearly within the 
legislative power of Congress to adopt, and that in substance 
and effect, it amounted to an exertion of its authority under 
the circumstances disclosed to compulsorily arbitrate the 
dispute between the parties by establishing ••• a leg-
islative standard of wages, operative and binding as a matter 
of law, upon the parties ••.• 52 
Translate this to the state level and you have, as it looked to Mr. Hug-
gins and the other founders of the Ians as experiment, ample justification 
to regulate wages, hours of labor, and working conditions in industrial 
disputes , if the public welfare was in any danger, by the state indus-
51 . Huggins,££• cit., P• 77 • 
52. 243 U.S. 332, P• 351. 
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trial court. 
Upon these cas es was princi pall y based the authority to estab-
lish t he Kansas Court of' Industria l Relations. The founders were con-
fident that they had not only found a way to eradicate industrial war-
fare altogether, but that they had also found a constitutional way to 
do it. It was to be up to the Supreme Court of the United States to 
eventually decide whether or not the Kansas law could be supported by 
these other decisions. We have said t hat the Kansas law was not entire-
ly new, and that it was in part based on previous pri nci ples enunciated 
by the highest court din the land. Mr. F. Dumont Smith, a Hutchinson 
lawyer, and one of the f ramers of the industrial law, said that the 
industrial court was not new or novel, but was simply the ap plication 
of the police power , the old attribute of sovereignty, in this respect 
to a modern conditi on that had become intolerable. 53 To him, the police 
power had little or no l imitations , and was the broadest -and the most 
undefined of all go vernmental powers . It was, in fact , the final end 
and aim of civilized government , and that which all other governmental 
powers had to r espect. It could even override the sacredness of contract . 
At least, it has been seen that it was relied upon heavily in the creation 
of the indust rial court. 
Opinion For and Against the Court 
It might be well to j ust pause at this point to briefly summa-
53. Topeka Dai l y Capital, July 20, 1920. 
69 
rize some of the arguments, pro and con, concerning the Kansas law.-
There were literally hum.reds of articles, books, editorials, and news-
paper articles written about the court. It seems as if the writer was 
either very much in favor of the law or very much against it. There 
didn't seem to be too much written in a purely objective light on t he 
merits and demerits of the new statute. Of course those of labor were 
bitterly opposed to the law, and even many representing capital; while 
those who had had a part in the passage of the law were passionately 
supporting it. Some writers, in most part college professors, economists, 
arrl political scientists who had no direct interest in the law, im-
partially weighed the law, looking more at its possible reception in 
the courts, certain fallacies in its principles, and mentioning the 
parts of the measure 't.Orthy of praise, and whether or not such a 
measure was really the answer to industrial warfare. 
One such writer was Mr. w. E. Atkins of the University of Chicago. 54 
It seemed to him that the Act was colored with the impatient thought of 
the post-war period, and that under more tranquil conditions its would 
have been difficult to conceive of such legislation being passed, at 
least for s:::>me time to come. He emphasized the tense atmosphere of the 
Kansas legislature, and the fact that they apparently wanted to settle 
the matter (of possible recurring strikes in the coal fields) once and 
for all. He was under the impression that three things should have been 
54. w. E. Atkins, "The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations," 
Journal of Political Economy, XXVIII (April, 1920) , pp. 339-352. 
70 
clear to the legislators when they passed the .law. First, that there 
were limits to the implications some people found in t he doctrine of 
public interest -- when difficulty arose between employer and employee, 
especially when the doctrine of public int er est was spread as it was 
in the Kansas act, that the int erest of the public was distant and in-
definite compared to that of the worker who was fighting for what he 
termed his very existence. Secondly, Mr. Atki ns thought that since 
labor had had difficulty with the courts f or many years, the act might 
provoke rather than curb difficulties. For his third point , he f ound a 
danger in the provision that the appointment of the judges lay with th e 
governor; he was not bound, moreover, to choose a purely representative 
group of judges.55 It should be brought out here that it wasn't the 
idea of the governor, nor of those who framed the bill, to have a r epr e-
sentative group chosen for the court. This w::mld have made it more a.ft an 
arbitration court, with haggling bet11een t he judges, and a compromise 
solution probably being the result fun the majority of cases. The i ndus-
trial court was to be exactly like any of the other legally constituted 
state courts, made up of impartial judges who would adjudicate the 
industrial disputes purely in th e light of known facts, tempered with 
justice for both parties. 
Mr. Atkins did think the court had possibilities am might gather 
some success because of the fact that Kansas was largely ag~icultural, 
not predominantly an industrial state. He did think the doctrine of 
55. Atkins, .Q.12• cit., P• 347. 
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public interest had been spread much too far, especially in the inclu-
sion of the production of wearing apparel. 
Mr. William Allen White was one of the virgorous supporters of 
the Kansas industrial law. Besides speaking before the special session 
of the legislature in support of the bill, he wrote several magazine 
articles in which he upheld the content and purpose of the law. He 
emphasized the advantages held by the industrial court over former 
arbitration and conciliation plans. Arbitration and conciliation had 
sought peace, on the best terms possible, but it was only a temporary 
peace. Now the Kansas court would seek justice in labor controversies, 
this justice naturally being followed by that peace in our industrial 
56 life that everyone wanted. 
Numerous magazine articles were written by Governor Allen in 
support of his court. In all these writings his a rguments fo llowed the 
same line of thought. Why di d Kans as - create the irrl us trial court? 
The state reasoned that government has put a stop to 
every other quarrel which threatens the welfare and good 
order of society. The industrial quarrel is t he only one 
which government anywhere allows to proceed on its own 
destructive will. And so reasoning that the state by the 
broad exercise of its police powers has t he right to pro-
tect the public a gainst the danger and the waste of t he 
industrial controversy, it adopted a law which declares 
that neither labor nor capital shall conspire to close down 
an institution which is engaged in the production of an 
essential commodity such as f ood, f uel, clothing, or 
transportation.57 
56. William Allen White, "Industrial Justice -- Not Peace, 11 The 
Nation's Business, X (May, 1922), PP• 14-16. 
57. Henry J. Allen, "What About the Public?" The Rotarian, XXI 
(September, 1922), PP• 117-119. 
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He always reiterated his f ear that a small group of radicals were in . 
the process of getting cont rol of the workingman, and was encourageing 
him to look for justice through t heir own force, not through just ice as 
rendered in the courts of the land. Government should come out right now 
and prove that it was able to protect the many against any encroachments 
by the few. Governor Allen was by far the staunchest supporter of the 
Kansas law, not only whi le he was in office, rut after he had' retired 
to private life. 
Labor, largely through the \0 ice of the American Federation of 
Labor, was always a bitter critic and opponent of the measure . They call-
ed it involuntary servitude, said that it was meant to protect the f inan-
cial interests of t he employer, and that it had been passed largely due 
to a wave of hysteria created by Governor Allen during the period of the 
coal strike and after. 58 
Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, was 
especially bitter in his opposition to the act. He once engaged Governor 
Allen in public debate over t he issue. 59 'rhe main thing he had against 
t he Kansas Court was it s prevention of strikes. He thought the whole 
act was undemocratic arrl wouldn't work . "Th e right to quit work must be 
maintained inviolate if freedom :ti.s to be preserved. 1160 He scof fed 
58. "Kansas Court of Industrial Relations , 11 American Federat ionist , 
XXVII (July , '1920) , pp . 627-629. 
59. See, Debate Between Samuel Gompers and Henry{• Allen at 
Carnegie Hall, New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1920 . 
60. Samuel Gompers, 11The Case For Or ganized Labor, 11 The Rotarian, 
XXI (October, 1922), p. 174. 
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at the contention of Governor Allen that there was a distinct "third-
party" which had a very vital i nterest in _all industrial disputes . He 
said there was no such thing as a detached general public; that the 
whole population was divided as employers and employees . His solution 
to the industrial problem was to hang on to voluntary arbitration. 
The framers of the Kansas statute al ways disputed with the 
opponents of the oourt the question concerning this right to quit work. 
The court made a differentiation between striking and the mere quitting 
of work. 61 To labor they were one an:i the same t hing . In reply to the 
charge of Mr. Gompers that the court had taken away the divine right of 
the worker to quit work whenever he so desired, Mr. Allen said, "We 
have merely helped to take away Mr . Gomper•s divine right to order a 
man to quit work. That is all . 1162 
Mr . Johns . Dean, a leading Kans as lawyer and one-time Unit ed 
States District Attorney for Kansas, was another who felt that the 
Kansas law was fundamentally wrong. He feared for private enterprise 
under the system as established by the Kansas law. He made much of the 
fact that manufacture and pro duction were fundamentally and unchange-
ably private business. It was one of the inalienable ri ghts of the 
American people, that of engaging one's propert y and services in 
business activities, to control and manage t he same as he wished, t o 
61. Section 17. 
62 . Henry J . Allen, Address to Kans as Bankers' Association, A 
Moder n Weapon, Topeka, State Printer, 1921, P• 11. 
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hire and discharge whom he desired, and to be left perfectly free in 
contracting for his labor. 63 
Mr. Dean thought the main features of the law contravened the 
most elementary principles of individual liberty and private property. 
He could not see how economic change and modern progress had suddenly 
impressed such private industries as the production of food and clothing 
to such an extent as to subject them to state regulation. 
To select these particular industries and deprive the own-
ers and the workmen employed by them of the freedom of contract, 
untrammeled control of their own property and their individual 
liberty, while leaving the ta.lance of their fellow-citizens in 
the full possession of these invaluable rights; to burden the 
owners and v-.0rkers in these particular industries with the 
supervision, control and management of a state collilllission, is 
a flagrant denial of the equal protection oft re law guaranteed 
by the tzurteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States . 
These have been some of the principal argumerri:,s used by those for 
and against the Kansas industrial law. One screamed justice, the other 
tyranny. A middle g rourli was hard to find. Mr . F. Dumont Smith refuted 
the arguments that the law made men work against their will, that it 
made an irrl ustry continue operation at a loss, etc., which were prin-
cipal arguments used by the opposition. He said the law didn't even 
pretend to do these things. "It merely attempts to prevent a breach of 
the peace by settling a strike before it reaches that point, and merely 
63. Johns. Dean, The Furrlamental Unsoundness of the Kansas 
Industrial Court Law, 11 American Bar Association Journal, VII (July, 
1921), P• 333. -
64. Ibid., p. 63. 
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asserts the power to compel conti nued production when a stoppage of' 
production would endanger the public health. 1165 
In a speech before the International Convention of Rotary Clubs 
in Atlantic City, New Jersey, on June 22, 1920, Mr. Huggins very ade-
quately summarized the main purpose of the Kansas statute, and what it 
would do for both capital and labor. He said that: 
The prime purpose of the industrial law is the protection 
of the public against the inconvenience, the hardships and t he 
suffering so often caused by industrial warfare . It protects 
every citizen in his God-given right to work, to support his 
family like a free man without molestation and without fear . 
It conf irms the right of every man to quit , to change his em-
ployment, like a free man; but it forbids him either by vio-
l ence or by intimidati on to prevent others from working . It 
assures capital i nvested in the essential industries f reedom 
from the great economic waste incident to industrial warfare . 
It offers a fai r r eturn upon such investments. It guarantees 
to workers en gaged in these essential industries a fair wage, 
steady employment, and healthful and moral surrourrlings. It 
gives to enployers, to employees and to the general public 
alike an impartial tribunal. to which mey be submitted all 
controversies vitally affecting the three . It declares anew 
the democratic principles that the will of the majority l egal-
ly expressed shall be the law of the land. It prohibi sand 
penalizes the rule of the minority by means of intimidation. 
It prohibits trial of industrial disputes by gauge of battle, 
and it offers in place the reof, a safe, sane and l?i vilized remedy 
for industrial wrongs.66 
The success, or failure, which attended the efforts of the Kansas i ndus-
trial court to fill in this picture with effective action will be left 
for the next section of this paper. In it will be described the intimate 
workings of the court, including sample cases arrl investigations, plus 
a short summary of the court's struggle with organized labor. 
65. Topeka Daily Capital, July 20, 1920. 
66. The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations,! Modern Weapon; 
(Topeka : State Printer , 1921), p. 6. 
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CHAPTER DI 
THE COURT IN OPERATION 
This chapter will be_mainly co ncerned with the activities of 
the court in connection with industrial disputes. However, a word 
about the supplementry activities of the court. When the Court of In-
dustrial Relations was organized, February 2, 1920, th e powers and 
duties formerly belonging to t he Public Utilities Commission were given 
to it. The court only had this jurisdiction far nine months, at which 
time the Public Utilities Commission was created again. During its 
first year of operation the court was mainly occupied with the utility 
side of its duties. During the first nine months, ll04 cases concern-
ing public utilities, their rates, stock and bond issues, approval of 
building plans, and sales were decided by the Utilities Di vision of 
1 the court. 
Aside from the public utility functions of the court, 28 cases 
were f iled on the i ndustrial side during the first 10 months , which is 
roughly the period covered by the First Annual Report. Of these, 25 
wer e filed by labor and 1 by capital , while 2 investigations were 
initiated by the court. Of the 25 cases filed by labor, 20 received 
formal attention and decision. In 13 of these cases a wage increase 
was granted; in 3, wages wer e found to be fair so that no increase was 
allowed; in 2, only workiil!; conditions were involved; while in 1 the 
1. Court of Industrial Relations, First Annual Report, St ate of 
Kansas , (Topeka: State Printing Pl ant, 1921), P• 4, 
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empl oyers took action satisfactory to the employees, the court simp1=y 
approving the settlement . lhe remaining case was merely a referee action 
2 on a collective agreement • 
During the times between cases the work of the court went on. In 
order to correctly adjudicate labor controversies, them mbers* found 
that they needed information concerning such things as the cost of liv.i. ng, 
the working conditions in the various industrial plants throughout the 
state, hours of labor, sanitary and health conditions, safety appliances, 
ruxi a variety of other matters. The court employ ed tw::> lawyers to act 
as i nvestigators or inspectors, and whenever a complaint was made, they 
went to the plant or industry a f fected and tried to ascertain the f acts 
involved . t times questionaires were sent out by the court to gather 
information concerning prices and costs, in order to gauge the rise or 
fall in the cost of livi rg •. This was an important matter in the adjudi-
cation of disput es where a wage increase was asked for . 
At the time that the powers and duties of the Public Utilities 
Commission were removed from the jurisdiction of the indust r i al court , 
other duties were conferred upon it by the legislature . The legisl atur e 
placed the activities of the labor department, free employment service 
and Industrial Welf are Commission under the jurisdiction of the indus-
2 . U. S . Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Kansas 
Court of Industrial Relations , Bulletin No . 322, (Washington: Government 
Printing ffice, April, 1923), P• 37 . 
* The first three j udges of the industrial court were: W. L. 
Huggins , presiding judge; James A. McDermott and John H. Crawford, 
judges . In 1923 Henderson S . Martin replaced Mr . McDermott on the court, 
and in 1924 j udge Crawford was succeeded by Joseph Taggart . 
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trial court . 3 This is how the functions and duties of t he court were tBen 
lined up . The court was composed of five main divisions . 
I . Industrial divis ion 
1 . Adjudicat ion of disputes between employer and employees in 
the essential industries named in the statute 
2. Adjudication of disputes in any industry subnitted by agree-
ment of the parties 
3. Original investigations in essential industries 
4. Procuring continuous and efficient operations of essential 
industries sufficient for the protection of the public 
II. Labor divi sion 
1. Mine inspection department 
a . Accident prevention, ventilation and sanitation 
b. Mine- rescue work . Maintenance and superintendence of 
mine- rescue stations at Pittsburg, Arma, and Scammon 
c . Making statistical reports on mines, surveys , tonnage 
production, workmen employed, etc. 
2. Factory inspection department 
a . Safety and sanitation 
Fire prevention 
Safety of buildings 
Elevator inspection 
Machinery inspection as to safety appliances, etc. 
Lighting 
Ventilation and sanitation 
Orders for betterment 
b . St atistical inspections and reports 
Number an:i classification of e:nployees 
Wages paid 
Minors employed 
3. Administration of all labor laws 
a . Eight-hour day on public work 
b . Reports of industrial accidents (fatal and nonfatal) 
c . Other miscellaneous provisions. 
III . Women's division ( and child labor) 
1 . Investigat ion as to ¼Omen in i ndustry 
2. Promulgating of orders relating to: a. Hours of labor 
b . Minimum wages 
c . Safety, sanitation and welfare 
d . Child employment 
e . Recording and supervising issuance of child-labor permits 
f . Enforcement of child-labor penal laws 
3. Court of Industrial Relations, Second Annual Report, State of 
Kansas , Topeka, State Printing Plant, 1922, PP• 5-6. 
IV. Free employment service 
1. Maintenance and supervi. sion of public free employment 
offices. 
a. Topeka, Wi .chita , Kansa s City, Salina , Hutchinson 
and Parsons 
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b . Cooperating with federal employment service 
2. Regulation and supervi si on of private employment agencies 
3- Investigat ion of nonemployment, and reports to stat e and 
f ederal authoriti es 
4. Harvest labor 
V. Miscellaneous activities 
1. Reports and i nvestigations of settlements in industrial 
accid ent cases 
2. Advisory-workmen ' s compensation claims 
One of the new duties thus imposed on the i ndustrial court was that 
of factory inspection. This had formerl y been done by the labor commission-
er in the Department of Labor and Industry. long with this was the duty 
of seeing that the labor laws were enforced . In doing t his a systematic 
and regular ins p ection of all places of employment was required. The 
labor department had been carryi ng this out for y ear s, now it merely be-
ing under the direction of the new court. Since most of the activities 
newly-conferred on t he court were mere routine, they will not be gone 
into in any detail in this paper. 
An example of t he worki ngs of one of t hese other minor divisions 
is a pro j ect carried out by the Women ' s division in 1 921 . It made a Cost 
of Living Survey, which was later us ed as a basi s for hea rings held to 
aid the industrial cour t in investigating conditions pr e liminary to 
revisi ng mercantile, laundry, factory and public housekeeping orders of 
various Kansas cities. 4 As a result of these hearings modifications of 
4. Court of Industrial Relations, Thir d Annual Report, State of 
Kansas , Topeka, St ate i nti ng Plant, 1923, p . 115 . 
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orders affecting ...omen workers were made by the industrial court. Cn_anges 
were made in minimum wages, hours, ove?'time, and prohibition of night 
work. The Women I s Division alro made an investigation of the child labor 
conditions in Kansas and published a report in 1922 mainly concerning 
child-labor in the sugar-beet fields. 5 
As we have seen, tbe Kansas Court of Industrial Relations was or-
ganized primarily to deal with industrial problems and oo ntroversies. For 
this reason the remainder of the discussion concerning the activities of 
the court will be in connection with this function. One t hing will be 
noticed in this respect, arrl that is, that each yea:r the number of cases 
of the industrial side of the court declined in number,until in 1925 the 
court was nearly inoperative a s far as adjudicating i ndustrial contro-
versies was concerned. There seem to have been several reasons for this. 
In the first place, t he re was a gradual lessening of industrial t ension 
by 1923 throughout the oountry , and especially in Kansas. Then . there was 
the fact that Kansas wasn't a great industrial state to begin with, as a 
result of which there would never be marry industrial con flicts to be 
settled. In 1923 Mr. Jonathan Davis was elected governor of Kansas. He 
was a Democrat and had been elected on a platform of abolishing the 
industrial court. 'fhis apparently sh owed that the people in Kansas were 
losing interest iri their industrial court. In his first message to the 
Kansas legislature, Governor Davis advocated t h e repeal of the industrial 
court law. 6 He said the greatest progress toward t he p eaceful settlement 
5. Results of this investigation published on pages 123-124 of the 
Third Annual Report. 
6. State of Kansas, House Journal, January 10, 1923, PP• 9- 24. 
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of differenc~s between employer and employee had been made in mutual 
understanding and by the state's aid in conciliation. To him the law 
was a failure because it had failed to engage the mutua l confidence 
and support of ather enployer or employ ee. He, too, saw in the law a 
threat of spreading socialism. "Followed to the ultimate conclusion, the 
principles involved in the attempt to regulate wages and conditions and 
activities through this so-called court, would involve the state in t he 
regulation of all business and produce state socialism • ••• 11 7 He 
attacked the legality of the court also, saying that the so-called court 
could not enforce its decrees save through the civil courts, nor could 
it be properly clothed with power to do so . It was not even a court, and 
the legislature could not create a court in this manner . 
Governor Davis had a n alternative plan in mind to resolve differ-
ences between labor and capital. He thought a law should be enacted 
creating the office of industrial commissioner, consisting of one commission-
er to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. This 
commissioner would aid in arbitration and conciliation of labor disputes. 
In case of a dispute, he was to ask the governor to appoint a representative 
of labor and one of capital to meet with him and form a board to try and 
draw up a settlement . It could make investigations, subpoena witnesses, 
am. publish its findings, b.l. t could not force either party to agree to any 
settlement it might decide upon. 8 
7. Ibid., P• 17. 
8. Ibid., P• 18. 
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He wasn't able to abolish the industrial court law, however, be-
cause the legislature was Republican and they were committed to support 
of the court . He was successful in weakening the court though. Heap-
pointed Mr. Henderson Martin, who had opposed him in the gubernatorial 
primary on an anti - court pledge, to a vacancy on the court. To another 
seat he named Mr. Leo Goodrich, repeatedly and publicly pledged against 
the court and all its works. Als:>, the appropriation made for the 
industrial court for the next two years was $77,900, barely enough to 
keep it alive. 9 The staff of experts, engineers and accountants was 
also drastically re duced. It looked as if the only reason the Republicans 
in the legislature had retained the court was because the Democratic 
governor wanted it abolished. 
Another reason for tr.e growing weakness of the court was an ad-
verse decision rendered int~ United States Supreme Court on its con-
stitutionality.lo The decis · on outlawed the provision allowing the 
court to fix minimum wages in the flou.t'-milling industry. This case 
will be taken up and discussed in the next and final chapter. 
The 28 cases filed in the industrial side of the court during the 
first year was the greatest number for any one year. During 1921 
· d · al · d ll f th there were only 13 cases filed on the 1.n ustri SJ. e. one o ese, 
the Charles Wolff Packing Company case was later carried to the United 
9. Charles B. Driscoll, 11 The Kans as Industrial Court -- Gassed, 11 
The Nation, CXVI (April 25, 1923), p. 489 . 
10. Wolff Packing Co . !· Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 
522, 1923. 
11 . Secord Annual Report , PP• 14-15 ° 
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States Supreme Court and was responsible for the series of cases re-
sulting in the virtual nullific ation of the more important features 
of the Kansas law. There were 10 industrial cases filed during 1922. 12 
The number of cases had dropped to 2 by 1923, 13 and in 1924 only one 
new case was brought before the court. 14 
Illustrative Cases Before the Court 
Examples will be given of certain of the more i>-riportant cases 
which appeared before the cou rt f or settlement, plus an original in-
vestigation entered into by the industrial court, to show t he methods 
used by the court in reaching decisions and adjudicating the disputes. 
The fir st case appearing in the court for settlement was the Topeka 
Edison Case. 15 
The complaint in t h is case was brought by the attorney-general 
of Kansas on behalf of the electrical workers, members of Local Union 
No . 841, International Brotherhood of Electrical Worke rs, and the 
respondent was the Topeka Edison Company, a corporat ion engaged in 
generating and selling electricity for lighting and power purposes in 
Topeka, Kans as . 
A dispute had arisen between the local union and the company in 
the matter of hours of labor and wages . The complaint charged that all 
12. Third Annual Report, p . 23. 
13 . Fourth Annual Reoort , pp . 12 and 14. 
14. Fifth Annual Report, p . 7. 
15. Miscellaneous Pamphlets, Volume II. The State of Kansas ~ · The 
Topeka Edison Company, Docket No. 3254-I- 2, pp. 3-10; The Court of Indus-
trial Relations, Selected Opinions and Orders, Topeka, October 12, 1922, 
pp. 10-15. 
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efforts to reach an agreement with the company had failed. In their 
reply, the company admitted that there was a controversy, but that they 
had offered the workers an increase of 2½¢ per hour, which they had 
turned down. They were insisting on an increase of 10¢ per hour and a 
standard 8-hour day. 
The workers, in particular, who were complaining were the line-
men, the men who put up and maintained the lines transmitting the 
electric power from the compaey to the city . It was mentioned that 
their work was very hazardous, that they were all enployees of long 
standing with the company, and were skilled workers in every s ense of 
the word. Upon this ,mainly, they were justifying t heir demand for a 
wage increase, and the standard 8-hour day. The matter of the 8-hour 
day was settled between the tw:> parties with the concurrerce of the 
court, and so wasn't any longer pa.rt of the dispute to be settled by 
the court. 
The wage of the workers (the linemen) had increased from a daily 
wage of $2.75 in 1916 to 60¢ per hour for a basic 8-hour day in 1919, with 
time and one half for overtime arrl double time for ..ork on Sunday. In the 
hearing it was brought out that prior to the year 1919 the workers were 
able to · live ard support their families reasonably upon the wage which 
they then received. Some, apparently, were able to save a little money. 
The 60¢ per hour wage for the 8-hour day, of course, raised the daily 
wage to $4.80, but the men were complaining, that with the tremendous 
rise in the cost of livir:g, they were not able to support their families 
as well on this as they formerly had on the $2.75 wage scale. The ceurt 
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remarked that it was evident the cost of living had indeed gone up, and 
that the cost of food had inc reased 100% by November, 1919 , over Novem-
ber, 1913, and that clothing and furnishings had risen even more. The 
worker's rent, and the price of coal, had also gone up as much as 50%, the 
court reported . 
The s e statements of fact naturally brought up the most important 
point of the whole case, arri that was what the industrial court consider-
ed a fair wage . How did the court arrive at a so-called fair wage? The 
court made a differerce between a living wage and a fair wage. A living 
wage was defined as a wage which era.bled the worker to supply himself 
arrl those absolutely dependent upon him with sufficient food to maintain 
life and health ; with a shelter from the inclemencies of the weather; 
with sufficient clothing to preserve the body from the cold, and to en-
able persons to mingle among their fellows in such ways as may be neces-
16 
sary in the preservation of life . As to a "fair wage", which the 
court said that all industrial workers were entitled to, several important 
circumstances were taken into consideration, namely: 
1 . the scale of wages paid f or similar kinds of work in other 
industries . 
2 . the relation between wages and the cost of living. 
3. hazards of th e employm~t . 
4. the training and skill required. 
5. the degree of responsibility inherent in the job. 
6. character and regularity of the employment. 
7. skill, industry, and fidelity of the individual employee. 17 
16. Ibid., P• 5. 
17. Ibid., p . 7. 
86 
The court went on to say that a skilled worker should have a higher -
wage than an unskilled worker. Such skilled workers were entitled to 
a wage which would enable them to procure for themselves and their 
families all the necessaries and a reasonable share of the comforts of 
life. They were entitled to a wage which would enable them, by industry 
and economy, not only to supply themselves with opportunities f or 
intellectual advancement and reasonable recreation, but also to en-
able the parents world.ng together to furnish to the children ample 
opportunities for intellectual and moral advancement, for education, 
and for an equal opportunity in the race of life. A fair wage would 
also allow the frugal man to provide reasonably for sickness and o:id 
age. 
However, the industrial statute 5Upowered the court to fix only 
a minimum wage. The minimum could be fixed by the court, but the maximum 
must depend upon the skill, fidelity an:i industry of the employee, the 
fair and equitable disposition of the employer, the prosperity of t he 
business, an::l. other economic circumstances. 
The court foun:i that the wage pa.id to the workers mentioned was 
unreasonably low and was not a fair wage to be paid them and other work-
ers similarly situated and employed by the Topeka Edison Company. The 
main reason given for the fact th at the wage was unduly low was the 
rise that had occurred in the cost of living during the years following 
the World War. A minimum wage of 67½¢ per hour on the basis of an 8-hour 
day, time and a half for overtime and double time for Sundays, was 
established by the court in this case. The wage order was to be 
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continued for a period of six months, unless changed beforehand oy 
agreement of the two parties, with the approval of the court. 
This case shows the points taken into consideration by the 
industrial court in its attempts to a rrive at fair minimum wages, a 
difficult job in any situation by any board or commission. The same 
criteria were used in the other cases brought before the court in which 
attempts were made to find a new wag e scale. There was no contention 
in the 'l'opeka Edison Case concerning the a bility of the company to pay 
the increased wage rate. In the following case this point did come up, 
and it is int eresting to note the philosophy developed by the judges 
concerning the relationship between the need for a higher wage scale 
and the financial inability 9f a company to pay it. 
The case to be mentioned now was the Joplin and Pittsburg Rail-
way Company case. 18 The officers and members of local union No. 497 of 
the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees 
of America brought this action before the i ndustrial court. The company 
concerned operated an electric railway in Crawf ord and Cherokee counti es 
in Kansas, and to Joplin, Missouri. The union members represent ed al l t he 
various occupations connected with the railway company. 
The union claimed that the wage paid t hem was unfair, was un-
reasonably low, and was not sufficient to provide r easonably livi ng 
conditions for them and their families; and they mentioned that the 
18. The Court of Industrial Relations, State of l\.ansas , Selected 
Opinions and Orders, Topeka, issued by W. F. Wilkerson, Clerk, October 
12, 1922, pp . 25-30. 
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controversy wuld endanger the continuous operation and efficient ser-
vice of the company •. It was, of course, only under this condition that 
the industrial court could take jurisdiction. The union claimed that 
efforts had been made to work out an agreement respecting wages with 
the company, but that the company had refused to come to any agree-
ment. The union claimed that, since the controversy w::iuld affect the 
public, would endanger the public health, and the general welfare of 
many people in Kansas, the industrial court should take jurisdiction, 
make an investigation, and establish a reasonable minimum wage for them. 
The railway company claimed that the industrial court had no 
jurisdiction, as they were in interstate transportation business and 
could only be regulated by the federal government . The court ruled, how-
ever, that they did have jurisdiction over the matter. The company also 
denied that the controversy would in any way endanger the public health 
or welfare, and claimed that, with its present earnings, it would be 
unable to pay a higher rate of wages than they were then paying. 19 
Two entire days were taken up in hearing the evidence upon the 
issues brought up . The evidence was very voluminous a.nq covered a wide 
range of facts . Among other points, the evidence showed that within 
recent years a strike of 80 days had occurred, totally paral yzing 
business, with a result of more than $68,000 loss to the company. Later, 
a thirty- six day strike occurred with a corresponding loss to the company. 
19 . Ibid., p. 26 . 
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Also, it was found that some voluntary increases in wages had been made 
since August 1, 1914. Then, in May, 1918, a wage controversy was sub-
mitted to the Hon . William Howard Taft, and Frank P. Walsh , j oint chair-
men of the War Labor Board, and on July 31, 1918, a decision was rendered 
by this board fixi ng a certain wage scale for the enployees of the company. 
This award was to continue for the duration of the war, except that either 
party might reopen the case before t he arbitrators at periods of six 
months' intervals, beginning February 1, 1919 , for such adjustments as 
changed conditions mi ght render necessary.At the time of this case, 1921, 
the workers claimed the right to reopen the case before the Court of 
Industrial Relations as the War Labor Board had ceased to function. The 
court upheld them in this oont enti on. 
The problem was made difficult by the fact that both skilled and 
unskilled labor was involved, and there was a wide divergence between the 
various crafts and classes o f labor as to the responsibility imposed. This 
made it difficult to fairly- adjust the difference in the wage rates to the 
various classes. The oourt said t hat it was evident that there had recent-
ly occurred a rise in the cost of living , and thought that the 42¢ per 
hour minimum fixed by the War Labor Board f or both skilled and unskilled 
workmen was unfair. The court mentioned again the criteria used to deter-
mine a fair wage. These were mentioned in connection with the Topeka 
Edison Case. 
During the case the question arose as to whether or not the rail-
way company was financially able to pay a higher wage rate to its employees. 
The company hadn't been .financially prosperous for years arrl didn't pay a 
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reasonable return on the physical value of its property. There had ~een, 
however, imreases in f reight and passenger rates gr anted by the indus-
trial court. The growing competition of b us lines and trucking service 
was mentioned as having had effects on electric railways the country over. 
Then the court brought out a bit of philosophy which was adhered 
to by it throughout all its existence. It said: 
This court is very desirous to do nothing in this case which 
will unduly burden the resporxient ( railway company) . However, 
it must be admitted that wages to labor shouild be considered 
before dividends to the investor, and that a business which is 
unable to pay a fair rate 8f wages to its employees will even-
tually have to liquidate. 2 
This was justification for the power conferred upon the industrial court 
to fix a minimum wage and have it obeyed by the corporations. Then, too, 
the court in this case brought out the point that t he poople of southeast-
ern Kansas ir.ould vitally need the services of t he electric railway for 
years to come, which merely meant that, even with the financial straits 
enveloping the company, it must remain in operation. This wasn't out-
right ordered because the company didn't a sk to cease operations, but if 
the company had, it is quite probable that the court would have denied 
the permission. In that case t he state ...ould have been in position to 
assume operation of the company if necessary to maintain its continuous 
and efficient service to' the people in that sector of Kansas. 
The industrial court found that the wage then being paid by the 
company was unreasonably low and was not a fai r scale to be paid to the 
employees. The court then set another scale which was to be paid by the 
20. Ibid., p. 28. 
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company. This new scale raised the minimwn wage to be paid the employees 
as much as 10¢ per . hour for rome types of work. It was a general raise 
for all classes of employment. This new wage rate, however, was only to 
apply to such employees who were bona fide residents of Kansas, and like-
wise was to run for a period of six months, unless changed by the parties 
during that time. 
But not every case before the court result ed in th! g ranting of a 
wage increase. It mi ght be well now to glance at a case in which a re-
quest for a wage increase was denied, and at the reasons why it was 
denied. This was a second case involving the Joplin arrl Pittsburg Rail-
way Company. 21 It ini:.olved train despatchers on the line. They brought 
suit in the court to get a wage increase shortly after many other employees 
of the company had been g ranted an increase, referring to the case just 
mentioned. 
In this case the industrial court took t h e f ollowing attitude. The 
wage then being paid train despatchers by the r ailway company was $160 
per month. The court found from the evid ence that the work was done by 
telephone, and was ,-.ork of the sort that it required by a short space of 
time for an apt student to learn. The work was not heavy and was not com-
parable with train despatching on the steam railroads, either in the 
matter of skill required, or of the responsibility imposed. From this 
evidence, the court ruled that the wage rate was not unfair. It believed 
that the $160 per month that was being paid for such work was a fair wage. 
21.. Court of Industrial Relations, First Annual Report, State of 
Kansas , Topeka, State Printing Plant, 1921~44-
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The request for an increase was there fore denied by the court. 
Here is another case , one in which a decision was made by the 
industrial court on things other than wages. It is the Fort Scott 
Sorghum-Syrup Company Case. 22 This company manufactured syrup from 
sorghum cane, and furnished for the most part only seasonal employment. 
The grinding of the cane and the first preparation required something 
more than 100 men from 50 to 90 days in the fall of the year, running 
the plant 24 hours per day. During this time from 5 to 7 steam boilers 
and engirl's were in use . After that the process of mixing and ref ining 
the syrup and preparing it for table use and for shipment, called for 
but a few men and only one steam boiler. 
On July 15, 1920 , the company made an agreement with the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers in the nature of a closed 
shop contract , There was no controversy except as to the rrumber of men 
employed after the heavy fall campaign, the period of the year when the 
plant operated at full capacity, was over. During previous years two 
engineers and t W::> firemen had be en required to run the necessary b oiler 
and engine, but in the autumn of 1920 the company found itself doing 
only about 4 or 5 percent of its average business. The company, there-
fore , sought t o reduce expenses by discharging the two firemen, two 
engineers working alternate shifts and firing their own boilers. The 
two engineers were willing to fire their own boilers in view of the 
small amount of work required, saying that to fire the engine would 
22 . Selected Orders and Opinions, PP • 35-38. 
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not require to exceed two hours of time per day. The Engineer's union 
refused to permit this , as it would violate the "one man, one job11 
policy of their union. 
The company felt that some concession should be made, otherwise 
they would be required to pay $12 per day for men to perform two hours' 
work. Admitting that the sum was relatively small, the company said that 
nevertheless it would simply increase the deficit the company had been 
operating under . A general representative of the union, who was present 
at the trial, thou:e;ht that the cone ession ought to be arranged, and ex-
pressed his belief that local officers had made a mistake in insisting 
on the "one man, one job" idea. The court wished to waive decision until 
the unions could make their own arrangements, but both parties stated 
that they had agreed to abide by the order of the court and insisted 
upon an immediate and authoritative decision. 
In its decision the court recognized the closed shop in the 
particular case because it had been instituted by mutual agreement, 
but it did think it was unfair to require the enployment of two men to 
do the w:>rk of one . In this connection the court ordered t hat the 
contract should be so modified as to permit one man to work at two or 
more jobs not requiring excessive periods of ti r11e, in which case his 
union membership might be transferred without cost to any party so long 
as the necessity for this work should continue. 
The last representative case to be mentioned also concerns the 
Joplin and Pittsburg ~ailway Company. In this case the same employees 
who had been granted a raise in wages by the inoustrial court in 1920, 
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the first Joplin and Pittsburg Railway Case reviewed in this paper , 
went into the court for another increase . 23 Also included in their re-
quest was the adjustment of a collective a _'reernent relative to train 
crews, hours of labor, and days per week. 
rhe i ndustrial court dccl · n the wage increase on the ground 
that there was a general tendency toward a decrease in living c osts , and 
while it had not yet materially affected the ultimate consumer, there had 
at least been no advance. The ot her point decided by the court in this 
case was similar in some respects with the Fort Scott Sor ghum case, t.tlat 
is, the company complained too many men were being demanded by t e union 
for performing c ertain functions , merely increasing the operating costs 
of the company. 
The me n wished the co ntract to require three men on their trains 
that handled t hree or more cars at the same ti ne . The court I s view of 
this was , that considering the nature of t he w:,rk done upon the freight 
trains usually handled by the company, the third man would add an un-
just burden to the costs of operation without public benefit, a result 
which ...uuld ultimately be reflected in lower wages to the men or poorer 
service to the public. 
In this case the court again brou~ht out the principle that wages 
to labor should come before all else in the business operations of the 
concerns affected by the Industrial Court Law. That is, the company 
should see that fair wages were being paid to t he -workers, then di vidends 
23 . Selected Opinions and Urders, PP· 30-34~ U. S. ureau of Labor 
Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, XII (April, 1921;, P• 123 . 
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and prof its wo uld fall into second pl ace. Another point in this case_ 
related to t he establishment of an 8- hour day . A method of working an 
18- hour shift on an 8-hour basis was worked out by t he chief accountant 
of the court, but it was comput ed that thi s -would add $25 , 000 to t he annual 
operating cost, an amount t h e company c ould not pay without subtracting 
from its deprecia tion f und or f ai ling t o pay int er est due. The court 
maintained its view that wages mus t come be for e dividends , and t hat a 
business which couldn't pey- f air wage , and at the s ame time earn a 
reasonable return, must event ually go out of busines s . However, as t he 
problem was eventually worked out, t h i s 8- hour sys tem was not instituted. 
Instead , it was decided t hat , t aking i nt o consi der at ion t he nature of 
the wor k performed , a 9-hour dey- v.0ul d not unduly deprive t he wor ker of 
a reasonable t i me f or r es t , r ec reat i on , self- improvement , social di ver-
sion, and the family circle . 
These r a ndom c ases will t end to illust r ate t he working s of the 
court in its decis i ons regar ding indust rial disputes . A standard had 
been s et up t o mea sure a fai r wage, c ertain i deals r egar ding the opera-
tion of b usi n esses affect ed by the i ndustrial law were enuncia t ed, a nd 
t he long rocky road to i ndustri a l peace was being warily trod by the new 
court. Another important act ivity of the court that s hou ld be mentioned 
at t h is t ime is t h at of maki ng original i nve stigations i nto certain 
industries. Out of t hese i nvestigations the court gathered much valuable 
i nformation relating to suc h t hings a s t he co ntinuous operation of 
certain industries, could they be oper at ed mor e regular ly t h an they 
were, or were t here cogent reasons f or par tial el apsi ng of oper ations ? 
We have mentioned the surveys carried out by certain minor divisions of 
the industrial court and their importance . Investigations were made i nto 
the coal industry at various times in order to furnish the court with 
needed information in correctly adjudicating disputes occurring therein. 24 
One such investigation, which will suffice in pointing out th is part of 
the court I s activities, was the original investigation carried out by 
the court concerning the continuity of production in t he flour- milling 
industry at Topeka and other points in the state of Kansas . 25 
The occasion of this investigation was the i nformation, which 
came to the court in an informal way, that the flouring mills located 
in Topeka, Kansas, were reduci ng production . preliminary i nvestigation 
was held and testimony was taken from the seven milling companies and 
from many others located throughout the state . The one outstanding 
fact which emerged from this investigation was that t he mills had not 
stopped operation in any general sense, but that owing to condi t ions, 
the mills of Kansas generally were running at about 60i capacity . The 
court was to decide whether or not there was any nint t h at the millers 
were in any way hirrlering production merely to bring the price of flour 
up. In summing up the results of the investigation, Judge Wi l liam L. 
Huggins, the presiding judg e of the industrial court, went back over 
certain parts of the industrial law to make the situation clear. He 
mentioned section 6 which said that it was necessary for the public 
24. First Annual Report, 
25 . Selected Opinions arrl Orders, p. 39; First nnaal Report 
pp . 68-71. 
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good that the in:iustri es encompassed by the a ct be operated with reason-
abl~ continuity and efficiency. The law then provided, however, t hat be-
cause pf seasonal changes, market conditions, or other factors influenc-
ing a certain industry, an application could be made t o the court to fix 
certain rules and regulations which should govern the operation of t he 
industry so as to give t he best possible and eff icient service t o the 
people. Then, if the suspension or limitation of production in any 
industry would threaten the public welf ar e, the court was authorized to 
take control and operate it throughout the emer gency period. It was to 
be real emergency, like t he 1919 coal strike, though, bef ore this final 
step w:>uld be t aken. 
After the i nvestigation t he court decided t hat the flour mills 
had not been guilty of deliberately slacking production in order to af-
fect the market pri6fe. I t found tha t the world conditions made the 
situation so that t hey coul d onl y operate at about 60% capacity . There 
was a surplus of Canadian wheat, bei ng marketed in the United States 
free; an innnense wheat crop was being harvested in Australia, and in 
the Ar gentine; then, the European peopl es were so destitute that they 
were poor customers f or American wheat . Because of these circumstances, 
it was f ound that there was excuse enough fo r the cur tailed ope rat ion of 
the f lour mills in Kansas . "Unquestionably the testimony shows that the 
millers of Kansas are conf ront ed with market conditions which are beyond 
26 their control and beyond control o.f this court . " 
26. Ibid., P• 70. 
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The court also found from the evidence that the milling indu~try 
was om of the essential industries in the sense of the Kans as statute, 
and was therefore subject to such regulation as was necessary to protect 
the public . The court further found that the industry was affected by 
market conditions, that such influences were inherent in the nature of 
the business, and that reasonable rules , regulations and practices should 
be prescribed by the court to be observed in the operation of the industry 
for the purpose of keeping whe court informed as to continuity and efficien-
cy of production, and of securing the best service to the public consistent 
with the rights of employers and employees engaged in its operation as 
provided by the Kansas industrial law. In view of this fact, the follow-
ing rules and regulations were drawn up to apply to the flour-milling in-
dustry throughout t he state. 
1. Each company to make reports to the industrial court at such 
times as they might be called for . Forms would be prescribed 
by the court. 
2. In case any company was forced to reduce its production be-
low 75% for period of 15 days or longer, to make application 
to the court, listing reasons for reduction. 
3. Every company operating a flour mill in the state should 
familiarize itself with the demand for flour in the state 
at all times, and should cooperate with, and use all possible 
means, to assist the industrial court in preserving t he flour 
supply and preventing shortages. 
4. In so far as it was reasonably possible, head millers, chief 
engineers and all other skilled w:>rkmen in mills located in 
the state should either be paid on a monthly basis or be given 
other employment during the period of reduced or suspended pro-
duction, so that efficient production could be promptly resumed 
when conditions permitted . 
5. All employees of Kansas flour mills were to be given reasonable 
notice, when possible , before any cessation or limitation of 
production takes place, in or~ar that they may provide them-
s elves with o t:, her employment • 
30 . Ibid., P• 71. 
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These last rules and regulations promulgated by the industrial court 
show the extent to which the state was inserting itself into the con-
duct of private business in the name of the public welfare. It is no 
wonder that intensive opposition grew up in the state opposing this sort 
of activity. These sample cases and investigations are illustrative of 
the industrial functions carried on by the Kansas court. It can be seen 
that all aspects of hl siness and industrial relationships came under 
purview of the court.Not only were industries instructed as to how to 
actually carry on their business in some respects, but such things as 
minimum wage scales , hours that workmen could be worked, and the number 
of men to be required by the unions in various tasks were taken under 
consideration by the court. 
The re is another interesting sidelight to the workings of the in-
dustrial court, and that is concerned with its success in preventing 
strikes in the industries aff,,- cted by the industrial law. That was one of 
the main reasons for the pas sage of the a ct, it was to be one of its main 
purposes, and was to be an important excuse for its very existence. It 
was not successful, however, in preventing industrial strife in Kansas. 
side from numerous small and minor stoppages, there were four major 
strikes called in violation of the Kansas Industrial Court Law. A brief 
review of these strikes, and the stand taken by the industrial court in 
their regard will now be taken up as illustrative of this side of the 
court I s functions . It will certainly bring out the fact that a large 
group of people cannot be kept from taking certain actions merely by 
the passage of a penalty law. This is especially true of a g roup repre-
8'nting, not only a certain occupation or trade, but a distinct class of 
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the population. You can't j ail s everal thous~nd p eopl e f or violating 
such a penalty law, at least its never been tried. Somt hing deeper and 
more basic is a pparently needed in all co ntroversies if they are to re-
sult in peace , understanding ani agr eement. You have to er as e the 
fundamental causes bringing on the disputes, ins t ead of providing f or 
punishment for t h ose t aki ng part i n them. 
Strikes and t he Kans a s I ndust r i al Court 
The most bitter and persistent enemie s of the new Kansas court 
were t he coal miners of southeast Kans a s, and especi ally thei r leaders. 
The principal leader in th is f i ght on the court was 1r. Alexander Howat , 
president of District 14, United Mine Wo rke rs of Americ a . He was the 
cause of a s eries of case s t aken t o the Kans as supreme court, and later 
to t he United States Supr eme Court c one er ning the validity of the new 
l aw. When Governor Allen s poke of radical labor leader s , men who lived 
off of i rrlustrial stri f e and miners' dues, he had Alexander Howat 
especially in mind. They were at it "hot and heavy 11 during the years 
the industria l court was in exist ence. Thi s was the man often mentioned 
during the debate previ ous to the passa~e of the law in January, 1920. 
To supporters of th e mea sure he was a t yr ant who had refused coal to 
hospitals and child r en dur ing the 1919 coal s trike . To labor leaders he 
was t h e apostle of t ~ awakened working cl ass ; to o thers a mis guided , 
man, sincere in his ef f orts to improve l he l ot of the coal miner, but 
wrong in his methods of seeking this i mprovement . He was casti gated by 
his enemies as creating class hatred , and of fomentimg industrial strife 
l l 
to merely flout the law and t he stat . e w· c ertainly to b an . 
especially prickly t horn in the au gus L, ide of the indu tri urt . 
n the Monday f ollowi t h e passage of th Indu tri · l O u t · w 
400 miners went out on strike in protest a ains t th bill. 
Governor Allen31 the Attorney- Gener al was imm diately s nt t Lh fl 
to begin prosecutions under th e crimin 1 s e tion ft he n w 1 w. Before 
he had time to make any arrests, the s tri ki miners all went b cl t 
work. Governor lien said t he u nion l eaders asked them t "for t th 
matter" . It doe s seem, however, as i f the overnor w twisti 0 • th 
situation just a litt le . 
In the first place Howat disclaimed any responsib' lity f 
ing t h e strike, s ai d he wouldn't order the me n k L worl a nd th t 
2 
the miners of Kansas would quit work whenever they w nt d t . J tt r y -
Genera l Hopki ns r eported from the fields that ther 
organized strike , and t hat t 11 er e wa s ab lut 1y noth up 
base a pro secuti on under t he Kansas indW:itrial 
Hopkins t h.a. t t he miners wer no t out n strike 
n 
The attorney-gener al t hen reported that a pp r n t y U, rn n ha i j u I;, 11 L. 
gone to work that day becau e it w s "b ue M n ay '' , ar1d th L th y h· d 
volunta r i l y r e turned t o t he m · nes the fo owj ng y ' nyw y . ci o t'I.PJJ r n l. I Y 
Governor Al l en was at tempting Lo pre' nt th v w trv: t ea of Lh n w 
.31 . Henry J . Allen, '' Ho w Kan1:J. Bok a r ' k m WouJd '' Iv li 
Labor Pro bl em, " Cu r ent Op · nion, J X:V 1 1 r ( Ap il , - >1 20) , PP · h 7;~- 8 · 
32 . Top ka Dai y .::.C=;;.,;t_a=l, J · mw.ry 27, 1920, 
33 . f!i.._ ., J n ry 2e , 1920. 
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court had driven the men back into the mines, and hat th · ttorney-
general had be en on the vercre of rresting many for the strike. 
During the summer of 19,W, however, th ere veloped a strH e 
which was more s ·ious than this initial w lkout . t de el pe ut uf 
the so-called "Saturday-holiday movement." 1 t,e in June, 1920, nd e:i.rly 
in July, and throughout the mo th, there was a seri us sh rt ge of rail-
road cars in Kansas to move the coal from the co al mines. The in ust i 1 
court sent a man to investigate this shortage. '£he co· 1 o erat re· h 
complained that the railroads wer e furnishi only 38 of the car order-
ed by the operators . 34 Accordir to he report of r . G. H. ,, ! h, who made 
the investigation for the court, it w sn' t entirely the shorta e o o l 
cars that held down coal shipments f rom the ittsburg field du1ing the 
summer What was wrong was the fact t hat the cars were unl acted lowly 
and therefore didn't return to the mines rapidly •. '£hen, too, there we 
long waits on sidings and t he cars moved oo slowly in trans· t.35 A ng 
with these delays there was also an admitted shortage of railroad car • 
This condition resulted in intermittent operation at the mires, s it w s 
no use mining the coal until th re were cars en 1h gaLlered t t~ke it 
away. As a result, numerous local unio ns voted to discontinue wo k on 
Saturdays . It was hoped that e1 ough cars woul be accumulated at Lhe 
mines then by the first of the week to i\1rnish falrly steady eruployiue L 
until the next week- end . 
34. Ibid., July 24, 1920. 
35 . Loe . cit . 
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The contract of the miners with the operators, however, provided 
for fines of f rom $1 to $2 per day for f ailure to work Saturdays . There-
fore, when about half the miners of the Pittsburg district quit work on 
Saturdays, th e operators deducted ac co rdingly from their pay.36 Alexand-
er Howat deelared the levying of fines -- even though authorized by the 
contract -- an outrage , and asserted on July 25 t hat the miners would 
start a clean-up of the mines the next day, preparatory to a walkout . 37 
'fhe actual number of miners who s truck in protest against th e fines is 
not known for sure. Alexander Howat claimed there were 7,000 miners out, 
but the operators' association officials set the number at 180o.38 
Apparently this part of the co ntract had never been enforced be-
f ore, so when the opera tors invoked it in this case, t hey let them-
selves in for the charge that they were conspiring to run the pr ice of 
coal up. It was thought by some that they were goading the miners i nto 
a stri ke, ...hich w:>uld result in a shortage of co al, and then the pr ice 
would go up. The re probably was little truth in the allegation. 
Because of the shortage of coal cars up to the week of the 
strike, the production and shipping of coal f rom the district had not 
been seriously affected by the efforts of the miners to shorten their 
working time to f ive days a week . However, after t he st rike occurr ed, 
Gov.;ernor Allen announc ed that the production of coal was s eriously 
36. Domenico Gagliardo, The Kans as Industrial Court, Universit y of 
Kans as Publications, Lawrence, 1941, P• 134. 
37. Topeka Daily Capital , July 25, 1920. 
38., Ibid., July 28, 1920. 
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impaired , that a> out of 127 miners were idle with the chance that more 
soon would be, an d that the point would probably be reached where the 
normal production of the district would be reduced about one-third . 39 
After the above announcement by the governor, the court began an 
investigation i mmediately, arrl tre g ranting of a permanent injunction 
against Howat and othe r union officials was considered. It was even 
rumored that drastic st at e action, meaning state operation of the mines, 
might result, but only if t he production of co al reached th e point where 
the public welfare was aff_ected. The governor hoped tha t this wouldn ' t 
be necessary. 
As t he whole matter ended, the industrial court -was not obliged. 
to t ake any action whatever . A quarrel developed b etween John L. Lewis, 
president of the United "1:i.ne Workers of Ame rica, and Alex Howat, presi-
dent of the Kansas district. Lewis, aft er studying t he situati on, decided 
that the miners were in clear violation of their contra ct and t hat t hey 
should be ordered back to work . Lewis sent a t e legram to Howat denouncing 
him for fostering the strike trouble . 40 In t his message Lewis declared 
the pr esident of the Kans as miners h ad made no attempt t o s et t l e th e 
strike as provided in th e contract wi th the operators, and h e warned 
Howat t hat he must comply with t he laws of t he union . 
A corrtinuation of t he mad course you a re pur suing i n 
Kans as will bring further condemnation to your organi zation 
and st amp you a s a man devoid of pri nci pl e and destitute of 
honor • • • • The mi r e r s of Kans as, t hrough the ioc essant 
and continuous strikes whic h you have di r ectly ordered or 
39. Ibid., July 31, 1920. 
40. Ibid., August 5, 1920 . 
sanctioned, are g radually being reduced to a state of 
poverty and woe • •• • The office is in receipt of 
appeals from many members of t he organization in Kansas 
pleading for the intervention of the int er:pational union 
to save them from your ruinous government.41 
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Lewis was insisting that all local unions abide by the contracts they 
had with the operators . He went on to inform Howat the wails which 
would no doubt emanate from him upon receipt of the message would not 
change the situation at all. "The miners of I ansas shall not be per-
mitted to be sacrificed to the whims and caprices of a demagoge. 1142 
This acti on of Lewis I undoubtedly came as a shock and a surprise 
to Howat, who had apparently thought Lewis would stand clear and let 
him fight it out with Governor Allen an::l the court by himself. At any 
rate, it was a critical spot for Howat . Lewis bad ordered Howat to send 
the miners back to work, and upon Howat 1 s refusal to do so, had himself 
sent telegrams to 33 local unions in Kansas ordering them to return to 
work and end the strike . 43 This was too much for Howat , and he sent a 
return telegram to Lewis denounci r:g him for taking the action he had. He 
denied having c ailed the strike in the first place, and said that if Lewis 
had stood as firmly in defense of the mine workers of the country during 
the 1919 coal strike as he was now standing in defense of the operators, 
a lot of labor quarrels could have been avoided now. He challenged Lewis 
"to do his worst . 1144 
41. Loe. cit. 
42 . Loe . cit . 
43 . Kansas City Star, August 5, 1920. 
44. Topeka Daily Capital, August 6, 1920. 
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Little by little the miners went back to work and. all were again 
at work by August 24. This was t he first major clash in the struggle be-
tween Howat and Lewis which was to result in the final defeat of Howat. 
45 The operators, in the meantime, refunded the fines that they had collected. 
As it turned out the industrial court took no def inite action of any kind. 
Governor Allen pointed out t hat under the law no jurisdiction was conferred 
upon the Court of Industrial Relations except in cases where a controversy 
of this kind threatened the public. 46 He then said that since it appeared 
the whole thing would be settled by the national union there was no 
occasion for any further action on the pa rt of t he court. Was this side-
stepping the issue? When does, or will, a controversy threaten the public 
welfare? It seems as if the court was left a lot of leeway as to what 
action to take, if any, in industrial disputes, and that it would be 
easy under certain circumstances to not intrude too far into t he question. 
The next important stri ke taking place after t he formation of the 
industrial court was t he so-called Howat strike of 1921. It developed 
out of a minor affair known as the Mishmash strike. This had occurred 
some six months after the strike over the Saturday-holiday movement . 
Mishmash had worked in a mine on a boys' pay until reaching the age of 
19, at which time he was paid a mans' wage. He later sued for back w_ages 
as he claimed he had reached 19 years of age before t he date he originally 
45. Gagliardo, 2.E· cit. , p. 136. 
46. Henry J. Allen, 11 I s the Industrial Court Maki ~ Good?" 
System, XXXIX (January, 1921) , P• 100. 
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claimed . The di spute dr agged on for sever al years, the union making 
no attempt t o collect the back pa;y . The result was that Howat apparent-
ly used the trivial affair as an excu~e to call a strike, with the 
pr obable intention of testing the industrial court law. The strike 
was called on February 3, 1921. 47 The industrial court held a hearing 
and ordered the George Mackie Fuel Company, where Mishmash had form-
erly worked, to pay the boy more than $20o. 48 The court also notified 
the miners not to refrain from returning to work because of the strike 
order issued Febr uary 4. Needless to say , the operators were much put 
out with the award to Mishmash , some even threatening to join Howat in 
his fight against the industrial court. After the money was awarded to 
Mishmash the miners all went back to work. 
On September 30, 1921, Howat went to jail 0n a six months' 
sentence for violating the Kansas Industrial Court Law in calling the 
Mishmash strike. This occasioned the 11Howat strike 11 of 1921. When Howat 
went to jail the miners went out of the mines in protest against hi s 
imprisonment . There was no actual strike call issued, but a majority 
of the workers went out on strike . 
By October 4 all Kansas miners were out on strike. As yet the 
industrial court had held no conference on the situation, apparently not 
being in agreement as to what action should be taken. Here was a clear-
47. Kansas City Star, February 3, 1921. 
48 . Ibid., February 18, 1921. 
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cut violation of the industrial law and a chance presented to the court 
to prove that the measure actually had teeth. Judge Huggins said he per-
sonally was in favor of giving Lewis a chance to straighten out the sit-
uation before the industrial court took .any action. 49 Immediately, how-
ever the judge changed his mind and advocated that the court take vig-
orous action in handling the situation. He formulated a five- point "pro-
gram fo r resuming coal production in 
points of his program: 
50 ansas. 11 Here were the main 
I . The irrlustrial court should at once ask the governor ... 
to organize through the adjutant- general, a military police 
force of sufficient strength and. of selected men from the 
various National Guar d units • · •.• Said military police 
force should be used if needed in the mining district to 
protect miners who are -willing to work, so long as such 
protection may be needed . 
II. If production was not resumed by Uctober 12, the court 
should ascertain the cause why it hadn 't. If the cause 
was defiance of' the industrial act as reported, then the 
court was to find out whether, with police protection, 
the operators would be ,dlling to rest.Uie operations with 
the miners then in the district . If not , and the operators 
were -willing to resume, the court should aid in getting 
labor from elsewhere to operate the mines . 
III. Advocated abolition of the 11 check-off 11 system. 
IV. If t h e opera tors were unable or unwilling to proceed at 
once in producting coal, then Lhe court should proceed 
under Section 20 of th e industrial law to take over and 
operate the mines . 
V. If the court did take ove r, the program should be same as 
outlined above . 
This plan was not adopted because the other two members of the court did 
not concur in it. This hesit lion on the part of some can probably be ex-
49 . Topeka Daily Capital , Uctober 4, 1921. 
~ . Herbert Feis, "Kansas Miners ana the Kansas Court, 11 Survey, 
XLVII , (Februarry 25, 1921), p . 825. 
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plained in the following manner. There was a pparently no s erious coal 
shortage as yet , t he judges couldn't_ agree on jus t WJ.at action should 
be taken, and there was always the h ope that Lewis would step in again 
and settle the matter onc e arrl fo r all. 
Meanwhile, on October 7, Governor Allen announced that the 
i ndustrial court had formulated a definite program of action in the 
event of a prolonged coal strike . He said merel y that the details would 
be r evealed from time to time as developments warrant ed. "The publ ic may 
b e assured t hat after t l e ef forts of a year and a half to devise a t r i-
bunal to i nsure industrial peace, i t will not fail to act when the 
proper time comes. 1151 But when is the proper time? That , of course, was 
to be decided also by the court. 
The strike deadlock was broken on October 13 when John L. Lewis 
suspended the Kans as distri ct of the United Mine Workers, Di strict No •. 14. 
Alexander Howat and all other distric t officers were removed, and pro-
visional officers appointect. 52 All loyal miners were ordered back to work. 
This involved about 12,000 dues-paying miners in the district . Legal pro -
ceeding s were initiated to force th e outgoing offi cers to surrender re-
cords, books., and offices . They had refused to do oo . Howat's reaction to 
this action by Lewis was c onsis tent with his previous attitudes . 11 To hell 
with John Lewis and Governor Allen. Our plans are unchanged. We will 
continue the f i ght . 1153 
51. Kansas City Star, October 7, 1921. 
52. Ibid., October 13, 1921 . 
53 . Loe. cit. 
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The cause of the action in suspending district 14 was based on 
the refusal of Howat and his district board to put back at work miners 
called out on strike during the Mishmash affair . The International 
Convention of the union had voted for Howat to put the men back to 
work, and he had refused to do so. In other w::>rds, the laws of the 
union were being flagrantly violated by the Kansas district . 
When the provisional government in distr ict 14 ordered the 
mire rs back to work, they re f used to accede, with the result that the 
charters of the local unions were revoked and all miners refusing to 
return to work were automatically expelled from the union. New unions 
were organi zed by the international organization, and such miners as 
were willing to r eturn to work and 'Who were acceptable as members of 
the new organization were received and admitted into the union. By this 
process a large numb er of miners g r adually returned to work, thus per-
mitting resumption of operations, until within 60 days practically normal 
resumption of mining was accomplished and the very radical element in 
the miners' unions was eliminated. 54 
No sooner had pro duction been re sumed in the mines than disturb-
ances broke out in the coal field , necessitating the calling out of the 
National Guard. Bands of women attempted to halt the work being resumed 
at the mines and intimidated many of t he men attempting to work . The 
industrial court took no formal action whatever during the entire 
controversy,held no hearings, took no t estimony, and issued no orders. 55 
54. Second Annual Report, p. 10. 
55 . Gagliardo , 2£• cit . , P• 143. 
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In other words , the court took no effective action to break the strike, 
but the state did. 
On January 4, 1922 , attorney-general Hopkins met the peace 
officers and city officials of t 1e two counties, Cherokee arrl Crawford, 
affected by the strike, and demanded that every town in the district 
pass the following ordinance: 
Any person engaged in any unlawful calling whatever, or 
who shall be foun loitering without visible means of support, 
or who being without visible means of support, shall refuse to 
work when work at fair wages is to be procured in the community, 
or vtio shall threaten violence or personal injury to fellow 
workmen or to employers of labor shall be deemed a vagrant, 
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned in the city 
jail for a period of not less than ten days nor more than 30 
days for each offense, and shall be compelled
6 
to work at hard 
labor until sentence is fully complied with.5 
As can be plainly seen, this was aimed directly at striking miners pre-
sent in the mining section, to make them go to work or leave the state. 
It was also aimed at preventing any more disturbances in the coal fi elds. 
Th~ state was still looking upon all miners who went out on strike as 
being radicals, and thought this one good way to run them out of the 
state . Attorney-generd Hopkins said that no man could be compelled to 
mine coal, and that a man could quit work when he pleased, but could 
not quit honest employment and be a loafer depending on charity if there 
was work to be had in the community. Hopkins was referri~ here to 
strike benefits being given the miners 'qy unions in Kansas and Illinois . 
Most of the towns passed these ordinances, apparently arousing no 
opposition as being distinctly un-Arnerican except from the miners them-
56 . "Forced Labor in Kansas, 11 New Republic, XXIX (January 25, 1922), 
P • 240. 
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selves. These ordinances were drafted without reference to the indu~-
trial court, and the court wasn't responsible for their issuance. It 
is reported that Governor Allen consented to them against his better 
judgment 57 in the hope that they -would drive the troublemakers out of 
the coal fields. Judge Huggins is reported to have been opposed to the 
ordinances and emphasized the fact that the court had had nothing to do 
with their passage. 
On January 12, 1922 Howat issued a lengthy document from his jail 
cell ordering his supporters to return to work. 58 He said that the pur-
pose of the strike had been accomplished, in that it had shown that the 
Kansas Industrial Court Law had failed in its purpose of doing away with 
strikes and industrial turbulence. He accused Lewis, Governor Allen, arrl 
the operators of working in opposition to the aims of the Kansas miners' 
organization, but asserted that the 4-months strike had been successful 
nevertheless. Attorney-gener 1 Hopkins said Howat had called off the 
strike to save his face, and that the vagrancy ordinances had thrown 
fear into the miners ,making them realize that if they co ntinued to loaf, 
i.e. strike, they would be picked up and sent to jaii. 59 It is hard to 
judge just what effect these ordinances did have on many of the men 
returning to the mines. The attorney-general also made the statement 
that many of the returning mine rs w::>uld find their places filled b_y men 
supporting Lewis, and that these men certainly wouldn't be discharged 
57. Feis, .sill• cit . , note bottom of P• 825 . 
58. Topeka Daily Capital, January 13, 1922. 
59. Loe . cit . 
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to make way for the returning strikers. These returning men would 
have to take what jobs were left, and the rest go on the waiting list. 
The final chapter in this dispute came on January 1,5, 1922, when 
Circuit Judge Samuel A. Dew refused to grant Alexander Howat, the deposed 
Kansas mine leader, an injunction against international officers of the 
United Mine Workers, to keep them from continuing the provisional organi-
zation . 
60 
John L. Lewis hailed this as a vindication of the long-estab-
lished policy of the union of observing cont racts with employers. The 
deposition of Alexander Howat was not permanent, however, as he was re-
instated in the union and re - elected to the presidency of district 14 
in 1929. 61 
Now why didn't the industrial court take more vigorous action, 
and why did they mostly stand on the sidelines during this struggle? 
The court made an explanation of its attitude. It based its non-activity 
mainly on the fact that there wasn I t an emergency requiring the court I s 
intervention. According to the court, during the progress of the strike, 
there were only two ~eeks of complete shut-down, and succeeding the first 
two weeks, mining operations were gradually resumed. 62 In this period 
there was no abnormal demand for coal, the available supply from within 
and without the state being more than sufficient to meet the demands of 
60. Ibid. , January 15, 1922. 
61 . Gagliardo, 2.E· cit., P· 143. 
62 . Second Annual Report , P• 10. 
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the public. Then, the court said th at they had original. ly agreed to 
stand aside and let the rational union settle the question, which it 
eventually was instrumental in doing. If they could settle the question 
before a serious fuel shortage developed they were to be left free to do 
so. The court also took the view that there had been no actual contro-
versy between employer and employee, the only sort of controversy the 
court had the power to settle according to the industrial law. ·whatever 
the merits of the arguments, it did add further proof of the inability 
of the court to actually prevent industrial. disputes from det eriorating 
into work stoppages and strikes . 
The next important strike occurring after passage of the industrial 
court law was the Packing Strike of December, 1921. This strike involved 
the Big Five Packers , which included the Cudahy,- 1lilson, Morris, Swift,and 
Armour companies. During the World War the employees of these concerns 
were working uni er an award as to wages and working conditions made by 
Federal Judge Alschuler, acting as federal administrator unaer tne Bureau 
of Conciliation of the United States Department of Labor. This agreement 
expired September 15, 1921, and the packing concerns thereupon installed 
what was termed a plant assembly representation plan, whereby the e:'lllployees 
of the various plants elected their representatives as members of the plant 
assemply, the employer also designating members of such assembly on its 
behalf, and these plant assemblies would then negotiate ano determine the 
63 terms of the contract of employment . These assemblies negotiated a 
63. Ibid., p . 11. 
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wage contract which was a very substantial reduction over those wages 
received under the Alschuler administration. A strike vote in the Big 
Five plants was taken by members of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and 
Butcher :forkmen of North America, authorizing the executive board of 
that organization to call a strike in case the packers failed to meet 
their demands, and on December 1, 1921, a strike call was issued from 
Chicago by the butchers union. 64 It was to take affect December 5, and 
was to affect all plants of the Big Five packers in the United States. 
Mr. Dennis Love, secretary of the packers union, said the strike 
had been called because the plant assemblies, which had voted for a 6% 
wage decrease, did not represent the workmen am expressed opposition 
to the action taken by these assemblies. 65 Following the announcement 
of the strike, attorney-general Hopkins filed a petition asking the 
industrial court to investig ate into the proposed strike. He charged in 
his petition that the parties to the dispute were conspiring , contrary 
to the industrial court law, to bring about the cessation of an essential 
industry. 66 The public interest was affected because 10,000 workers were 
affected by the strike order, and the cessation oft he packing industry 
would shut off a large part of the me at supply of the state. 
Following this, subpoenas were issued for certain officers of the 
local unions, as well as superintendents of the packing plants, to appear 
64. Loe. cit., Kansas City Star, December 1, 1921. 
65. Topeka Daiiy Capital, December 2, 1921. 
66. Ibid., December 3, 1921. 
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before the industrial court in h..ansas City. he union early showed a 
determination to both strike arrl defy the industrial court. £he union 
workmen were ordered to take all their tools home. Pickets from the 
packing union challenged the authority of the court by walking the 
street in front of the city hall in Kansas City, exhorting witnesses 
subpoenaed by the court not to acknowledge the summonses. Only one 
union official appeared at the heari[\s; all packer's representatives 
came. 67 The court also informed the strikers that if they ceased work 
on Monday morning, when the strike was to take place, they were no 
longer employees of the packing industry and could not regain their 
old positions without the consent of their employer, and that the 
court's concern after December 5 would be wholly with the employer and 
those who took the places of those going out on strike, arrl to further 
see that the industry operated continuously and efficiently. 68 
Attorney-general Hop.Kins , after the union officials had refused 
to appear before the industrial court, applied to the district court to 
order the 16 union officials to appear and testify. Before going into 
the district court, the members of the industrial court issued an 
order taking jurisdiction and forbidding either the packers or the 
69 
employees to make any move until after a further hearing of tht:: court. 
67. Kans as City Star, December 3, 1921, 
68. Second Annual Report, p. 12. 
69. Kansas City Star, December 4, 1921. 
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That order amounted to a temporary injunction in its ef fect and scope . 
The same day the industrial court applied for aid from the district 
court, the international headquarters o.f. the union informed the local 
officials to ignore any pleas to halt the strike action scheduled for 
the fifth , unless word was received from headquarters. They blamed the 
industrial court for not preventing the wage reduction voted by the 
plant assemblies in November, 1921. 
The district court subpoenas were obeyed by all but one of the 
16 union officials to whom they were issued. Five of t hem were sworn in 
to give testimony. 70 The same day the three industrial court judges warn-
ed the mayor of rans as City that unless the crowds of strike sympathizers 
about the packing plants were dispersed by noon of the f ollowing dey, they 
would recommend to the governor that the militia be called out . The court, 
in effect, was prohibiting all picketing, even peaceful, which was one 
of the powers given to the ~ourt by the industrial law. Picketing in 
this instance even referred to the strikers loitering on the streets in 
the vicinity of t-he packing plants, whether or not they were doing any-
thing in the way of active picketing . 
The union remained defiant through all of this activity . Mr. :E. . W. 
Jimmerson, St . Louis, who was in Kansas City directing the packing strike, 
defied the industrial court in a speech before 2500 striking packing 
70. Ibid., December 5, 1921. 
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house workers. "If the industrial court w:> uld call on me to end thi-s 
strike before you win your fight, I would go to j ail before I'd obey 
their order. 1171 He constantly referred to the i ndustrial court as "Allen's 
pet dog", and endeavored to outline the conditions on which the striking 
emptoyees would go back to work . The crux of his terms was the re-estab-
lishment of the federal arbitration court with a presiding j udge as fair-
minded as was Judge Alschuler, whose term expired with the agreement in 
September. 
Immediately after the strike began, on December 5, 1921, it was 
apparent t hat it would never gather much force . By the 6t h. and 7th. 
it was already losing strength. The packers estimated on December 6 
that meat deliveries were 75% of no rmal . Men were be i ng hired and some 
strikers were returning to work . The laoor leaders kept up their asser-
tions t hat from 85 to 98 per cent of the employees affected by the wage 
cut were still out on strike. On the 7th. the Big Five announced that 
they were meeting the normal demand in Kansas City. 72 Employees who 
answered the strike cal l were going back to work in large numbers, 
plant officials reported. The ps.ckers held that workers were neturn-
ing to work because they no longer feared possible action from the 
crowds of t he idle. The se crowds hs.d been prevented from congregating 
near the entrances to the packing plants . So it seems as if the non-
picketing order and the policy of t he plants to remain in operation 
despite the strike had thrown the ti de against the strike element • 
71. Ibid., December 6, 1921. 
72. Ibid., December 7, 1921. 
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The industrial court spent most of its times keeping an eye on 
the situation, and members made tours of the plants, assuring them-
selves that the work was going as per usual. Judge J. H. Crawford re-
ported that it app eared as if the plants were operating all departments 
with skilled hands arrl that conditions were about normal. 73 
There was one great difference between the packing strike as it 
was carried on in Kansas City and li1ichita, and the methods used in 
Chicago, the seat of the packing industry. There, blood was shed and 
there were numerous clashes between police arrl strike sympathizers. 
There was none of that in the ansas section, probably due largely to 
the assertion of the industrial court tnat it would enforce the anti-
picketing order with the state mill tia if it came to that . Also the local 
police cooperated with the court in preventing congregations of strike 
sympathizers near the plants where outbreaks could very easily have 
occurred. Even t he strike leaders in 1\ansas City urged the strikers not 
74 
to use f orce and to scrupulously obey the anti-picketing order. No 
doubt they feared martial law and the effect it would have upon their 
strike, and what they were trying to accomplish. A few radical and 
passionate leaders now and then counselled the disregarding of the 
order, 75 but for the most part cooler heads prevailed . 
Normal production in the packing plants had so far been resumed 
by December 21 that attorney-general Hopkins announced t hat the indus-
73. ropeka Daily Capital, December 8, 1921. 
74. Ibid., December 7, 1921, 
75. Ibid., December 9, 1921. 
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trial court was practically out of the affair . 76 Be said that ~here then 
e:xisted neither a controversy between employees and employers, nor a 
cessation of production, the two causes for action on that part of the 
court . There was no controversy between e~ployees and enployer because 
most of the old workers had been replaced by new ones, who naturally 
were not part of the dispute; therefore, there was no quarrel bet.ween 
the workers an a the plants . Then, too, aince normal production had been 
nearly achieved again , at least enough to supply t he demand at that time 
of year , there was no threat to the public from a meat shortage. The 
stri ke had j ust about ended in a fiasco for the striking workers . 
On January 18, 1922, the Federal Governnent made an offer to 
mediate the packer ' s strike. Officials of tne Big Five , however, declared 
that they saw no need of federal mediation . 77 Plant conditions were normal, 
and as far as they were concerned, there was nothing to meoiate -- the 
I 
I 
str i ke was over. As ti~ e went on more strikers returned to work, and 
where they didn ' t , new workers were put on in their stead. Finally, it 
became clear even to the remaining men out on strike thi:i t the whole 
affai r was a complete failure, and that the only thing to do was to 
retur n to v,0rk . On February 1 , 1922, by unanimous vote, 600 packing 
hous e st rikers ended the strike against the packers in n.ansas City . 78 
Union headquarters in Chicago had recommended that the strikers vote to 
end the st rike because to continue it would only work hardship on the 
76. Ibi d., Dec ember 21, 1921. 
77. Kansas City Star , January 1 8, 1922. 
78 . Ibid., February 1 , 1922 . 
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families of the strikers . 
Immediately hundreds of the men showed up for their old jobs 
and found them filled. The packing houses said they had all the men 
they needed, and did not i ntend to discharge men hired when the old 
employees were out on strike. The number of idle men was put at 2000. 
They received small strike benefits for awhile, but most of them got 
behind on such things as rent and groceries. They hadn't won their 
strike, and had only created a ci vie problem. 
Now there was criticism from several points about the part 
played by the industrial court in the packer's strike. 79 1'1ost of them 
agreed that the court had acted tardily. Some thought that the court 
should have stepped in when the plant assemblies voted for the 6% wage 
reduction to be sure it was fairly entered into,and represented the 
desires of all parties . Apparently the court was un:l er the impression 
that the w::>rkers had vol ntarily accepted the wage reduction. There was 
criticism also that all the court did was to enforce the anti-picketing 
provision of the industrial law, p reserve order, and prevent bloodshed. 
Certainly they had no quarrel with this aspect of the court's actions, 
but they thought that along with it should have been included a vigor-
ous attempt to step in and fix wages and hours in the packing plants in 
order to prevent the threatened strike. 
Judge Huggins, in replying to these critics, defended the court's 
79 . Herbert Feis , "The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, Its 
Spokesmen, Its Record, 11 Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXXVII (August, 
1923) , PP •· 705- 733 -
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t . d . l 80 ac ions ur ing t 1e strike . He said that all the information reach-
ing the court befor e the strike took place was to the effect tnat the 
worker s had accepted the 6% wage decrease declared by the plant 
assemblies. Then he mentioned that only a small percent age of the pack-
ing house workers had desired to strike, proven by the way in which 
they flocked back to the plants following the abolition of picketing 
by the industrial court . Since this resulted in nearly normal production 
there was no great emergency, no threat to the public welfare through a 
meat shortage, an:i therefore, no especial cause for interference on the 
part of the court. By keeping order arourrl t he plants so they could be 
operated, said Judge Huggins, the court had fulfilled its main duty of 
ensurir:g continuous production. He was very pleased with the work 
done by the court up to 1,he end of the packing strike and emphasized 
81 t he fact that it had not failed in any respect . 
As to the probabl,~ action of the court if there had developed 
a serious situation, that is i f the plants hadn 't have been able to 
maintain production, it is mere speculation. Probably the court would 
have taken over the operation of the plants if workers could not have 
been found to run them. The whole thing hinged on the ef fectiveness of 
the court in enforcirg the anti- picketing provision arm in maintaining 
order, because it was no doubt largely due to this that men flocked 
back into the plants to resume operations. But the strike had been a 
80. Letter by w. L. Huggins to The Survey, 1'1arch 18, 1922, P· 968. 
81. w. 1 . Huggins, 11 A Reply to Samuel Gompers, n The Rotarian, 
I (October, 1922 ) , PP• 176-177 . 
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failure from the start and the court had merely assumed that an emergency 
requiring active intervention had not occurred. 
The last strike to be mentioned in connection with the industrial 
court was the strike of the Railway Shopmen, which occurred in 1922. The 
strike, called July 1, 1922, was national in scope and included the lines 
maintaining shops in Kansas. Prior to the calling of the strike, the 
shop crafts and the employing railroads had submitted their controversy 
with reference to wages and working conditions to the Federal Labor 
Board, and had received a decision from that board with which the shop 
crafts were dissatisfied, and the strike was called as a result. 82 
The industrial court also played a minor part in this strike. As 
in the packing strike it spent most of its time in seeing that order was 
maintained and that there was no intimidation by either party. The court 
explained its stand in the following manner: 
All the principal r ru.lroads of Kansas are interstate carriers 
and do very largely an interstate business, so tnat the men em-
ployed in the shops were to that extent also engaged in interstate 
business • .-Jhile the men engaged in the mops within the state of 
Kansas might in the first instance have submitted their contro-
versy to the Kansas Irnustrial Court, yet the Federal Labor 
Board also having jurisdiction of the dispute, and both parties 
having submitted their controversy to that tribunal, the Kansas 
Industrial Court was deprived of any jurisdiction so far as the 
merits of the dispute were concerned; so that upon the calling 
of the nation- wide strike, under Section 4 of the industrial 
act, it became the duty of this tribunal to see that all of the 
provisions of the industrial act were enforced, including the 
provisions against picket~~, intimidation, and conspiracy to 
inter17Upt transportation . 
82 . Third Annual Report, P• 9. 
83. Loe . cit . 
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Still, there was a strike in Kansas , and such a thing was outlawed by 
the industrial law. 'l'his is merely another example of the fact tha t 
something mor e fundamental is needed in industrial controversies than 
the mere outlawing of certain a ctions and practices. Here was a strike, 
and striking was in stict violation of the industrial court law. The 
only conclusion, co ming on top of the other strikes w-iich have been 
mentioned, is that the court was utterly unable to actually prevent 
strikes. True , many controversies were submitted to the court, they 
were adjudged, and t he decision was adhered to by the parties , which 
otherwise might have resulted in strikes. In that sense it did pre-
vent many strikes. But, in major cas es, such. as the national packing 
and railroad shop strikes, the court could do nothing . 
The industrial court still might have assumed jurisdiction in 
the matter, regardless of the interstate character of 1,he employment, 
and the jurisdiction of th Feaeral labor board. Something similar to 
this had happened before and the court had assumed jurisdiction. In 
March , 1920, members of the International brotherhood of Stationary 
Firemen arrl Oilers , as existing in Kans as, came befo r e tm court claim-
ing insuf ficient pay. The nine roads named as responderts were engaged 
in both i nterstate and intrastate commerce. The court asswned juris-
diction, found the wages were insufficient, and made an order applying 
84 
only to actual Kansas residents of the union •. 
The carriers had been unwilling to submit ti:le matter to the state 
84. United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor 
Review, II (August, 1920), P • 142. 
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industrial court , and denied the right of that court to assume juris-
diction, as they were engaged in int rstate commerce, and that under 
the Transportation Act of 1920, they wer, paying wages l'ixed by the 
.uirector--General of the United States rtailroad Administration, ana that 
the industrial court had no jurisdiction on account of' t l~ provisions 
of t re transportation act of 1920 for settlement of ctisputes by the rail-
road labor board . 
The industrial court based its ri 6 ht to take jurisdiction on a 
decision of the United St3.tes Supr .. i"1e Court, 85 setting forth the compe-
tence of a state to govern its internal commerce and adopt measures of 
a reasonable character in the interests of its people , although inter-
state commerce might incidentaD.y or indirectly be involved. It was 
decided that any ·action that the court mit;ht take would be presumed to 
be fair and reasonable, and if so, no injury could come to interstd.te 
commerce, and no unnecessary burden be irnposed upon it. Neither could 
it be presumed that the Federal Labor Board w:mld rende:c an award 
which "IDuld be unfair to the public, nor that the court of industrial 
relations would refuse to approve a reasonable order made by the 
labor board if such was accepted by the disputants . 
In other words , the court was saying that it was possible f' or 
the state ani federal laws to exist side by side without conflict, leav-
ing each free to act in its field, and providing a ready means of ad-
justment if anything in the nature should arise. 
85 . Simpson~- Shepard, 230 U. S . 298. 
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The court , as has been hinted, spent most of lt s t.l,ne prev .nt-
i ng picketing and s eeing that no one interfered in y w· y wL th trans-
portation on the railroads . In t-his the court w· s very efl'ectiv . ecuu 
of this activity the maximum amount of frei ht was kept rolling n the 
railroads during the duration of the strike . In Dece111b r, 1922, th. 
industrial court sent out questionnaires to the railroads op 1· 1LLng n 
Kansas for the purpose of obtaining t.heir statemeuts as to shop employ-
ment during the strike period, the amount of frel ~ht traffic Cc al d, · s 
well as the amount of extraordinary expenses incident to the trike in-
curred by th em from July 1 , 1922 to January 1, 1923. 'l'h se l'eturn 86 
showed how effective the court was in maintaining uequate trar sµu:r·tation 
facilities in ansas during the strike period. £he report of the court, 
based on these questionnaires, showed that , so far s ton miles o 
freight hauled were concernea, durin,g the strlke period. l,h!'.': total fo1· 
all railroads in Kansas was Jractically the some as for U.e swae perJ od 
in 1921. Was the industrial court solely responsible f'OJ.' t u.s'? J.cubably 
not entirely, but certainly the keepln6 of order, t-lie prevention of 
int· idation, and the leaving of the railroads frt:e to owerate wl th the 
help tney had, contributed much to the continued ef fici ncy of railrva. 
transportation in the st· te. 0y the time this stri e occurred wrions 
had come to uccept t 1e fact tr1at one ol' Lhe HHiln fw1ctions of the cuurt, 
an sometring it wo 11 not hesita.t to ao , wa.s to pcevent picketing 
ana otner Kina~ of coe.ccion coru!ll.on to labor quabb es. lhe y ut'tei t.h 
86. T ird nnu; teport. p~ 10-~. 
---- -- - -- - - - - - - ---- ~----
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strike began, a union official in Topeka announced t.hat ther would 
be no picketing by the striking shopmen because it was prohibited by 
the industrial court law. 87 This was certainly a raclical departure 
from the former conduct of strikes in Kansas . 
This concludes the discussion involviug Lhe industrial court and 
strikes called after it was formed, the adjudic ation ol' industriul clis-
putes brought before the court by various parties, its investigations 
to find out facts and data concernimg dif i'erent phases of indusLrial 
enterprise in the state so that continuous and efficient production in 
the essential industries w:,uld ensure the public ad"quaLe necessHies, 
and t h e subordinate duties attached to the court by acts of the lec,is-
lature in 1921. It is hoped that a clear pict.ure has been presented as 
to how the court conducted itself in attempting to fulfill th e duties 
conferred upon it by the special session of the le5islaLure . 
87 . Topeka JJail;r 'a ikl, July 2 , 1922. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE INDUSTRIAL COURT LA'.v BEFORE THE COURTS 
The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations law was an intensely 
litigated piece of legislation. Roughly speaking , two sets of cases 
appeared in the courts relative to the Kansas act. One group of cases 
concerned Alexarrler Howat , the afore-mentioned president of the ansas 
miners, and his attempts to get the court declared unconstitutional. 
The other set of cases grew out of an industrial court ruling involving 
the Charles Wolff Packing Company. It was here that the court sustained 
its defeat at the hands of the United States Supreme Court . This final 
chapter will take up these cases, and will bring out t h e reasons for 
the attitudes the various courts took concerning the constitutionality 
of the law. The iniustrial court will be followed through the courts 
to its demise in 1925. 
Shortly after the industrial court law became effective, February 
22, 1920, reports came from the coal fields in Crawford and Cherokee 
counties that Alexander Howat, president of the United Mine vlorkers, 
district 14, was openly defying the law and threatening to call a 
1 
strike for the purpose of testing certain provisions. There is no doubt 
but what Howat was openly defying the court and its principles. In his 
fourth report to the biennial convention of district 14, United Mine 
Workers of America, Howat declared the court inimical to organized 
labor, was an insult to every union man, am was a disgrace to the 
1. Court o f Industrial h.elations, First Annual Heport, State of 
Kansas, 1920, p. 163. 
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2 
state of Kansas . He also foresaw t he destruction of organized lab0r, 
not only in Kansas, but in the United States if such laws were allowed 
to exist on our sta tute books. The irrlustrial court received its in-
fonnation concernil'"\g t he calling of a strike from an unidentified miner. 
This miner informed the court that Howat and his officials had been 
doing field work among the miners and miners 1 locals, endeavoring to 
arrange for certain delegates to be sent to their convention in Kansas 
City, "and they are expecting to select delegates to be sent from each 
local instructed to vote a general strike in Kansas during the session 
of the corwention. 113 
The information was apparently reliable, because the convention 
did vote backing to Howat at such ti ne he should deem it a dvisable to 
call a strike . Then, in an address before the Illinois miners' conven-
tion late in the same month, Howat castigated the inoustrial court law, 
announced his determination + o fight the law "whether or not my bones 
rot in a prison cell", am said that, "Be the consequences what they 
may, there is no power on earth, injunction or otherwise, that will 
make me call off this strike. This strike will be called by me in the 
very near future. 114 The Illinois I miners pledged their unqualified 
support to Howat and his 12,000 Kansas miners in whatever action they 
might decide upon. 
2. Topeka Daily Capital, March 9, 1920. 
3. Loe . cit . 
4 . Ibid . , March 21, 1920. 
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As a result of all this the industrial court had a temporary 
order issued by Judge A. J. Curran in district court, restraining 
Howat and 47 other district officials of the U. M. w. from interfering 
with coal production in Crawford and Cherokee counties. 5 The order was 
issued after Howat publicly declared his intention to call a general 
coal strike early in April •. Governor Allen justified the restraining 
order on the grounds that Howat was simply going to call the strike to 
defy the industrial court, and also on the grounds, that by issuing 
the order, the court was preventing economic waste, loss of wages to 
labor, violation of the law, and suffering to the people of Kansas. 
The first oonflict between Howat and the court, however, broke 
out over something other than the calling of a strike. It took place 
during the period when Howat was being restrained by the industrial 
court from calling a general coal strike. The i ndustrial court began 
an i nvesti gation in the Kansa coal mining industry upon the complaint 
of certain miners of district 14. About 2000 miners were out on strike 
at the time. It wasn't an organized strike, called by unions officials, 
but a walkout in protest against the award which had been made by Pres-
ident Wilson ' s coal wage commission. Howat wanted it understood that 
"The men are out on their own initiative. 116 He said there was much dis-
content throughout the coal field over the commission's award. 
The industrial court immediately began its investigation into the 
5. Kansas City Star, farch 30, 1920 . 
6. Topeka Daily Capital, April 6, 1920. 
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situation. The investigation Wi:l.S directed toward working conditions 
in the mines with reference to hours 01 labor, provisions l'or safety 
and sanitary conditions; miners' incomes with r elation to living costs; 
plans of mining as to continuity of production; con:iil:.ions of the mines 
with reference to future supply, and the cost of production as compared 
with previous years; school and church privileges and gener 1 social 
surroun'.iings; ani complaints of mine workers, or owners, or the public . 7 
In carrying o tlic investigation between 45 and 50 witn sses, including 
operators and miners were subpoenaed to appear as witnesses b !'ore the 
industrial court. Along with these men, 25 union officials were ordered by 
attorney- general Hopki ns to appear before the court and state why the 
miners went out on strike and on whose orders. According to the miners 
the strike was lbr one day only and that the men would report for work 
. 8 
the next morru.ng. 
Among the union of ficicU. s ordered to appear before the ind us trial 
court were Howat, August Dorchy, vice-president of district 14, and 
Thomas Harvey, secretary-treasurer of the local. After these men had 
been served with an order f rom Judge Curran of the district court to 
appear before the court and ;ive their testimony, they were in anoLner 
room of the building where t he industrial court was s~ttlng . l'hey told 
the sheriff, who went to them because of an in uiry by tne presiding 
judge, that they were having a little meeting of their own and would be 
through in about 10 minutes . They didn't appear after that, and apparently 
7 . State 1 · ~, 107 Kan. 423, P· 425. 
8 . Topeka Daily Capital, April 6, 1920. 
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showed no disposition to obey the process. 9 Howat then issued another 
of his diatribes against the court and Governor llen, saying that 
the miners didn't recognize the industrial court. 10 
As a result of this action, Howat was taken into court on a 
contempt charge. When first brought before Judge Curran he again threw 
down the gauntlet of d:cfiance to the industrial court, t hen backed up, 
pleaded guilty, changed his mini again, and finally concluded to stand 
11 
trial. Howat was c ornmitted to jail, but when he bad asked for a con-
tinuance in order to make his defense, he was released on 500 bond to 
reappear before the district court. Howat either had to completely 
give in and appear before the industrial court as a witness, or refuse 
and go to jail for contempt of the district court. 
In the meantime there was growing evidence of dissatisfaction 
among the miners in the district toward Howat and his actions 12 and 
many were going back to work. By April 8 all mines were working except 
one which was not because of certain mechanical difficulties. This 
dissatis faction directed toward Howat was something often claimed by 
the industrial court and the state officials prosecuting Howat, but in 
the clutches this dissatisfaction seened to melt away, leaving nothiq?; 
but fairly firm support. The miners were probably going back to work 
because they were getting hungry, not to show that they were opposing 
9. 107 Kan. 423, P• 429° 
10. Topeka Daily Capital, April 7, 1920. 
11. Kansas City Star, April 7, 1920. 
12. Ibid., April 8, 1920. 
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their leader. It will be remembered that tne miners had already 
announced that they would be returning to the mines in a short while, 
as the 11 strike" was only a temporary affair directed in protest against 
the award of President Wilson's cocl commission. 
When Howat 's case came to trial, he anuthe officers mentioned 
with him,were sentenced to jail until such time as they would consent 
to appear before the industrial court as witnesses and answer questions . 13 
In response, Howat's counsel filed in the district court an answer con-
sisting of 23 paragraphs. The first 21 alleged that the act undertaking 
to create the court of industrial relations was void because it was in 
conflict wi. th various provisions oft he state and federal constitutions, 
and that, therefore, it had no legal existence, 6nd the district court was 
without jurisdiction to enforce attendance upon it. rhe 22nd. paragraph 
denied the violation of any lawful order of the district court, and the 
23rd. was a 6eneral denial 14 
While in jail, Howat resumeo his attacks upon the court and 
Governor Allen . Now he included Judge Curran in his remarks . !"or some 
reason or other the sheriff gave t1owat the run of the jail and allowed 
him to make a speech from the front porch to an assembly of miner 
sympathizers. Here he referred to Governor Allen as 11 that skunk, that 
tyrant, that would-be destroyer of organized labor, that oporessor of 
15 human rights." After his sentence to jail, Howat was once more 
lJ . Ibid., April 9, 1920, 
14. 107 Kan. 423, P• 425, 
15, Tooeka Daily Capital, J pril 13, 1920. 
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assured that he wasn I t losing his control of t re 1\.ansas miner~, as 
manJ people were wont to believe. 
\1any miners quit w::i rk tnrou~hout the Pittsburg area in protest 
to the imprisonment of lowat . r'.Iiners I meetings were held around the 
district protesti ng the jailing of their president . It was at this ti. e 
that evidence was once ,1ore presented 11easuring Lhe part that anti-alien 
sentiment throughout the country was playing in influencing many every-
da.r events . 1fe have mentioned that it, in part , lay behind the agitation 
for an industrial law in ansas in 1920. Tne state began to fear that 
radical labor elements made up of aliens , not familiar with our system 
of government, wou l d try and take over the fight against Howat I s imprison-
ment . It was even reported that hundreds of socialists were ~orking in 
railroad shops and were planning to stage a demonstration in f'avor of 
16 
Howat. As a result of this ill- founded fear, Howat and the oLher 
officials imprisoned with 1-ii.n, were removed from the jail at Girard and 
were taken elsewhere. Immediately, however, the union officials were 
released from jail on ;i,2, 000 bond pendir:g c1.ppeal of their conviction to 
the supreme court of ansas . 
Immediately before Howat got into trouble with tne industrial 
court, arri tne district court, for re1·using to tes ify in the investi-
gation oft~ coa -mining industry, it will be recalled that a re-
straining order had been issued forbidding ~owat to c· 1 a strike in tne 
coal fields . row, after tne miners had _p'1e out because 01 the ir prison-
ment of Howat , Judge Curran issued an order to Ho at and the otrer union 
16. Kansas i.J.:U ~tar, . pril 14, 1920. 
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officials to order the miners back to work, or show cause for refusing 
to do so April 27.
17 
The motion for this wider and supplementary order 
charged trat the strikers had quit work simultaneously and that the 
movement was directed against the industrial court law, and for the 
purpose of violating that law by causing a curtailment in coal produc-
tion. Howat issued a statement saying that the miners themselves would 
18 decide whether or not they would return to work. However, the committee 
which had been in charge of the demonstration in sympathy for Howat be-
gan urging the men back to mrk. 
The hearing on the restraining order was heard before Judge Curran 
on pril -27, and on April 30 he issued a t~porary injunction, which had 
been sought by tte state, to prevent the calling of a strike in the Kansas 
coal mines. He did not make the injunction mandatory, as to making Howat 
call the miners back to work, as evidence of the state mine inspector, 
and officials of the opera.tors association, showed that the miners by this 
time were back at work. 19 He said, however, that if further proceedings 
showed that the miners were not working, a mandatory order would be 
issued by the court. 
Alexander Howat appealed his contempt conviction, for refusing to 
appear before the ind us trial court and testi:t:y, to the 1•ansas supreme 
court . 2° Counsel for Howat attacked the validity of the industrial court 
17. Ibid . , April 17, 19.20. 
18. Topeka Daily Capital, April 20, 1920. 
19 . Kansas City Star, April 30, 1920. 
20 . State~- Howat, 107 Kan 423, 1920. 
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law before the supreme court. That court said, however, that the only 
question involved in the proceedings was whether ~he defendants could 
be required to attend as witnesses before t:.he Court of Industrial Rela-
tions. It said that it involved no more than the right of' a witness to 
refuse obedience to a subpoena. Most of the objections of a constitutional 
nature raised in the supreme court.by counsel for Howat were directed to 
the provisions of the act creating the court of industrial relations. The 
supreme court ruled that the validity or invalidity of these objections 
had no possible bearing on the disposition of the case at hand. 
The Kansas court did, however, advance a few arguments justifying 
the creation of the indus trial court, since the defenaants had attacked 
its validity. Saying tra t the court was partly an aoministrative body, 
the supreme court was of the opinion that the legislature surely had the 
power to pass laws designed to protect the health and safety of miners , 
an:l. could authorize an a ninistrative body to make rules in that connection 
having the force of law. The supreme court echoes the attitude of the 
principal framers of the industrial law in saying that the police power 
of the state could be used to protect the public welfare, and t:.hat the 
industrial court was merely the instrument of this power . 
As Howat and the other officials had refused t.o testify at a hear-
ing held by the i ndustrial court in conjunction with its i11vestigation 
into the coal mining industry, the supreme court ruled that their con-
viction could not be challenged on the grouna.s that the industrial court 
d.idn!t have the right to institute such an investi 6 ation. No reasons 
were suggested to the judges why the legislature could not authorize the 
court of industrial relations to conduct an inquiry into conditions 
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existing in Lhe mining field, and in f urtherance of the inquiry requ;ire 
the atL,endance of witnesses . 
The supreme cour t a lso upheld the ri6ht of the inaustrial court to 
appeal to a uistrict court for an orcter requiring attendance at its hear-
ings or obedience to its orders, on the ::,rounds that since the industrial 
court was mostly an awninistrative body , it had no power to enforce its 
own pro cess. The conviction of 1 owat 01 the contempt charge, then, was 
upheld by the Kansas supreme court. It was then appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court . As it was appealed to this court i n conjunction 
with another case arising out of the 1ollowing circumstances, the ais-
position of them in that court will be taken up. aiter these circumstances 
have been looked into. 
In Chapter DJ a discussion was undertaken of the various strikes 
which took place in ansas after the passage of ~he industrial court law. 
One of those mentioned was t1e so-called howat strike of 1921, growing 
out of a minor strike called the Mishmash strike. This had been a dispute 
over back wages allegedly due Mishmash by a coal Illlru.ng company. It 
fi gures in the story again here because, in calling that strike, Howat 
violated the industrial court law and Judge Curran ' s injunction. It was, 
in f act , the first officially-called strike of the coal miners in Kansas 
after t he passage of the i naustrial court law. Two hum.red miners were 
affected by Howat's order, employees of the George K. Mackie Fuel Company, 
where Mishmash had formerly been employed. 
Governor Allen announced, a s soon as the strike had been called, 
that the only question to be determined by the industrial court was 
whether or not the closed mines (there were two involved, both belonging 
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to the above- named company) should be oper ated under a state receiver-
ship as authorized by the industrial law. The prosecution of Howat und~r 
the criminal provisions of the law were in the hands of the attorney-
general an::l. the criminal courts. 21 Before taking any direct action, how-
ever, attorney-general Hopkins wired the Crawford county attorney to 
make an investigation of the reported strike. The report apparently 
convinced Hopkins that Howat had actually called the strike because 
Howat and four other members of the district board were arrested f or it. 
Bond was fixed at $500 an::l. the defen::l.ants were all released on their 
own recognizance. 
There was, i n fact, no po~nt in Howat denying having called the 
strike, because before he was brought before the district court, a 
miners' union off ici al at Scammon, where the strike had been called, 
had showed the original strike order to Judge Curran. When brought be-
22 
fore Judge Curran, Howat readily admitted calling the strike. He said 
he called the strike solely to get injustice for , lishm.ash, a poor boy 
being exploited by a 11 greedy corporation. 11 
A postponement for the hearing of a week was granted by Judge 
Curran. In urging a continuance, the defense counsel suggested to the 
court that only two mines were made idle by the strike order, and stress-
ed the fact that the supply of coal to the public was not menaced as a 
result . This seemed to indicate that the defense attorneys would offer 
as a defense that the union officials actions had violated the letter of 
21. Kansas City Star, February 5, 1921. 
22 . Topeka Daily Capital, February 8, 1921. 
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the state industrial court act, but not the spirit. 23 Judge Curran re-
minded counsel, however, that Howat was not being tried for violating 
the industrial court law, but was accused of ·violating an order of the 
di.strict court. He went on to say that the constitutionality of the 
industrial court law would not figure at all in the case. 
The defense attorney made two attempts to halt the hearing when it 
was taken up again~ They filed two demurrers, one claiming that the evid-
ence submitted failed to properly show t hat t he defendants had called a 
strike, and denying that any of the district board menbers had had any-
thing to do with the calling of the strike. Judge Curran merely pointed 
to the admission of Howat at the preliminary he.a.ring that he had called 
the Mishmash strike. 
When asked by an attorney for t~ irrl ustrial court if the district 
board had considered tl-R t the calling of the strike was in violation of 
the injunction, and that it might end in a jail sentence for the members, 
Howat replied: 
We considered only one thing, arrl that was we were out for 
justice for this boy and his widowed mother, at whatever cost. 
We did not believe that the injunction granted ty Judge Curran 
meant that these miners had to be chained to their jobs whether 
they were paid or not. 've believed that the injunction was a im-
ed only to preven~ a ge~4ral tieup of all the .Jri.nes, such as took place last winter. 
This explanation didn't impress anyone very much thoue;h . In the first place, 
the union had never pressed the company for the alleged back-pay before the 
' 23 . Ibid. , February 9, 1921. 
24. Ibid., February lb, 1921. 
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creation of the industrial court. Therefore it seemed tra.t the real pur-
pose back of the strike call was defiance 01 tne new law. 11ishrnash, on 
the other hand, had not worked at the mine for months, and was not press-
ing the payment very heartily . Howat got more to the point, tnen, when he 
atlded that it had never been the union's policy to go to a court for wa
0 
settlements. He said they had always gotten the worst of it, d.Ild. so hadn't 
gone into the industrial court to recover payment for Hishmash . rtlso, he 
declared, . Lhe union considered the inaustrial court unconstitutional.. 
Judge Curran found 1fowat , and five other union officials, guilty of 
contempt for violating the district court's injunction, and sentenced t,hem 
to one year in jail and also to pay all court costs. 25 1fotion for a new 
trial was overruled by Judge Curran, and bond was set at ~2, 000 when de-
fense counsel gave notice of appeal. The, case was ap~Jealed to the h.ansas 
supreme court. 26 
In the Iansas supreme court, the defendants attacked the validity 
of the injunction itself, and the constitutionality of the industrial court 
law. As far as the first point was concerned, the supreme court ruled that 
the state had a perfect right to use the power of an injunction to protect 
the public health and welfare. Aore emphasis, howeveer, was placed upon 
the attack on the constitutionality of the industrial law made by counsel 
for Howat and the other union officials. 
The main line of attack oy owat I s counsel was their attack on 
the constitu:tionality of the act creating the court of industrial rela-
25 . Kansas Gity Star, February 16, 1921. 
26 . State!· Howat, 109 Kan . 376, 1921. 
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tions because it contravened the fourteenth amendment to the constitu-
tion of the United States, in that it destroyed liberty of contract 
and permitted involuntary servitude on the P3,rt of workingmen. The 
court went into a long discussion refuting this argument, and it might 
be well to mention the main points in this opinion. 
Much of the argument of the court in sustaining the industrial 
court law was similar to that used bJ those originally proposing the 
establishment of the industrial court. It brought out that the public 
is usually the greatest sufferer in industrial disputes, that the Kansas 
legislature realized this and the need for industria.l cooperation. But, 
if the two parties to inaustrial disputes couldn't, or wouldn't, volun-
tarily get together and collectively iron out their difficulties 11 why 
should they be permitted to start a fight, which quickly brings upon the 
public a recrudescence of barbarism? 1127 In other words, the state had a 
right to step in and rt_;quire them to settle their differences in a peace-
ful manner. 
The supreme court went on to say that in dealing with the constitu-
tionality of the 1920 legislation it would be necessary to bring out a few 
disagreeable facts concerning the industrial history of the United States. 
The Pullman Strike of 1894, -with all its violence ana inti nidation, was 
mentioned by the court as a good example of rampant labor leadership and 
the inherent evil in industrial warfare directly resulting. Tne court 
_27. Ibid . , p . 395. 
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pointed to the strike history of the United States during the ,1orld ,lar 
as another blot on our industrial r ecord . 
Between April 6, 1917, am November 11, 1918, tre period of 
our participation int worla war , there were more than 6,000 
strikes in the United States, so·'le of whicL h1µ{;riled winning 
the war. 11:hen the whole worJ_d was shaken by the earthy_uake of 
the world war , and the flower of this country went forward as 
willingly as a bridegroom goes to his bride , to hurl themselves 
into the raging pit of hell in Western E~8ope , l,heir fate tr.ere depended on patching up strikes at home . 
Therefore, the court was implying, ;..he right to strike was not at all un-
limited and should be curbed to some degree . This was one of their bases 
for upholding the legality of tne Kansas court. The supreme court went 
on to outline the general coal strike of 1919 ana all the suffering it 
had brought to the people, inc-'-uding in its discussion tre opinion that 
Alexander Howat I s district was ruled in medieval fashion . 
The court also based its justification for the establishment of 
the industrial court to a great extent upon the world conditions in 1920. 
I t s aid the following , which seems to be its principal justification of 
the indus rial court. 
At the beginning of ~he year 1920 it had not been demonstra-
t ed that the world would escane bankruptcy as a result of the 
war . The problems of' economic ana industrial reconstruction were 
not merely local and national, but were international in charac-
ter . Early hopes of a speedy and easy transition from war to 
peace conditions were not realized . Instead of that, the situa-
tion, always grave, was complicated ana aggravated by continued 
rise in prices, by profiteering, by social unrest fanned by radical-
ism, and by other ugly influences . The bitterness of the struggle 
between those who ought to be partners in industry became acute, 
the only remedy for the high cost of living -- joining forces in 
gr eater production - was rejected21rd economic readjustment pro-mised little but economic turmoil. 
28. Ibid._, p . 398. 
29. Ibid., p . 402 . 
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It vas unier these conditions, then, that Governor 1-1.llen called the 
special session of the legislature to consider what might be done to 
pr otect the prople from dislocations in Kansas certain to ensue from 
these conditions , special emphasis, of course, being put on the con-
tinued production of those things re f erred Lo as the necessaries of life. 
The supreme court, taking the view a,sain that the court was in 
reality more of an ad.1!1.inistrative board , said it was an impartial body 
with adequate facilities to promulgate just and r easonable re gulations 
to govern the relationships between ca pital and labor, and that with a 
group of this kirrl to appeal to industrial disputants had no moral right 
to resort to striking or lockouts. The court even took the view that gov-
ernment could take action to prevent striking because it always affected 
the public welfare . 
In conclusion the supreme court brought out the fact that hereto-
fore industrial relationships had been r egarded as existing between only 
two members - - indus rial managers, and industrial wor kers . Now, however, 
there was a third member, the public , which was to see to it that business 
did not come to a standstill because of a controversy between the first two. 
Defending the act and its principles, the court said that 
The privilege of irrlustrial managers to organize is not dis-
puted . The privilege of industrial workers to or6anize is express-
ly recognized. Coll ctive bargaining between che two organizations 
is not only encouraged, out is i n effect placed on the plane of 
duty . The ri ghts of society as a whole , however, are dominant over 
industry; and the state is under obligation to intervene to compel 
settlement of differences w~enever failure of manager an~ labore30 to agree endangers the public safety or causes general distress . 
30 . Ibid. , P • 417 . 
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On the basis ol' these arguments the Kansas Slpreme cow-t affirmed ths 
judgment of the district court in convicting Howat for violating the 
injunction by calling the 1iishmash strike. 
fhis case, along with the case31 upholding ~he decision of the dis-
trict court adjudging Howat guilty of contempt in refusing to testify be-
fore the in:::l.ustrial court, was appealed to the United Stat~ Supreme Court . 
This court decided both cases at the same time. 32 
In presenting these Cdses before the Supreme Court, Howat's coun-
sel took the same line of attack as they had in the supreme court of 
Kansas -- attacking the constitutionality of the Kct11sas Industrial Court 
Act. They held that the district court was without jurisdiction to 
issue the injunction and that, therefore, they couldn't be punished for 
violating it. They hela that the industrial court law was unconstitution-
al because it violated the liberty of contract; tl::at it was in general 
violation of the 14th. Amendme11t; that it abridged tre privileges and 
immunities of citizens, that the void. sections were so int errningled with 
the other sections to cause the whole act to fall; and that the industrial 
court held legislative, judicial, and administrative functions. 
In presenting the case for the state of t\.ansas, cou sel first of 
all held that the cases presented no federal question. rhen they held 
that the district court had authority, even without statute, to issue 
the order, that the injunction was authorized by the l.•ansas statute 
creating the industrial court, which was constitutional; that it was 
31. State!· ~, 107 Kan 423, 1920. 
32. Howat ! · Kansas, 281 U. s. 181, 1921. 
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competent for a state to declare that strikes should be unlawful gener-
ally; that there was no constitutional right to strike; that the injunc-
tion could be supported by the power of the state to regulate industries 
affected with public use; that the strike called by Howat abridged the 
constitutional rights of the fuel company; ana, finally , that if any 
provisions of the statute other than those making a strike unlawful 
should be invalid, it would not affect the validity of the strike pro-
visi. on. 
Chief Justice Taft delivered the opinion of the Court . Right at 
the beginning he said that ''We are of opinion that in neither case is the 
Kansas Industrial Relations Act present ed in such a way as to permit us 
to pass upon tnose features W'lich are attacked .•• as violative of the 
Constitution of the United States . 1133 After going into a discussion of 
the act, i ts purposes, powers am it..s operation, Chief Justice Taft said 
that the Supreme Court obviou ly could not pass upon the constitutional 
validity of an act presenting such critical and important issues unless 
the case before it required it to do so . He recognized that the industrial 
court was misnamed court, and that it should have been called a board, be-
cause it was really an aaministrative body. He upheld, however, the right 
of such a body to compel the attendance of witnesses to give testimony . 
The Supreme Court then held that the supreme court of l\.ansas had 
disposed of the cases without any considerdtion oft he application of the 
Federal Constitution to the feature s of the ansas statute of which com-
33 . Ibid. , p . 556. 
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plaint was made . ~ven if those features of the law which had been attack-
ed were void, the Court said tnat the stat,e court had. sustained in con-
t empt convictions on general law, and that , therefore, the Supreme Court 
could not consider the Federal question . 
The Supreme Court, in ef fect, was saying that the injunction suit 
in the district court was not the enforc ement of the Industrial Relations 
Act , but was a proceeding wholly independent of that, and didn't depend 
upon the ronstitutionality of that act for its jurisdiction in granting 
the order . The violation was of an order of the district, court, not of 
the industrial law, ro co nstitutional questions didn't enter into it. Even 
if the industrial law was unconstitutional, it aidn ' t gi ve Howat the right 
to disregard an order of a legally-constituted s-r,ate court requiring attend-
ance to it . Nothing can justify the disregarding of a court order, unless 
the court itself has no l egal basis or standi ng . "As the matter was dis-
posed of in the state court on principles of gene ral law, ana not Federal 
law, we have no choice but to dismiss the writs of error. 1134 
On July 1, 1921, Alexander .Howat and Au,::ust Dorchy, president and 
vice-president respectively of district 14, United Mine Workers of ,-unerica, 
were charged with the violation of the cr.iminal provisions of the Kansas 
industria 1 court law by calling the stri ke in February at the mine of the 
35 
George K. Mackie Fuel Company, the so-called Mishmash strike . Their 
prior conviction, it will be recalled, was on the violation of the district 
34. Ibid. , p. 559 
35, . Topeka Daily Capital, July 1, 1921. 
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court I s injunction against the calling of a stri ke . In the trial the 
presiding judge made it clear that the industrial court law was not 
being tried . He instructed the jury that the question to decide was 
whether Howat and Dorchy used their power to call the strike, thus 
hindering t he production of coal. 
The two were four:rl guilty of a misdemeanor for violating the 
cri ninal sections of the Kansas law. No testimony was offered in behalf 
of Howat and Dorchy in the short trial . The defense counsel had rested 
without calling a single witness .
36 
This was Howat 1 s first conviction 
by a jury. It was understood when tr:e verdict was b rought in that three 
jurors voted for conviction on the felony charge on tre first ballot. The 
felony charge, however, was soon disposed of'. At one stage of the jury's 
deliberations , the reports stated, seven were for acquittal . Members of 
. 
the jury, discussing their v.0rk, said that it was the g eneral opinion of 
the jurors that the Mishmash strike had not been called to curtail pro-
duct.ion. 37 
Howat am Dorchy were sentenced to serve six months in jail and pay 
a fine of $500 by Judge Frank Boss of the Cherokee County district court. 
The judge also ordered Howat and Dorchy to give a bond of U2,000 each not 
to again violate the Kansas Industrial Court .\ct. Notice of appeal was 
g.i ven immediately and the two were turned loese pending this apoeal. A 
moti.on f or a new trial was overruled. ' s part of the motion requesting a 
new trial , counsel for the convicted union officials introduced an 
36 . Kansas City Star, J uly 1, 1921 . 
37 . Loe . cit. 
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affidavit drawn up by the jury which had found them guilty. rhe jurors 
said in this affidavit that they returned a verdict of guilty only be-
cause they had taken an oath that 11 l'hey would be governed by the law as 
set forth in the judge's instructions. 1138 
As far as the trial itself was concernea, howat aidn 1 t think he had 
been tP-Ven a fair one because there had been no miners on Lhe Jury. A jury 
of miners, it seems would have been his concepT..ion of a fair jury to judge 
his case. Howat also continued his vituperation against the court and 
Governor Allen after his conviction for violati!l!; the criminal ection of 
the statute. He made a speech to a mass meeting of miners at Colwnbus , 
Kansas, at which time he charged that the industrial court law was drawn 
to benefit large corporations , and even went so far as to declare that 
three members of the ansas supr~e court were identified in the drawing 
up of the law. He flayed Governor Allen as "the man who tried to ride into 
the 1.ihite House on the back of organized labor. 11 39 It was at this time that 
there was some talk of booming Allen for the presidency , ,villiam Allen 
White being one of the leaders of the movement . After his conviction Howat 
also made the statement that he would drop the strike as a weapon a 1:5ainst 
the court and concentrate on organizing union labor, farmers and anti-
court factions with the idea of getting control of ~he Republican party 
by putting anti-court candidates in the field for the Republican nomination 
for state of fie es. 
38. Kansas City Star, July 8, 1921. 
39. Topeka Daily Capital, July 9, 1921. 
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Howat applied to J. C. Pollock, United States District Judge for 
Kansas, for a writ of habeous corpus, raising the question of the consti-
tutionality of the Kansas act. Before the case was decided Howat dismiss-
ed the application and went to jail September 30, 1921. 40 There he de-
clared he was willing to remain in jail until the industrial court was 
41 taken off the statute books. ppeal was taken to the supreme court of 
Kansas, and on February 6, 1922, Howat was released from jail pending 
the final decision of the case. Before being released from jail pending 
this appeal, Howat a.11d Dorchy had to post a $2000 peace l:o d not to call 
any more strikes. In rupport of his previous statement that he was willing 
to stay in jail until the industrial court was taken of f he statute books, 
Howat announced that t~ only reason he was leaving jail now was so he 
could attend the international convention of the United Mine ivorkers in 
Indianapolie , after which he would return to finish his term. 42 
In the ansas supreme c o~rt, then, counsel for Howat and Dorchy 
brought suit to have their conviction set aside, contending that their 
arrest, trial, an::i conviction and sentence were in violation of the 
rights guaranteed them under the laws and constitution of the United 
States . 43 On the authority of its decision in State y_. Howat,109 Kan. 
376, the supreme court affirmed the di strict court's co nviction of Howat 
and Dorchy for violating the criminal provisions of the Kansas act. 
40. Gagliardo, .Q.Q • cit., P• 179 
41. Copeka Capital, September J), 1921. 
42 . Ibid., February 7, 1922. 
43 . State y_. Dorchy, 112 ·an. 235. 
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Appeal was then taken to the United States Supreme Court . 44 
Before this appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, however, 
something happened which altered the situation completely. After the 
Kansas supreme court had upheld the conviction of Dorchy and Howat, an:i 
before appeal was made to the bupreme Court of the United States, that 
Court hao ruled that compulsory arbitration as applied to packing plant,s 
violated the Federal Constitution (Wolff Packing Company~· Court of 
Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522) . This case will be brought up later 
in connection with the dispute between the ~olff Packing Company and the 
industrial court. 
In the case now brought before them (Dorchy y_. Kansas, 264 U.S. 
286), the Suprene Gourt held, that for the same reasons 6 iven in the 
wolff case, compulsory arbitration (or wage-fixing by the industrial 
court) was also unconstitutional as applied to the coal mines in Kansas . 
However, the Supreme Court said vhat the question to be decided now was 
whether or not Section 19 (the penal section under which Howat and Dorchy 
were convicted) was invalid , and had fallen as a part of the system of 
compulsory arbitrction. If this part of the statute was so closely inter-
mingled with the compulsory ar itration features of the d.Ct that it had to 
fall with the others, why naturally Howat and LJorchy couldn't be convicted 
under it; for, as the Supreme Court said, "If ::iection 19 falJ.s as the 
result of the decision in the Charles Wib.lff acking Company case, the 
effect is the same as if t he section had been repealed without any 




The Court did make the ouservation that a statue had 
in part was not necessarily void in its entirety. 
The court held that most of the provisions of the original act 
were very intimately connected with the system of compulsory arbitration, 
but whether or not Section 19 was was a question of interpretation and of 
legislative intent. It went on to say that the task of detennining the 
intention of the state legislature in this case, liKe the usual function 
of interpreting a state statute, rested with the state court, and its 
decision as to the severability- of the provision would be conclusive 
upon the Supreme Court. Therefore, in order that the Kansbs supreme 
court could pass on the question of whether or not Section 19 fell with 
the system of compulsory arbitration, its judgment -- which had been 
rendered before the Wolff Packir\g Company case --was vacated. Judgment 
was reversed to allow the Kansas court to decide the point. 
Section 28 of the industrial act reads as follows: 
If any section or provision of this act shall be found in-
valid by any court, it shall be conclusively presumed that 
this act -....ould have been passed by the legislature without 
such invalid section or provision, and the act as a wnole shall 
not be declared invalid by reason of the fact that one or more 
sections or provisions may be found to be invalid by any court. 
The Kansas supreme court said that , because of the pioneer character of the 
legislation, the legislature had so framed the act so that any invalid pro-
vision could be eliminated without affecting the others. 46 The Kansas court 
45 . Ioid., p . 289 . 
46. State ~· Howat , 116 Kan. 412, 1924. 
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also took exception to the Supreme Court calling the work of the indus-
trial court conpulsory arbitration. 
Justice was to be done between employer and employee, but 
protection oft.he public interest was to be paramount, and 
the public interest is not a subj ect. of arbitration. besides 
that, the constitution and functions of4tpe tribunal forbade its classification as an arbitral rody. ' 
As for the main question, that of deciding whether or not it was intend-
ed that the provision a gainst using official power to c all strikes in the 
industrie s named in the act should stand, even if the provisions relating 
to the regulation of wages be held unconstitutional, the "·ansas supreme 
court said it should remain . "To free labor-union members from tyrannical 
domination by ruthl.ess labor leaders, prevent meddlesome interference 
with the relation between employer ana employee, and so secure continuity 
"48 in production of coal , Section 19 was inserted in the law. The con-
clusion drawn then, was that Section 19 was to be regarded as having 
the legal effect of an independent statute, making it a punishable off~nse 
for an officer of a labor union, acting in his official capacity, to call 
a strike of coal miners . The judgment of the district court in imposing 
upon Dorc hy and Howat the penalties prescribed by the section in question 
was affirmed. Two justices of the 1\.ansas court dissented, thinking that 
the act as a whole should fall as a result of the decision of the United 
49 
States Supreme Court in the Charles Wolff Packing Company case. 
47 . Ibid., p . 415 . 
48 . Ibid., p . 416. 
49 . Ibid., P • 419-420. 
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As a result of l,his decision of the Kansas Slpreme court affirming 
their earlier opinion in the conviction of the two union officials, the 
case was taken back to the United States Supreme Court on appeai. 50 In 
this case counsel for Dorchy and Howat held that compulsory arbitration was 
unconstitutional and did not apply to coal mines in Kansas, on the basis 
of the wolff Company case . Also they challenged the constitutionality of 
Section 19 of the Kansas act, which had been held still valid by tne supreme 
court of h.ansas. 
Connsel for the state held that since the supreme court of Kansas 
had held that Section 19 was irrlependent, the.re could be no question there 
of the validity of the provisions of the act concerning the fixing of wages 
and hours by the industrial court, and that t he plaintiff's in error (Howat 
and Dorchy) could only challenge the constitutionality of those parts of 
the act affecting them personally, in this case only tre penal s ection. 
The state also held that the 1':li shmash strike had been unlawful because it 
had attacked the constitutional as well as the legal right of the fuel 
company and its cust-.omers . 
The Supreme Court largely took the saine view of the matter , arrl 
ruled that sine e the l\.ansas Court had · said th e penal s ection could stand 
alone , it was bourrl by this decision. 11 The only question open -; • .- t s 
1 d . t . t ' . 1 11 51 whether the statute as so construed and ~pp ie is cons 1 u~iona • 
Referenc e here was being made to Section 19 standing alone as an independ-
50. Dorch,y v. K~, 272 U.S. 306, 1926. 
51 . lbid. , p . 308 . 
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ent statute, and whether or not it was constit utional standing alone . 
The question, in other words, was not whether the legislature had the 
power to prohibit strikes, but whether or not it had the power to do so 
constitutionally in the ,tishmash case. 1-1. t least, that is as far as the 
Supreme Court was willing to commit itself . It side-stepped the question 
of the general prohibition of striking by the state, and confined itself 
to judging the individual -Iishmash strike . 
In discussing this strike the ...,upreme Court said that t.nere was 
no trade dispute at the time between the operators and the miners; there 
had been no controversy between t.he company a nd the union over wages , 
hours or conditions of labor; nor was the strike ordered as a sympathetic 
one in aid of others engaged in any such controversy; the order was made 
and the strike was called to co i1pel the company to pay a claim of one 
Mishmash for ,$180. There was also no evidence that the claim had been 
submitted to arbitration, nor of any contract requiring that it should 
be . The claim was disputed and had been pending nearly two years . The 
Court said that: 
The r..:..g _t to carry on business-- be it called liberty or 
property -- has value. To interfere with this right without 
just caus e is unlawful. The fact that the injury was inflicted 
by a strike is sometimes a justification • .r:mt a strike may be 
illegal because of its purpose, however orcterlJ tne manner in wnich 
it is conducted . To collect a stale claim due to a fellow member 
of the union who was formerly employed in the business is not 
pernissible purpose . In the absence of a valid agreement to the 
contrary, each party to a a.isputect claim may insist that it be 
determined only by a court. 'o enforce paymert by a strike is 
clearly coercion. The legislature may make such action punishable 
criminally, as extortion or otherwise.52 
52 . Ibi d ., P• 311. 
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The Court went on to say also that there was no absolute right to strike, 
neither under the common law, nor the i"ourteenth Amendment. So it was de-
termined by the Supreme Court that a strike called to force payment of a 
contestea claim was unconstitutional, leaving the broader subject to the 
general prohibition of strikes unsettled. In an annotation to this case 
the Supreme Court listed the purposes for which strikes could lawfully 
be called. On this basis the decision of the Kansas supreme court is up-
holding the conviction was affirmed. 
This brings to a close the series of cases arising in the courts 
relative to the Kansas Industrial Court brought by lexander Howat and 
the other union officials of district 14 who sought to rave it declared 
unconstitutional. In these cases the law was continually upheld, mainly 
because the real controversial points of the new law had not been legally 
brought up for constitutional adjudication. Now it will be necessary to 
bring out another series of cases, the result of whic h was to seriously 
limit the industrial court as originally established. Th~se cases grew 
out of a conflict between the industrial court and tne Charles , olff 
Packing Company. These cases rave already been briefly alluded to during 
the discussion of the Howat cases. 
This case was conspicuous as being one that was carried to the 
supreme court of the state, and later to that of the United States, by 
an employer on the challenge as to the constitutionality of the act as 
it created a wage-fixing body. A contro ~ersy arose o er wa6es and hours 
of labor, and a meeting was called to take a strike vote. Instead of 
voting to strike, the employees voted to submit the controversy to the 
Court of Industrial Relations. A complaint was then filed by the workers 
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with the industrial court . 53 
The butcher I s union, which brought the case in the industrial 
court, alleged that the contract under which the men had been working had 
expired, and that without drawing up a new one the company had cut wages, 
would not guarantee at least 40 hours of work per week, and did away with 
a bonus provision of the previous contract . In answering the charge the 
packing company a~nitted th~ existence of the contract that had explred, 
claimed theybad carefully complied with it during its duration, said they 
had offered to discuss a new one, but that the union had presented one 
already drawn up for signature . 54 The company justified the wage reduction 
on the g rounds that they had lost in excess of ~100,000 during 1920, and 
could not , therefore , continue the former wage scale . 
Neither side to the controversy wished to change the "open s!'lop" 
status of the pa.eking plant . rhe industrial court thereupon proceeded to 
take testimony as to the presen cost of living as compared with the pre-
vious year, the evidence being ronf'lictin6• It was finally decided that 
there had been a slight drop in the co t of living sire e the previous year , 
so the court announced a wage scale slightly reduced from that one paid 
during 1920. Another sorely contested point had to do with the length of 
the i,.orking day, the court finally deciding that an 8-hour day should be 
basic . However , a 9- hour day could be observed not to exceed 2 days in any 
one week without penalty. The court presented its conclusions under ~O heads, 
53 . Court of Industrial Relations V. Wolff Packing Company, 111 
Kan. 501, 1922 . -
54. United States Department of Labor , bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Bulletin o . 322, Washington , Government Printing Office, 1923, pp. 21- 23 . 
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including those mentioned dealing with wages and hours. 55 
The 1lolff Packing Company rel'us ed to obey the order thus drawn 
up by the industrial court, so the state sought a writ of mandamus from 
th t t 1th . b d" 56 Th P · e supreme cour o compe e1.r o e 1.enc e . e ack1.ng Company at-
tacked the proceedings on several grounds, the minor ones need not be 
gone into at this time . The attack on the constitutionality of the law, 
however, was important. 
In the first place the company contended that the industrial court 
could not exercise t~ extraordinary power of regulating wages to be paid 
by employers except in cases of emergency, and that no emergency existed 
j ustifying the present interference on the part of the court. The court 
dismissed this contention by saying that the petition bringing the man-
damus proceedin~s sufficiently alleged that an emergency existed which 
justified the irrlustrial court taking jurisdiction. It might be inter"st-
ing to note this little sidel ght at this time however. After the indus-
trial court had applied for the compelling order, the supr~ne court had 
appointed a commissioner t.o consider the record, to take additional 
evid.anc e , and r eport his conclusions to the court. The commissioner 
found that the company had lost $100,000 the previous year, and that 
there was no sufficient evidence of an emergency or danger to the public 
from the controversy to justify action by the industrial court. 57 The 
55 . 111 Kan . 501, pp . 503- 4° 
56 . Court of Industrial rt.elations v . Charles 1.'olff Packing Company , 
109 Kan. 629,l92L 
57. 262 U. s. 522, p . 525. 
-
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supreme court overruled his report and ruled that the evidence did show 
a sufficient emergency . 
The packing co npany also contended that the industrial court law 
and th~ orders sought to be enforced by it in the mandamus proceedings 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Cons ti tiJ.tion in 
that the law and the orders made under it deprived the defendant of its 
liberty and property without due process of law, and also denied it the 
equal protection of the laws. To support this contention the defendant 
argued that enployees could not be governed by the orders of the indus-
trial court; that the wages of the defendant I s employees were not af-
fected with a public interest so as to subject such wages to regulation 
by the state; that the law arrl orders made by the industrial court de-
prived the defendant arrl its employees of the freedom of contract concern-
ing wages; and that the classification of the businesses to which the law 
applied was arbitrary and un,i11st . 
Here the oo nipany was principally attacking the provision in the 
law which prohibited strikes, an::i that which required a company to con-
tinue its operation unless the court gave them oermission to cease 
operation . The supreme court refuted their ar;uments by saying that both 
labor could quit work arrl. capital could cease operation, except witn Lhe 
intention in mind of violatiDe; the provisions of the act . The industrial 
court was to be the judge as to whether or not such was the intention in 
any case arising where a worker had quit or a business had ceased operation. 
The court justified state r ;ulation of he packing concern by referriflb 
to the fact that public utilities had long been re 1ulated b_y government 
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because of t.heir public interest, and, therefore, since the legislature 
had declared the packing business to be affected with th~ same putlic 
interest , it was suoject to the same reb-ulation. The charge by the 
co1i pany that the wages of its employees were not affected with a public 
interest was arn wered in the same way. 
The supreme court baseu its contention that the industrial court 
had t.he ri0 ht to fix minimum wages and hours of labor on the United 
States Supreme Court I s decision in filson v. New (243 u. ::,. 332), which 
upheld the damson law which fixed the 8- hour day and minimum wa6es for 
railroad employees. The commerce clause, that is, toe right of congress 
to regulate interstate commerc e was the basis of the decision . To this 
the Aansas supreme court said that 
If under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution 
cor:gress can regulate wages and hours of labor of those worK-
ing on railroads, the state, under the police power should be 
able to regulate the wages and hours 01 labor of those working 
in a packing plant operating wholly Vlli. thin he state. The 
powers of congress under t 1e corrnnerce clause are no greater 
than the authority of the state under the police power . 58 
Another analogy was made between the circumstances surrouaiing the two 
cases . The court recalled that the Adamson law had been passed to avoid 
a threatened tieup of the nations I railroads, also that the Kansas 
Industrial Court Law had been passed for the same rea sons; that is, to 
prevent sufferir:g and hardship from falling on the people . 
One other important point was brought out in this case, and that 
was concerning the freedom that doe s exist under the contract clause of 
58. 109 Kan. 629, P• 644. 
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the Constitution. In this case the court mentioned the fact that many 
state l aws had been upheld which prescribed minimum wages for women and 
children, am that any such law naturally restricted the absolute free-
dom of contract . But , it was held , there is no absolute freedom of 
contract , based also on the protection due the public by the state 
from absolute freedom of action by any person or corporation . It might 
be added here that the United States Supreme Court has also gone on 
record since l,he ti:r1e of the imustrial court a.s s aying that abaolute 
freedom of contract does not exist . 
59 
Here the Gourt said that freedom 
of contract was a qualified and not an absolute right, and that tnere 
was no f r eedom to do as one willed or to contr~ct as one chose. Contracts 
which worked abainst the interests of the community could not be allowed. 
Non- living wages worked against the public good and, therefore, were 
subject to minimun wage laws . 
On these 5 rounds, th ansas supreme court upheld the state 's 
demurrer to the se legal objections ol' the packing co 1pan.y to the mandamus . 
Only questions of law had been decioed at this time. The case went again 
50 before the state supr3me court anc) this time questions arising out 
of the evidence were disposed of . Here the court upheld the hi6 er wabe 
rate which the indiustrial court had ordered the pacKiil0 company to pay 
t o its employees . t will be recalled that in certain of the sample 
cases mentioned in chapter four, t he industrial court made the statement 
59 . fest Coast riot el voiapany -:!_ • Panish, 300 u. b . 379, 1937. 
60. Court of Industrial elations v . Charles .Jolff 1 acking 
Company, 111 Kan .501, 1922 . 
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that any company that could not pay a livi~ wage to its enployees and 
still make a profit had no busi ness operating . In this case the state 
supreme court went on record with the same philosophy . 
The operators of a packing plant cannot, by law, be com-
pelled to sell the finished product of their plants at a 
price that will not allow them a fair r eturn upon the invest-
ment , but that does not say that those operating the packing 
plant cannot be compelled by law to pay a living wage to t eir 
employees , notwithstanding the fact that the plant is being 
operated at a loss . n i ndustry of any kirrl that cannot be 
operated except at ~he sacrifice of its employees ought to 
quit business . 61 
In other words , the company, in this case , could not put their loss on 
the employees by making them work for a wage, which in the opinion of the 
industrial court , was not a living wage. As a result the supreme court 
ordered the packing company to pay the schedule of wa6es ordered by the 
industrial court, and also to establish the hours of labor which it fixed . 
It was t o look elsewhere to recoup its losses . 
After the rendering o' this unfavorable decision , the \folff 
Packing Company appealed their case to the Uni ted States Supr eme Court .
62 
This was probably the most i mportant of the cases affecting the indus-
trial court as it was instrumental in seriously curtailing its operation. 
In the Supreme Court the packing company attacked the law on practically 
the same grounds they had in the K&1sas supreme court. They held that 
wages paid by employers to packing house workers were ndimpressed with 
a public interest or subject to state re gulation. They also contended 
61 . Ibid., p . 507 . ,--
62. Wol ff Packinp; Company~· Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. ~. 
522, 1923. 
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that th order of the industrial court was void because it i creased 
the operating expenses of the packing compwzy- a ainst its will, not-
wit st nding the income o the company was insuf icient to pay the 
costs of raw material and operating expenses, includi J wages to their 
employees a 'fected by the order of the industrial court . In reply the 
state held that the business of the olff Packini:; Company was affected 
with a public interest , that an emergency existed, ana tne order made 
was constitutional an valid because of the state's ri6 ht to protect 
the welfare of the people . In this respect the state contended tnat the 
doctrine of freedom of contract could not make the law unconstitutional . 
The opinion of the Court was oelivered by Chief Justice aft. he 
based his first attack on the law under the Fourteenth endment, and 
it concerned the right of capital to cease operation, and the ri6ht of 
labor to quit work. The Chief Justice mentioned that the act pennitted 
an employer to go out of l:usiness only if he could show that he could 
only continue on the terms fixed by the industrial court at such heavy 
loss that collapse would follow. He also brought out the ri~ht of a lab-
orer to quit , but not to combine with others to induce them to quit. 
These privileges were genvrally illusory it seemed to the Chief Justice, 
and the act curtailed t e right of the employer, on the one hana, and 
of the employee, on the other, to contract about their affairs. 
The Gourt 1 s opinion on tne freedom o contract was that lt wasn't 
absolute, was su Ject to various restraints, but that these restraints 
could not be unreasona le or arbitrary . Freedom was to be the general 
rule, and restraint the exception. fhen came the discussion as to whet er 
or not exceptional circumstances, which coula only justify le islati ve 
authority in abridging Lhe freedom of contract, existed in the present 
controversy . The state held that such an emergency had existed, that 
since the legi slature had declared the preparation of food affected 
with a public interest , the state had the right w regulatE; that business 
by fixing wages and terms of employment so as to insure continuous oper-
ations which were necessary to safeguard that interest. The Court then 
attacked the i:\t.Jls as laws I extt:nsion of the public interest principle to 
such wide fields as preparation of r'ood , production of fuel , and the 
manufacture of clothing. 
The Court said that businesses to be clothea with a public interest, 
justifying some sort of state regulation, could be divided into three 
classes. (1) Those which are carried on under t~ authority of a public 
grant of privileges which either expressly or irnpliedly imposes the 
affirmative duty of' rendering a public service demanded by any member 
of the public . Such were the railroads , other common carriers arrl puulic 
utilities . (2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptioual, the public 
interest attaching to which , recognized from earliest times, hQs 
survived the period of arbitrary laws by Parliament or colonial lebis-
latures for regulating all traces and callings. ~uch are those of the 
keepers of inns, cabs , and gristmills . (3) Businesses, whi ch, though 
not public at their inception, may be fairly said to have risen to be 
such, ana have become subject in consequence to some 0 overnment regula-
tions . They have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public 
that this ~s superimposed upon them. In the language of the cases, the 
owner , by devoting his business to the public use, in er fect grants 
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the public an interest in that use , and subjects himself to public regul-
ation and to the extent of that interest, although the property continues 
to belong to its private owner and to be en~itled to protection accord-
63 ingly. After listing numerous cases cited under this third head, the 
Court said that after examining them it was rnanifeet that the mere de-
claration by a legislature that a business was affected with a puulic 
interest was not oonclusive as to whether or not it was subject to re-
gulation on any of the grounds mentioned . 11 The circumstances of its 
alleged change from the status of a private business and its freedom 
from regulati on into one in which the public have co'lle to have an inter-
di · 1 · · 164 S t est are a l ways a subject of ju cia inquiry. ' o it wasn' the 
principle of the public interest that the Court was attacking at all, 
because it had long been recognized as valid; but it was the extent to 
which the Kansas law had applied this principle which was wrong . To the 
Court "public interest" meant much more than that the public welfare 
was affected by continuity of operation or by the price at which a 
commodity was rold or service rendered . 
It has never been supposed, since the adoption oft~ 
Constitution, that the business of the butcher, or the baker, 
the tailor , the wood chopper, the mining operator, or tne 
miner was clothed with such a public interest tnat the price 6 of his product or his wages could be fixed by state regulation. 5 
To be affected with a public interest, the Court was saying, the business 
had to have a peculiar relationship witn the public, and the degree to 
63 . Ibid., P• 535 . 
64. Ibid., P• 536 . 
65 . I bid ., P• 537. 
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which they could be regula Led, depended upon the Y1'..ture of t 1 l usiness 
its elf . Cnly those rusinesses indespensable to the public , and hich 
could char ~,e exorbitant rates or char6 es to which th puolic would be 
powerless to oppose, were really affected with a pub.Lie lnt rest . ln 
other words , those that were monopolistic in character, those tthlL were 
not governed by competition or affe::cted by competi11u interests, were 
businesses actually affected with a puulic interest anu suoJect Lo 
public regulation. 
If , as , in effect, contended by counsel for the st.c:1.,:,c, the 
common callings are clothed with a public interest by a m re 
legislative declaration, which necessarily authorizes full 
and comprehensive r .gulation within le islative discretion, 
there must be a revolution in the relation of 5overn11ent to 
general b~1siness . 'rhis will be Egt1ning the public interest 
argument 1.nto the 6 round •... 
This could not at all be reconciled to the freedom of contract 6uaranteed 
by the Fourteenth .Ame1drnent . 
It will be recalled ,hat in a 1)revious case67 the K· nsas supreme 
court had said that the police power of the st~te was just ;...s ~reat as 
t1e powers of congress under the commerce clause . It had said the in-
dustrial court had the ri~_,ht _.o fix minimum waBes of persons working 
within tne state, under tr1is police power, since tne Feder ..... l Governm,nt 
nad the right to fix minimum wages for rc.:dlroad workers worKin0 in 
interstate co merce, under the commerce clause. The court was referring 
to ilson v~ ,lew, in which the Supreme Court nad upneld tne dainson act . 
6p. Ibid., p . 539. 
b? . 109 Kan. 629, P• 644. 
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To this, the Supreme Court now said that 
The minutely detailed government supervision, including 
that of their relations to i.,heir enployees, to which the rail-
roads of the cow1try have been gradually subjected by Congress 
through its power over interstate commerce, furnishes no pre-
cedent for regulation of the business of the plaintiff in 
error (Wolff Packing ~omp~8), whose classification as public is, at the best , doubtful. 
The powers of the Federal Governrrent under the commerce clause were 
greater, it seems, c.han the police power of any one of tne states in re-
gulating their internal businesses . 
The opinion of the Court was, then, that in so far as it pennitted 
the fixing of wa5es in packiDe, plants in h.ans ... s, the inaustrial law was 
in conflict with t~ Fourteenth endment and deprived the co., pany of J. ts 
property and liverty of contract witnout due process of law. 
After this decision by the United Stat es Supreme Court, the state 
of Kansas brought mandamus proceedings in the Kansas supreme court once 
more, this ti -ie to compel obe,lience of the packing co11pany to those }13.rts 
of the order previously made not invalid under t~ Supreme Court I s decision?9 
rhe packing company moved that the judgment of the KcJI1sas court originally 
upholding the order be reversed in its entirety, and that the industrial 
court be assessed all costs incurred by the packing ID mpany in t aking their 
case through the courts to its final decision. 
The Kansas court rejected this, saying t hat only those provisions 
of the original order relatifls to the fixi.ne, 01' wages were declared 
68 . 262 U. S. 522, p . 543 . 
69. Court of lndustrial Relations v . Charles ,lolff Packing Compa~y, 
114 Kan . 304, 1923-°' 
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invalid by the United States Supreme Court decision 
'he Supreme Court of the United States ha s not said 
that the court of i ndustrial relations act is invalid 
except in so far as it attempts to give power to fix 
wages . Other matters were embraced within the opi1uon 
an:i judgment of this court , but t.hey do not appear to 
have been determined by the bupr eme court. Strikes are 
discussed, but there is nothing in the judgment of the 
70 Court con c erning them. The judgment concerns only wages . 
The supreme court then is sued a writ of mandamus commanding the packing 
company to put into affect the parts of the order of the industrial 
court not affected by t~ Supreme Court . These included the basic 8-
hour day award, and oL her minor points concerning the period of work 
f o r vari ous cl a sses of employees , such as having 0 11e day off per week 
fo r thos e in departments operating 24 hours a day and seven days a 
week . 
The industrial court then brought another suit into the supreme 
court of the State asking for a writ of mandamus compelling the packing 
company to adher e to that pa.rt of the original order which, besides 
limiting the basic working day to e~ht hours, provided that all time 
worked over 48 hours per week should be paid for by time and a half. The 
industrial court clai ned that this wasn I t wage fixing, but. was part of 
the ori ginal order dealing with hours of w~rk . 71 Tnis part of the order, 
the fixing of hours of labor , ha.'d not been touched on by the Supreme 
Court . rhe supreme court ordered tat the above- named provision be in-
70 . Ibi d ., p . 306 . 
- 71 . Court of Industrial Relations v . Charles ,olff Packing Company, 
114 Kci.I1 . 48--:;-:-- -
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eluded in the other writ compelling obeciience to those parts of the 
industrial court's order not vacated by the Supreme Court. 
As a result 01' these actions, the Charles vfolff Packing Company 
then took their final case to the Supreme Court of the United States. 72 
They wanted the whole order of the industrial murt declared null anct 
void. They held that the purpose of the industrial act was compulsory 
arbitration, which was unconstitutional. The state held that the fixin:; 
of hours of work and conditions of labor, not having been included in 
the first decision of the Supreme Court, did not fall wi tn the provisions 
fixing wages . 'rhey also cont ended that, the industrial court had a valid 
right to fix hours of labor and working conditions. The Supreme Court's 
answer to this was as follows: 
••• the act, as construed and applied in the decisions 
of the supreme court of the state, shows very plainly that 
its purpose is not to regulate wages or hours of labor, either 
generally or in particular classes of business, but to authorize 
the state agency to fiY them where, and in so far as, they are 
subjects of a controversy, the settlement of which is directed 
in the interest of the public. In short, the authority to fix 
them is intended to be merely a part of the system of compulsory 
arbitration arrl to be exerted in attaining its object, which is 
continuity of operation and production.73 
Then the Court, bringing out the arguments they had formerly used in out-
lawing the fixing of wages by the industrial court, and using the same 
principle, said that they were as applicable to this case as to the other, 
and the same conclusion had to be reached in regard to the right to fix 
hours of labor and working conditions. Restated briefly, it said 
72. Charles :Jolff Packing Company~· Court of Industrial Relations, 
267 u. s. 552, 1925 . 
73 . Ibid., P• 565. 
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The system of compulsory arbitration which the act estab-
lishes is intended to compel, ana if sustained will compel, 
the owner and employees to continue the business on terms 
which are not of their making . It will constrain them not 
merely to respect the terms i f they continue the business, 
but will constrain them to continue the business on those 
terms . True , the terms have some qutlifications, but as 
shown in the prior decision, the qualifications are rather 
illusory and do not sultract much from the outy imposed. 
Such a system infringes the liberty of co ntract and :dghts 
of property guaranteed by the due process of law clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment . rhe established doctrine is that 
this liberty may not be interfered -dth, under the guise 
of protecting the public interest , by legislative action 
which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some 
purpose within the competency of the state to effect . 74 
The Court th en decided t at the authority which the industrial act 
gave to the i ndustrial court to fix hours of labor was merely a feature 
of the system of compulsory aruitration, and had no separate purpose. 
As a part of that system, therefore, it shared the invalidity of ~he 
whole. The judgment of the h.ansas court was reversed, s ayimg that it 
should have refused to give effect to any part of the order drawn up 
by the industrial court . 
This , then, is the record of the i ndustrial court and the judicial 
proceeding s growing out of it. It will be necessary now to look at what 
actually had happerled to the court as a result of the adverse decisions 
handed down by the highest court in the land, and what the history of 
the court was after their deciding. 
74. Ibid., p . 569. 
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Conclusion 
Just what was left of the industrial court after Lhese decisions 
of the Supreme Court? First of all the criminal provisions of the statute 
were not directly affected by any of the rulings, meaning that the court 
could still prohibit union officials from inciting strikes enforceable by 
fine ru1d imprisonment . l'he investigative provisions of the court were 
also untouched b;:{ the Supreme Court. ne court still nad the right, then, 
to investigate a strike, secure evidence by compulsion if necessarJ, and 
make public its findinbs. It couldn't establish minimum wages or hours 
of labor now, however, and force tnt: parties to acll1~re to tncm, thus pre-
venti!1c, strikes from taking place . 
There were various o inions as t.:> ,IhetL~r or not the industrial 
court was irreparably harmed by these decisions , and also various 
attitudes expressed concerning the correctness of the Supreme Court's 
position. ix-Governor Allen, Jonathan Davis beca;ne governor in 1923, 
said he didn't think tne decision75 was a body t low to the court, .. :mt 
merely a matter that could be adjusted by a legislative amendment . 
We always felt th~re was a little dan5er in that part of 
the law wherein we sought to establish minimum wages .... 
But the body of the act still stands. All that will be nec-
essary now ,jlll be a legislJ.t ive amendment to meet this one 
objection. 76 
This certainly doesn't sound lixe the Governor Allen 01 1920 advocating 
75 . Referring to 262 u. s. 522, 1923,in which Supreme Court said 
industrial court could not fix minimum wages in meat- packing industry. 
76. Topeka Daily Capital, June 13, 1923 . 
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and pushing the establishment of the court. We have seen that the framers 
o.f the law were sure toat constitutionally they were on f irm ground. Now 
that ground had been spaded from under them. 
It has already been seen that Governor Davis advocat ed t ne repeal 
of the industrial court after he crune into office and after the r endering 
of t.he volff Company decision. 77 The general concensus of' opinion was 
that the industrial court had been seriously weakened by t~ decisions. 
Some thought the court could still perform much useful service in 
deciding industrial cases which were brought to it by parties voluntarily 
seeking help in deciding the question. 
78 
If parties in such cases would 
agree beforehand to abide by th e decision the point would undoubtedly 
carry much weight . But it has been proven time and again that that is 
something hard to bring about . Since the industrial court was no longer 
able to enforce its own decisions, or rave them enforced, voluntary 
agreement would be the onl1 r way in which it could still have been useful 
in deciding industrial cases. 
Here was another viewpoint on the decisions: 
The decision (in the Wolff case) should be welcomed by 
labor and capital alike as a victory for true liberalism. 
Such a s saults on individualism under the guise of puolic 
welfare are becoming more and more frequent in state le5i~-
lation and against then all liberals should be on guard. 7 
In its roundup of editorial opinion on major issues, the Literary Digest 
often summarized fairly well the general country-wide thought and opinion. 
77 . Loe . cit . 
78 . "The Industrial Court of K.ansas 11 , The Outlook, C1JuCIV (June 27, 
1923), P • 252° 
79 . 11 The Supreme Court Admonishes Kansa.s, 11 The Independent, CX 
(June 23 , 1923 ) , P• 392. 
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It reported that most editors felt the court had had its teeth effect-
ively drawn, some thought the court was killed entirely, but most seem-
ed to a5ree with the decisions of the Court . 
80 Labor leaders, of course, 
rejoiced at the discomfiture of the industrial court after the decisions . 
Conservative editors were pleased with the failure of one more attempt 
to regulate private business . Another blow at socialismJ 
Hell, just what had happened to this compulsory arbitration which 
we have ;nentioned so much throughout the paper? What had the Supreme 
Court actually done to limit t,hat principle as it was applied by the 
Kansas court. Re.member, the Kans as experiment was the first serious 
attempt at real compulsory arbitration, or adjudication if you like, 
in the United States . First, compulsory arbitration in such industries 
as the production of food , clothing, and i'uel had been declared un-
constitutional . They weren't essential enough to the puolic welfare to 
be subjected to the regulation imposed upon then bJ the hansas law. 
The Supreme Court did imply, and it has never since been seriously 
questioned, that compulsory arbitration in public utilities and in 
the railroad industry could be upheld. These .industries were monop-
olistic in character, and the only protection the public bad from 
their arbitrary operation was from governmental re6ul~tion of some 
sort . Une writer did think the Supreme Court might uphold compulsory 
arbitration in the coal in:iustry if a nation-wide strike were called-
81 
which would threaten the health and welfare of all the people . 
80 . "The Kansas Court Losing Its l'eeth, 11 Literary Digest , LlUCVII 
June 30, 1923), PP • 13-14. 
81. Edward Berman, 11 The Supreme Court and Compulsory Arbitration," 
.American Economic Heview, AVIJI O arch, 1928), PP• . 19-44• 
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..J"illiam L. ug~ins, the chief architect of' ~he ori 6 inal indus-
trial law summarlzed the effect the Supreme Gourt decisions hao on the 
court in this way. He mentioned, as ~lready stdted, that theJ aid not 
a.1.'fect the administration of the industrial act as it applied to common 
carriers and public utilities • 
.Neither ·.~ere t11e penal provisions of the Act affectea by 
ejther of the ( olff) decisions. The penal provisions wnich 
remained in full force were those which the legislature in-
tended should prevent unreasonable i 11terference with any of 
the industries included wi"thin the terms of the act , whether 
by violence, by intinidation, threats against, or abuse of 
other workers, or cornpiring with others persons to induce 
workers to quit their employment for the purpose of hinder-
ing, delaying, L1t erfering with, or suspending the operation 
of any of the industries m.rned in the Act. 82 
The act still made it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment, 
for any person wilfully doing any of the things prohibited by the act. 
It was still a felony for a union official to call a strike too. 
1•Ir. Huggins was also of the opinion that the United States Supreme 
Court had made some important law in the two packing cases. Under this 
11 law11 coal mines, packing houses, and flour inills were mere private 
enterprises not at all affected with a public interest. "Unfortunately 
for the public, the United States Supreme Court cannot unmake -..he hard 
facts. 1183 Then followed a realistic picture painted oi' the hardship and 
suffering following in the wake of the 1919 coal strike in Kansas , the 
necessity of calling for volunteer miners, and the need for military 
protection for them . This had taught the people of !\.ansas, said 1vir. Hl:3.-g6ins, 
_ 82 . ~filliam L . Huggins, 11 Just what Has the Supreme Court Done to 
the Kansas Industrial Court? 11 American Bar Association Journal, AI 
(June, 1925), p . 363. 
83 . Ibid . , p . 366. 
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that the coal i ndust ry affected with .:i. public intere.,t, and a vLLhl 
on at that . 
Regardless of what men thought , pro l:l.rld con, on Lhe slt.uaLlon, Lt 
was an incontrovertible fact that the United St ates .Supreme CourL had 
thrown a body bloc k to the indus trial court . In Chapter l I il:, wa 
mentioned that, al'ter 1922, the work on t,he industric1.l side of tI1e new 
court declined until in 1925 it was pr acticall y dormant . Reasons were 
given for that, one of them b eing the adverse court declslons just dis-
cussed. In 1925 the Court of Industrial RelaLions was abolished by an 
act of the hansas legislature, effective March 10, 1925.e4 fhe ov1er0 
arrl duti~ still po s s essed oy tne court were transferred to a pul, le 
service con:mis sion, cons is ting of 5 members appointed o_y the ,overnor 
by and with the consent of the senate . rhen, in 1933 , the public s rvice 
co · ssion was superceaed bJ tne present ljorporation Jomrnis:;ion, a budy 
prir,cipally concerned witn vhe supervision arr.. re ula ion of co,nmon 
carriers arrl puo.Lic ntilities in the sta.te . s we sc,,w durin tne dit- -
cussion on tne legal asJects of the industrial court , rJ,e l nitect States 
Suoreme vourt oid not touch the subject of compu.Lsory rol tr·ut_un ln 
public utilities and cormnon carriers . It can orotiao y 1:,e i:ild , Jr~n, 
tnat if t. e state now ould atte:not w exerc · :..e ::., icb Jh, e o er i'L~f..:e 
a.c · .:_ t · ,s t.ney wo d oe pneld by tne ourt. 1 ne o t-r e 
i:.he r d.OOa.6 fr.d st rial Co rt, act wri.ict1 ,1ere left to it r~1 ~r r.., .e : .ff 
cases, .o,ever, ,ave ever· been use. ::sir.ce. 
n.1.s , 'vher , is st.or/ of tne an.eas 1d1 _.ria] /) r_, . , cu; 
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been seen how the strained conditions rollowing the T1vorld ifar led to 
t .e formation of t 1e court, the establishment of tnat court anu the way 
in which it worked, and its final handling by t~ buprerne Court . It might 
be well to just say this as to why the court was no more successful, nor 
longer-lived than it was. A creation like the inaustrial court, born in 
times of stress l functions best in those times because it is created to 
suit those peculiar needs and circumstances . After 1920 i dustrial strife 
in the United States declined, the same thing being true in Kansas 
especially. Therefore, there was less and less reason for the existence 
of suah a tribunal as the L1dustrial court . coupled with this, the 
opposition of the Supreme Court as to tne scope tne industrial court 
covered Ly its pub .... ic interest principle was just to mucn !'or it. 
It can I t be said t11a t the court didn 't ao some booo, and that 
it. was an abject failure. It admittedly wasn 't entirely successful in 
preventing all strin:es and la-..:ior aisturba.1c es, out the ones w1.ich 
happened mi6hL have been much :-1or e destruc ui ve if the court haun 
I t 
have enforced the anti-picketing and. indmidation features of t11e law. 
Then those cases volunta~ily sub ·tted to the industrial court un-
doubtedly prevented many disputes from turnin5 into strikes. The court, 
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